

THE LEHIGH REVIEW



A Student Journal of the Liberal Arts

VOLUME TWO

FALL 1900

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Each year, Lehigh University publishes *The Lehigh Review*, a student journal of the liberal arts. Every issue contains some of the best writing by Lehigh students.

Any scholarly articles, creative essays, or book reviews may be submitted. The Review does not ordinarily accept fiction or poetry.

All submissions should reflect the breadth and depth of the liberal arts. We are especially interested in submissions that draw from the content or methodology of more than one discipline. The *Review* expects students to submit well-researched work that exceeds mere reflection or synthesis of existing sources. Submissions should demonstrate imagination, original insight, and mastery of the subject.

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THE SECOND SECOND COMING

And what rough beast, its hour come round at last,
Slouches towards Bethlehem to be born?

(W. B. Yeats, "The Second Coming," 1921)

The 1993 issue of *The Lehigh Review* is the second number of the second series of Lehigh's student journal of the liberal arts. This doubly derivative character may be accidental and count for nothing. But this seems unlikely. To take an obvious example, the student and faculty collective responsible for the issue decided to succumb to the lure of inventing tradition and to republish, as did last year's number, a piece from the journal's original incarnation. The offering this time is a suitably weird short story (or is it, in fact, a work of fiction?) from the 1939 volume, Edwin Klein's "Out of Time — Out of Mind." The piece illustrates one of the more bizarre forms that student-faculty collaboration can assume. Its theme of time travel also connects nicely with the heightened historical sense that revivalism entails, while reminding us not to take the burden of history too seriously.

Now that we are definitely back, we find that a journal of the liberal arts at Lehigh requires no elaborate justification. This time the response to our call for papers was again a large number of interesting and diverse submissions. The competition for acceptance was stiff and the journal can boast of presenting some of the best writing by Lehigh students. But now, happily, the "some" needs special emphasis. Over the past year there has been a remarkable resurgence of interest in writing at Lehigh. The explanation for this new literary embarrassment of riches remains unclear. It may be just the happenstance of the technology of desk-top publishing and the mentality of the academic fanzine reaching Lehigh at about the same time. We have found no hard evidence that the upsurge owes anything to a corporate productivity plan for total quality control that the university has begun to implement.

Several new volumes for student writing have sprung up over the last year or so — *Outposts*, a journal of feminism and multiculturalism; *Vox*, a monthly newsletter from students in the Department of Art and Architecture; *Eyelevel*, an arts and design magazine produced by students in the same department; and the *Eudaemonist*, a journal of political discourse generated by an independent student cell. And, of course, *Amaranth*, Lehigh's student magazine of creative writing and the fine arts, continues its well-established tradition.

In addition to this welter of new titles, after a hiatus of several years,

the English Department last spring revived the Williams Senior Essay Prizes for quality writing. These prizes are awarded in a variety of categories, and one set is reserved for the best essays accepted for *The Lehigh Review*. (May we have the special envelope, please.) We are pleased to announce that this year's prize winners are: Bradley Foss, "Das Kapital and the Development of the Navajo Economy"; Jeremi Roth, "Second Sight"; and Gretchen Beidler, "Molloy: A Parody of the Jungian Mind."

We hope that the quickening of interest in writing at Lehigh can be sustained without waiting for a stormy night and rushing to that fiendish laboratory on Mountain Top campus (to commune with the spirit of Alferd Packer.) As always, we need more faculty to encourage their students who write first class papers to submit them to the *Review*. We encourage submissions from across the entire University, not just from traditional liberal arts departments. And we need more students to work on the *Review's* editorial board. If you are interested in submitting your work or working on the *Review*, please contact any of the people on the editorial board. One way or the other you will get to see your name in print — almost as good as in lights on South Mountain!

The Lehigh Review is grateful to the offices of the Provost and the Dean of the College of Arts and Science for their continuing financial support. A special thanks to Kristopher Takacs for his yeoman services as layout whiz — he is the recipient of *The Lehigh Review's* No Slouching in Bethlehem award. Finally, we asked Dean Gunton to provide a few inspirational words for this issue. As you can see, he did not disappoint us.

Faculty Steering Committee
August, 1993

"Go
For
It!"

— Dean James Gunton
College of Arts and Science



CONTENTS

Out of Time — Out of Mind.....	1
<i>Edwin Klein</i>	
Talking to Myself.....	5
<i>Howard R. Ernst</i>	
A Gentleman Ought Not.....	11
<i>Jeremi Roth</i>	
James Madison: Defender of the "Sacred Principle of Religious Liberty".....	23
<i>Jennifer Loxman</i>	
*Das Kapital and the Development of the Navajo Economy.....	45
<i>Brad Foss</i>	
Monkey: The Three are One.....	53
<i>Annemarie Connor</i>	
To What Extent were the Surrealists Influenced by Freud?.....	61
<i>Cynthia Esteban</i>	
Truth or Media: Do Varieties of Coke and Pepsi Really Taste Different or are the Advertisers Just Fooling Us?.....	71
<i>Lori Akawie</i>	
Unhappily Ever After.....	83
<i>Joanne M. Nokland</i>	
Operation Restore Hope: Three Phases of Propaganda.....	93
<i>Court Harson</i>	
*Molloy: A Parody of the Jungian Mind.....	103
<i>Gretchen Beidler</i>	
Chinese Vulnerability and Western Expansion.....	121
<i>Cynthia Esteban</i>	
Ayurvedic Medicine.....	133
<i>Ruchira Garg</i>	
*Second Sight.....	145
<i>Jeremi Roth</i>	

* Williams Prize Winner

Out of Time — Out of Mind *Edwin Klein*

Reprinted from *The Lehigh Review*, 1939

You can say that I am crazy if you wish — everyone else seems to think so — but I swear I am telling the truth. It was three minutes before four when I entered Professor Benton's laboratory on the day of his accident or whatever you prefer to call it. I remember the time because my physical chemistry report was due at four — you know Professor Benton was a stickler for punctuality. I knew he wouldn't accept it after four so I had hurried to his laboratory. He was funny about things like that — I remember how he used to say in class that Time was nature's most important factor.

I suppose I entered his room with almost an air of triumph, because my report was on time. He was working on something in the corner of the room and didn't appear to hear me enter. I had to cough and shuffle around a bit to attract his attention, and when he finally turned he seemed rather annoyed at the interruption.

"Yes, yes, just leave it on my desk," he snapped, irascibly I thought. He looked rather strange — almost crazy, twisted, mousy pinched features, eyes burning with a light I had never seen before. I hesitated an instant then laid my report on his desk and had turned to leave the room when he called me back.

"See here," he said, "I have a task for you to do." His voice had taken on a note of authority that I am sure it never had in the classroom — authority that was further emphasized by a pistol which he leveled at me — his eyes glaring over the sights.

He gestured with the gun towards a heavy oak chair, equipped with heavy, leather straps, which was securely anchored to the floor. He indicated that I should seat myself into his chair. With a few swift motions the Professor had me securely strapped into position. Then he stepped back from the chair and leered at me with a diabolic grin that drew his thin lips over yellow teeth.

"My colleagues all think I'm quite mad, you know," he remarked as he prepared a hypodermic syringe filling it with a dark, viscous liquid. "That's why I was forced to secure your assistance by such high handed methods. You aren't one of my best pupils, but I think you are sufficiently apt to serve my purpose admirably."

In the next few minutes he had explained a lot about isotopic quasi-elements that emanated strange rays cutting chords across the arch of time and how the human mind could travel along the chord as an electrical impulse travels along a wire. I didn't even pretend to understand most of what he said. He showed me a mass of complicated equipment that he had hidden behind a screen. Its aluminum and copper parts glinted evilly in the light of the mercury vapor lamps illuminating the room. He explained that it was the element disintegrator that was to liberate the time-crossing rays.

"And so you see I have conquered Time. And you, willing or nay, shall assist me in the crucial test, for I intend to transport my mind a billion years in the future."

He bared my arm to insert the hypodermic need. I lunged violently against the straps that bound me. I started to scream for help.

"No need for that," snapped Benton impatiently. "The college was so kind as to make this room soundproof so that my experimenting would not disturb the rest of the faculty. You will find this drug harmless enough. Just a scopolamine derivative that will serve to numb your conscious mind and leave you abnormally receptive to my thoughts which I shall endeavor to transmit over a billion years of time. As I explained my mind must be detached from my material self to make the journey and must merge with the first intelligent being I encounter on the time beam. Therefore I will be without identity and the thoughts you will receive, dear pupil, will be in truth the thoughts of that being via my mind and the time beam. Cheerio!" and he plunged the needle into my arm. A pleasant lethargic feeling took command of my senses and I drifted into unconsciousness.

...

I was in a large hall filled with a soft glowing light that seemed to come from everywhere at once. Oddly enough everything was perfectly familiar. My whole life had been spent in that room. I was Jakar, one of the Intelligents. It was good that I was an Intelligent. Many others like me occupied the room for this was the hall of the embryo Intelligents who upon reaching maturity would be absorbed by the Intellect. We were brains surrounded by soft protoplasm that transmitted all necessary impressions of sound, sight, hearing and smell during our preliminary experience. I, Jakar, had reached maturity. Soon I would lose all identity in the multi-brained Intellect which controlled Society. I had been created for that purpose. Since my conception I had been subjected to concentrated implied knowledge so that I would be prepared for my niche in the many-phased Control.

A vestige of emotion not quite removed by evolution made me feel pride in being an Intelligent rather than a Worker. Workers were necessary to perform the mechanical processes of Society, but they were sorry creatures. In the last billion years their physical characteristics had not changed appreciably. They still had trunks containing their vital organs, four appendages for purposes of locomotion and mechanical skills, a bulbous protrusion contained their sensory centers, plus sight receiving and olfactory organs, and an oral cavity by which they fed. Their minds were completely subjugated to the Intellect and all emotions detrimental to Society such as love, fear, hate, or pity had been removed so that they were perfect instruments for the Intellect.

One of the Workers entered the room to bathe me in the nutritive fluid that furnished fuel for my growth. I felt the stimulation of the liquid reach every cell. The archaic physiologies of the Workers were not adapted to this form of nourishment but had to absorb through their oral cavities quantities of synthetic gruel similar to the food used by the Ancients before the Age of Science.

During my bath, I felt an impulse from the Intellect. It was not the usual

influx of knowledge, but a summons. The time had come for the merging with the Intellect. I felt a vague feeling of satisfaction; my preparatory existence was completed. A Worker carefully lifted me from my place and stepped into a small tube car. We sped swiftly towards the Vault of the Intellect. This was my first glimpse of life outside the Hall of Embryos. We passed Workers preparing a new passageway from the plastic that is the basis of all our construction. This plastic can be made rigid or flexible, transparent or opaque. When completed, the plastic transmits uniformly the blue-green light that eliminates shadow and sight-sense fatigue.

We entered the Vault of the Supreme Control. A vast pulsating mass occupied the larger portion of the immense room. I was borne to my position. I was content. In a moment I would be subjected to a blast of mental energy that would forever destroy my identity and weld me into an integral part of the Intellect.

• • •

I fought my way back to consciousness. For a moment I sat there dazed. I tried to move but the straps held me firmly. My memory slowly returned. My head throbbed dully and I was sick from the drug. The hands of my watch stood at twelve-thirty-five. I had been in the chair for over eight hours.

I could see Professor Benton seated in a chair similar to mine. His eyes were open and he was breathing regularly. I spoke to him. He did not answer. I assumed that he had not fully recovered from the strain of the experiment. Minutes passed. I spoke again. I called louder and my voice shook for I suddenly realized the truth. I realized that the mind of the Professor who had conquered Time was sealed forever in the Intellect — a billion years in the future.

Talking to Myself *Howard R. Ernst*

As I walked in the cold night air, Autumn's leaves played freely at my feet. Heaven's stars were nothing but distant blurs behind the thick fog, which engulfed me. I was comfortable, as my winter shell protected me from the changing seasons. However, my steps were nervous and quick for these darkened streets were not safe.

In the distance, cutting through the fog, a neon light beamed brightly. As the light grew brighter, I was consoled by the realization that my destination was growing near. The familiar neon sign which reads "The Grotto" shone upon me as I opened the restaurant door. Cold night air followed me through the door as I descended the stairs into the cave-like building.

My eyes adjusted slowly to the candlelit room. Straining, I could barely make out two figures at the far end of the restaurant. As I neared the figures they took the shape of two elderly men. Both men sat in silence facing the bar. I joined these strangers in a drink and the following is a description of the conversation we had.

Without turning his head the first man began to speak. This man with ears as big as an elephant spoke in a soft scratchy voice:

Some say my name is Lao Tsu and claim I am as old as the ancient mountains.
Perhaps you have heard of Lao Tsu?

Before I was given time to answer he went on to say:

Certainly in your university you have been taught my name, studied the *Tao Te Ching*, and even been lectured in the way of the Tao. You have probably been tested on your ability to memorize the circumstances of my alleged life. What I am here to tell you is that the Tao that can be graded on a 'curve' is not the Tao.

With tired eyes Lao Tsu turned and recited a story. He said:

In an ancient stream there was once a turtle and a fish that met each day and played near the stream's surface. One particularly sun-drenched day, the turtle failed to meet his friend. The fish became worried and frantically swam from one end of the stream to the other searching for the turtle. Finally, as night began to fall, the turtle came swimming home.

The fish yelled out, "Where have you been, I have been worried sick about you."

The turtle explained, "When I was swimming down stream I came upon an old log floating at the water's surface. I climbed on the log and basked in the sun."

The fish thought, "The turtle must have meant he saw a log and swam near it basking in the sun."

The turtle then explained, "Later I climbed off the log and swam to the shore. I climbed on the bank and sat in the sun."

The fish thought, "The turtle must have meant he swam away from the log and then swam near the shore."

When the turtle had finished explaining he asked the fish if he had understood. The fish replied, "Yes."

Lao Tsu's eyes gazed away from mine as he said:

Your university teaches you the knowledge of the fish, not the turtle. With your diploma in hand you feel you know the ways of the world — but you know nothing of the world.

Lao Tsu slowly pulled away from the bar and walked around the room. As he passed each table he blew out the candle which illuminated it. When he blew out the last candle, darkness and silence filled the musty room. From the silence and darkness came a magnificent light. He said, "This is the Tao." Lao Tsu then touched the light to a candle and a small flame was produced. The flame threw shadows on the cave-like walls of the room. He pointed to the shadows and said:

Your society has taught you that shadows are a manifestation between the forces of light and dark. As a result, you see the world in a never-ending battle between the forces of good and evil. But I have shown you that the shadows on the wall are made of nothing but pure light.

Your "enlightened" society judges its very existence on the number of "things" it can possess and master. These "things" your society is obsessed with are merely shadows flickering on the cave wall. Your bewildered society is left with the hollow feeling of those that try to define their life by capturing straw dogs.

Living artfully is a matter of dancing in the shadows of life. Live life as if you are nothing but a shadow and you will realize that you are made of nothing but pure light. When the candle's flickering becomes the flickering of your heart, you will live a never-ending life of peace and harmony.

The old man's huge ears dragged on the floor as he walked back to the bar. Though we had talked for some time, I had yet to say a word. Before I was allowed to speak the second man began to say:

Lao Tsu tells of living life guided by the flickering of a candle. Though the candle's light enables me to find my drink, it does not offer me a fundamental principle by which to guide my life. Your society knows me as Confucius and my way is the way of the ancients.

Rising from his stool, Confucius walked around the room relighting the candles Lao Tsu had blown out. As he did this the Lehigh banners on the Grotto's dingy walls became visible. Confucius walked back to the bar and said:

Your society has created human factories called universities. By rewarding the competitive and crafty over the moral and virtuous, these factories are successful at producing technicians, businessmen and bureaucrats. While some factories produce widgets, the university produces people of "use." It creates rational minds suited for building, criticizing and recording the actions of others. The university's graduates have become "useful" tools of society instead of people of virtue. Ruled by greed and jealousy these people are not worthy of my friendship and have lost all sense of virtue.

The banners that adorn these walls are of more use to people than all the books in your engineering library. Perhaps you have seen the glass-covered tables of your university's cafe. Enshrined in those tables is a fragmented history of the traditions and rituals that your university has let die. Freshmen beanies, the death of calculus, and the old man in the mountain mean nothing to you. You have permitted your past to fade, and now you stumble through life bewildered and lost.

Lao Tsu was right in saying your society is plagued by a hollow feeling. However, he failed to realize the root of the infliction. Your society is tormented by the same despair that a child abandoned in the wilderness feels. Though the child may grow and live a long life, it is however a lost life. He will live and die

cut off from the ancients, unaware of the past and without the comfort of ritual. He has no chance of becoming virtuous and is more like an animal than a man. This is the state of your society. You are oblivious to the ancients' way, your rituals have lost meaning and your actions are governed by competition and greed, not virtue.

With a look of disgust, Confucius turned from me. Once again silence filled the room. It seemed as if time stood still as we sat without speaking. Finally, I could no longer stand the silence. These were the words I uttered to fill the void:

My aim is not to defend my society from your insightful criticism. I can not deny the empty feeling that runs so deep in my culture. The spiritual drought of my government, religion and institutions affects every aspect of my hollow life.

But the world in which I live is different from the world of Confucius and Lao Tsu. Nature, virtue and spirituality have been swallowed by the forces of technology, competition and science. In the name of "progress," man has created a system which destroys things of virtue and nature. With an unrelenting zeal my society chases the cave's lonely shadows.

In an attempt to master nature, we have isolated ourselves from it. The rhythms and cycles of nature have become foreign mysteries. Modern people do not believe that these mysteries should be embodied into their lives, but controlled. Lao Tsu, I ask you how can a people whose prosperity relies on destroying forests, polluting oceans and supporting wars be open to the Tao? My society is at war with the Tao, a war against ourselves, a war in which every victory is a blow against mankind.

Confucius, the same system that wars against Lao Tsu's Tao also wars against your ancient way. The virtue of people is no longer rewarded, but destroyed. Jesus, Gandhi, Socrates, Martin Luther King and many others paid for their virtue with their lives. Success in the modern world is judged on the basis of money, not morality. In a world where Donald Trump and Lee Iacocca are the measuring sticks of "success" there is no place for your noble path.

Blah! Blah! Blah! With an explosive racket my radio alarm clock sounds off. As I regain consciousness from my deep sleep a news broadcast blasts through the radio: "In last night's presidential debate Bill Clinton protected his 18-point lead by stressing environmental issues. President Bush tried to chip away at Clinton's lead by focusing on family values. Ross Perot claimed that during the course of the three-hour debate the deficit will increase by \$1 billion and claimed that this is the real issue facing America." As I turned the radio down and

prepared for class, my dreams began to fade. Lao Tsu's and Confucius' messages slipped away as I wondered what would be the curve on my Engineering 1 exam.

A Gentleman Ought Not *Jeremi Roth*

I have long considered the creative impulse to be a visit — a thing of grace, not commanded or owned so much as awaited, prepared for. A thing also, of mystery. 'Who is this, and what is here?' wonder Arthur's Knights at the sight of the Lady of Shalot.

Loreena McKennit, *The Visit*

The insight and judgment someone with good taste displays are valuable abilities, and they are especially valuable when directed toward those particular objects that are deemed worthy of displaying in museums. I am, of course, speaking of Art and the kind of taste buds we use on it: *aesthetic* taste. *Sensual* taste is a faculty given, in varying degrees of acuity, to all of us and makes the eating we do just to survive pleasurable (or unpleasurable); the aesthetic palate assesses our *visual* and *aural* consumption. This faculty of assessment gives us the ability to appreciate the symmetry and beauty of artworks and to develop a system of aesthetic perception by which we can judge the quality of their effect. It is a faculty that can assume a critical attitude toward our surroundings and enrich greatly our enjoyment of them.

Good aesthetic taste is hardly the simple ability to distinguish between good art and bad. Its negative gesture is much more potent: good taste is most importantly the ability to avoid the display of bad taste. But the second side of this coin has been cast curiously in contemporary aesthetic thought. Bad taste is not seen as an inability to taste, or even as peculiar or unorthodox judgments of taste, but rather as a surrender to or even consideration of pleasures that are not properly aesthetic. And the non-aesthetic includes anything of personal interest, any possessive instinct, and anything that is likely to cause one to break into a sweat. Good taste is a polite, internal, and intellectually driven sense that

regards only the overall unity of the work before it disinterestedly. This is the tyranny of the aesthetic attitude, and it is my claim that this rigid and suppressive limitation can produce only a gelded and troubled experience: gelded because so much that is important to us is forbidden, and troubled because those forbidden interests nevertheless force themselves, crippled and cheapened, into view.

Before I continue my protest, it seems appropriate to ground more firmly the significance of the aesthetic attitude. To do so, I must, of course, explore its history. It is not a concept that has gone unnoticed, and so I shall have lots of help, but the striking contrast between thought-about-art of the past and modern aesthetics and the fact that, chronologically, the contrast is so new, make a digression toward "the way things used to be" necessary.

The history of aesthetics is, of course, closely associated with the history of art. There was never a time in human history when art was not produced, but the *category* of objects we call Art is relatively young. Painting, sculpture, architecture, music, poetry, and dance were not always considered to be even nominally similar activities. In fact, we need turn back no further than the eighteenth century to find in the philosophy of art an attempt to gather artworks together under the heading "Art." The danger of anachronistically assuming a modern (post-eighteenth century) aesthetic attitude toward the art of the past is forcefully announced by Paul Kristeller, who asserts that "the 'philosophy of art' was invented in that comparatively recent period and can be applied to earlier phases of Western thought only with reservation."¹ Works of art as we think of them were produced in great quantities in classical Greece (of course), but there is no evidence to suggest that the various sculptures, buildings, poems, and plays that have survived were seen as activities *of the same kind* as they are today. They were appreciated as examples of fine craftsmanship in one medium or another, but they were not regarded as *peculiar* examples of human

activity, nor were they seen as different media expressing a common feature. They were special because they were produced by man, but for no other reason. The ancients spoke of art, but it was not a tightly defined concept. Kristeller points out that "When the Greek authors began to oppose Art to Nature, they thought of human activity in general."² Indeed, most treatises on artistic endeavors produced before the eighteenth century read like technical manuals.³ The principal value of such 'crafts' seemed to be their exhibition of fine craftsmanship. Beauty, a topic of such concern to eighteenth-century thinkers, is not even applied to these products. It is reserved mostly for the Greeks' main concern — man's inner being — not the work of his hands. Beauty "was never neatly or consistently distinguished from the moral good."⁴

There is a *lot* of history between classical Greece and the eighteenth century, but neither the scholars of the high Middle Ages nor the humanists of the Renaissance (nor anyone else) seem to have grouped the visual arts consistently together.⁵ Even Vasari, who by publishing his famous collection of biographies attempted to establish a sense of tradition and progress for 'artists' by patterning his Academy of Art after the literary Academies then in existence, seems to have been motivated not by the desire to develop an overarching category of Art but by "the ambition...to share in the traditional prestige of literature."⁶ He got his students to begin to look back (and forward), but, again, he asks technical questions rather than aesthetic ones. Artists remained craftsmen and needed only to develop skill in the manipulation of their medium. This skill would enable them to produce works that were pleasant to look at or called to mind the things that were important to the people they lived among — God(s), nature, heroes/saints, even beautiful women or men — but they did not try to anticipate a disciplined aesthetic viewer. Neither did the viewer of that day approach each work focused tightly on its impersonal, aesthetic qualities. *Genres* and their particular rules were all-important, and these rules were not

aesthetic but “were formulated out of the conviction that the genres, like the genera of natural objects, ‘have their immutable and constant forms, their specific shape and function.’”⁷ The things you can physically make clay and marble *do* concerned sculptors; painters just wanted to know about paint. Neither tried to learn from the other: they were different creatures.

The most significant integration of the *production* of art came with the grandeur of Louis XIV’s France. The separate arts flourished during that era, but more important, Kristeller notes, was the parallel “institutional development which followed in many respects the earlier Italian model, but was guided by a conscious governmental policy and [was] hence more centralized and consistent than had been the case in Italy.”⁸ Academies flourished, they began to be seen as having similar goals, and Kristeller could declare that “on the threshold of the eighteenth century we are very close to the modern system of the Fine Arts.”⁹ An all-inclusive philosophy of Art was to replace the medium-specific qualities of the discrete arts. The term ‘beautiful’ was applied less often to moral decorum and more often in a broad sense to a certain category of artifacts, those produced by painters, sculptors, architects, musicians, and poets.

Thus we return to the problem posed at the outset: the aesthetic attitude. Jerome Stolnitz, focusing on the British thinkers of the eighteenth century, sees the fledgling theories of beauty uprooted or at least pruned by the innovation of “aesthetics.” The advent of the aesthetic attitude and its characteristically disinterested attention to form and quality, with which all of us are now thoroughly indoctrinated, was a striking departure from the chimeric quest for essences that could be called beautiful. “What is now an unthinking gesture,” he says, “is the result, several times removed, of a concerted effort of reason in the eighteenth century.”¹⁰ Beauty had proven to be an extremely difficult term to define, and the Britons of the period, all the while debunking various of each others’ attempts to do so, began to look for a new way to confront art, one that

would end their embarrassing inability to agree. That new approach, Stolnitz says, involved a turn inward. Calling it "the Copernican revolution in aesthetics," he cites "the introduction of the psychological, introspective approach — 'a diligent examination of our passions in our own breasts.'"¹¹ The political philosophies of Hobbes and Locke were very much in the air, and, scared by the harsh primitivism of the former, thinkers welcomed the intellectual confidence and stylistic delicacy of the latter: "The British were buoyed by the Lockean conviction that, as Hutcheson put it, 'we need little reasoning or argument, since certainty is only attainable by distinct attention to what we are conscious happens in our minds.'"¹² Justified assurance was needed above all, and thus individual considerations had to be exorcised. The aestheticians of the day tried, as much as possible, to step outside themselves and critically examine their own reactions. The class system was beginning to weaken: more and more, men were being seen as basically the same. Disciplined introspection and intellectual honesty would chart the trackless expanses in which they were lost. Their line of reasoning was that by abandoning all personal interest in the object, any possessive instinct, the viewer could more nearly approach objectivity. All else inevitably tends towards sensual, ungentlemanly desire on which no stable theories can be based. Personal backgrounds and fetishes would taint the purity of the reactions. There was in their descriptions of the aesthetic experience an almost pathological aversion to any kind of feeling stronger than bemused delight. Everything around them became a proper object of the aesthetic senses, but their reaction to that everything was dry, calculated, and academic. Thus we hear Addison say things like "A man of polite imagination [has] a kind of property in everything he sees: ...he looks upon the world, as it were in another light, and discovers in it a multitude of charms, that conceal themselves from the generality of mankind,"¹³ or "Here the characteristic object is not 'the prospect of fields and meadows,' but rather 'a demonstration'..., which must be 'worked out'

by dint of thinking."¹⁴ They claimed not to need reasoning or argument, only the autonomous, uninhibited application of all their cerebral powers. And nothing else. This disinterestedness is the crux of the aesthetic attitude. Resonating with the scientism of the day, man's intellectual faculty — cold, hard, unyielding reason — was seen as the only way to systematize the vagaries of unsettlingly animal-like desire. They vigilantly watched their reaction to art and, by a sort of trial-and-error refinement, honed the aesthetic experience into an activity that could not be even sentimental, let alone passionate. Any kind of personal interest, especially possessiveness or the desire to "have" an object, was seen as base, even dangerous. Nothing cute or personally pleasurable could be artistic. (We can see the current results of this thinking in the sneers men like Norman Rockwell and Andrew Lloyd Webber elicit.) Shaftesbury, a contemporary of Addison, declares that gratification of such coarse impulses "is like that 'of the inferior creatures'... when they seek food. It presupposes and cannot occur apart from 'eager desires, wishes and hopes,' which are not 'suitable' to the 'refined contemplation of beauty.'"¹⁵

But while this attitude was to remain, no system of art appreciation could exist on such a rarefied basis for long. It was as though *art* had been reduced to its lowest common denominator during its transformation to *Art*. There had to be something else, and the eighteenth-century aesthetes soon found it. As interesting as the Copernican revolution in aesthetics and the eclipse of beauty was the parallel enunciation of a sentiment much darker and much more troublesome. As "beautiful" was applied more and more often to objects that were formally ordered, displaying symmetry and harmony,¹⁶ or that produced feelings of cheerfulness, sweetness, and gaiety,¹⁷ (all of these) inexpressive qualities the properly disinterested viewer could appreciate, there was articulated a category of qualities that aroused deeper, more murky feelings. The clarity and crystalline lifelessness of the beautiful were placed opposite the

obscurity, boundless size, and frightening expressiveness of *the sublime*. Rugged, dark, and gloomy, sublime things provoked not a cheerful, relaxed aesthetic investigation but a feeling of terror, an astonished rush of the need for self-preservation.¹⁸

It is hard to explain the sublime quickly but perhaps an example will do: the first lines of Shelley's "Mont Blanc" conjure the spookiness and not-quite-visible turbulence of the experience that accompanies the sublime:

The everlasting universe of things
Flows through the mind, and rolls its rapid waves,
Now dark — now glittering — now reflecting gloom —
Now lending splendour, where from secret springs
The source of human thought its tribute brings
Of water, — with a sound but half its own.
Such as a feeble brook will oft assume
In the wild woods, among the mountains lone,
Where waterfalls around it leap for ever,
Where woods and winds contend, and a vast river
Over its rocks ceaselessly bursts and raves.¹⁹

There is a malevolent sense of danger, of a blind power threatening to overflow the artistic banks of rhyme and meter. Sources and secret origins, nearly too wild to consider at all, evoked feelings of fear and insignificance. Personality and "human thought" are nothing but a "feeble stream" compared with the hostile force and overwhelming vastness of the sublime.

This was a deeply felt fear, a much more powerful experience than the beautiful could bring, and aestheticians were quite taken with it. While the line between it and the beautiful was only gradually solidified, it developed alongside the increasingly sterile conceptions of beauty and soon became a powerful counterpoint that had to be dealt with. In fact, according to Stolnitz, its rising prominence was "the single most potent force in dislodging 'beauty' from its formerly unchallenged primacy among the value-categories."²⁰ It was an exciting, invigorating feeling and it seemed to balance the safety and patness of the beautiful.

But this is where it is possible to say that the many kinds of interests man has in art objects, denied him by the eighteenth-century insistence on disinterestedness, have come bubbling to the surface, trashy and deformed. The aesthete's embrace of the sublime seems forced and fundamentally girdled. It is as though they *consciously* felt that there had to be more to art appreciation than the genteel poses they were describing and tentatively and half-heartedly allowed the description of the sublime to develop. For their delight in the fear of the sublime really was half-hearted. There is a distinction drawn quite explicitly and forcefully between the "sort of" scary and the "truly" scary. Burke, who was according to Stolnitz "the first to discern fearfulness in the sublime," says of this sense of threat that "When danger or pain press too nearly, they are incapable of giving any delight...but at certain distances, and with certain modifications, they may be, and they are delightful...."²¹ With such timid qualifications, their exultation over "terror" and "horror" seems staged and noisy. They could not allow fear of the unknown or the vastly large to crack the shell of disinterestedness they had labored so hard to construct. The unknown cannot be "worked out by dint of reasoning." There is a point where uneasiness becomes real fear, where the *thought of* self-preservation is replaced by the *necessity for* self-preservation, and they had to barricade off the territory beyond that point, placing a warning sign reading "simply terrible."²² One is reminded, to use a contemporary example, of Chris Burden arranging to be crucified, but with sterilized, extra-sharp nails, on his Volkswagen instead of a cross, by careful observers instead of Roman soldiers.²³

When this timidity is illuminated, the entire structure of aesthetic disinterestedness, of inward-looking, genteel diffidence appears to have created a situation in which much of the power of art is ignored. The sublime is cheapened when it is appropriated by an obstinately doctrinaire, cognitive aesthetic theory. Might not all art be cheapened by this girdle? A theory that

tells us to look at a depiction of a naked woman and see only light, shadow, and shapes and forbids us to tap our feet to music (unless we are properly “counting”) cannot exult in the power of the uneasiness, paralysis, and hinted-at horror that the sublime arouses in us. Even if we are affected deeply, we are not supposed to be really *scared*; if we are, we have to hide it. This is much ado about nothing, even if the ado is polite and elegantly phrased.

But this does not mean that the sublime is an inherently cheap category. There is a way it can be truly frightening. More importantly, it can threaten the beauty/sublime distinction and perhaps enter and recharge the domain of the aesthete, resulting in a less stratified aesthetic experience. Art can be dangerous in its power to force us to think in ways we are afraid to. Awareness of our vulnerability and mortality is just one of those ways. It can erode beliefs, cheapen heroes, and ridicule egoism and self-esteem. To again return to a contemporary source, Robert Smithson said of the sublime that its “eternity brings about the dissolution of belief in temporal histories, empires, revolutions and counter-revolutions — all becomes ephemeral and in a sense unreal.”²⁴ We might see our idols portrayed as no better than ourselves; we might see ourselves portrayed as no better than that which we despise. The ground shakes beneath us; the handrail leading us down the stairs disappears.

And the importance of such blows to our pride can go one step further. Our ability to counter or resist such attacks can be a powerful thing, but the first movement of the sublime, the fear by which we are made to feel small, is eclipsed by a second movement, by which we are assured that we may be small but are nevertheless able to weather the storm. Our power over such attacks is possessive in a psychological way, because we have conquered. We realize that handrails were comforting but we no longer need them. In direct opposition to the attitude of aesthetic detachment, we can assume a baldly appropriative stance, consuming what each work has to give us with appetite and enjoying, as

did the ancients, works for their craftsmanship and sensual beauty. Hunger has always been acknowledged to be the best seasoning. There is a wonder and a mystery to the creation *and* perception of art. “‘Who is this, and what is here?’ wonder Arthur’s Knights.” Inborn skill and the divine ecstasy of creation eclipse the reserve and delicacy of the aesthete. We can glory in our appetite while observing *all* the passions in our breasts.

The danger of ignoring these kinds of interest was brought to light in a painfully sharp way by the controversy surrounding the NEA-sponsored Mapplethorpe show. The way Mapplethorpe’s art was defended seemed somehow ridiculous. That obviously homoerotic and sacrilegious works had to be defended on a purely formalistic level just did not seem right. A crucifix dangling in a jar of urine has to be something more than an experiment with light, color, and form. Jesse Helms and his friends were partly right concerning this art: it is dangerous. Whether government agencies should or should not sponsor art of this sort is another question entirely. It cannot be good to ignore what those Mapplethorpe works really are: criticism of Christianity and homophobia. This art forces everyone who comes into contact with it to ask painful questions and causes powerful, inchoate reactions on a level that is anything but cerebral. It is a struggle between very vigorous and deeply-seated value systems, and the resolution of that struggle, *whichever side the final decision favors*, is a valuable experience. A Christian or homophobe who is able to maintain his beliefs in the face of such attacks is stronger than he was before; one who is encouraged to forsake those beliefs has been introduced to a whole new realm of living. Both are changed in a fundamental way. This is how art is dangerous and powerful. This is how life progresses — as a struggle — and the strong become stronger. It is every bit as important as the struggle to survive, and it is every bit as fierce. The struggle can be painful and frightening, but always precious. If we face these dangers, we always get what we pay for.

NOTES

- (1) Paul O. Kristeller, "The Modern System of the Arts: A Study in the History of Aesthetics," *The Journal of the History of Ideas*, v.12 (1951) p. 496.
- (2) *Ibid.*, p. 499.
- (3) Jerome Stolnitz, "'Beauty': Some Stages in the History of an Idea," *The Journal of the History of Ideas*, v.22 (1961) p.187.
- (4) Kristeller, p. 499.
- (5) *Ibid.*, p. 508, 510.
- (6) *Ibid.*, p. 515.
- (7) Stolnitz, p. 186.
- (8) Kristeller, p. 522.
- (9) *Ibid.*, p. 527. Kristeller mentions specifically Perrault's *Le Cabinet des Beaux Arts* of 1660.
- (10) Stolnitz, p. 186.
- (11) Jerome Stolnitz, "On the Origins of 'Aesthetic Disinterestedness'" *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, v.20 (1961) p.139.
- (12) Stolnitz, "Beauty..." p. 189.
- (13) Stolnitz, "On the Origins..." p. 142.
- (14) *Ibid.*, p. 141.
- (15) *Ibid.*, p. 140.
- (16) Stolnitz, "Beauty..." p. 192.
- (17) *Ibid.*, p. 200.
- (18) Stolnitz, "On the Origins..." p. 135.
- (19) Shelley, "Mont Blanc: Lines Written in the Vale of Chamouni," *Shelley's Poetry and Prose* (Norton, 1977), p. 89.
- (20) Stolnitz, "Beauty..." p. 191.
- (21) Stolnitz, "On the Origins..." p. 136.
- (22) *Ibid.*
- (23) Chris Burden, "Trans-fixed," 1974. In "Chris Burden: Through the Night Softly," *Arts Magazine* (March, 1975) p. 68.
- (24) Robert Smithson, "Letter to the Editor, *Artforum*, October 1967," *The Writings of Robert Smithson*. ed. Nancy Holt (New York University Press: New York, 1979) p. 38.

James Madison: Defender of the “Sacred Principle of Religious Liberty” *Jennifer Lowman*

Introduction

James Madison has often been portrayed as the Father of the United States Constitution, but his contribution to solidifying the foundations of religious liberty in American society has received less attention. Although Thomas Jefferson’s call for a “wall of separation between Church and State” has commanded more recognition from scholars and the general public alike, Madison played a tremendous role in elucidating the principle of “liberty of conscience” and the social and spiritual advantages of a disestablished church. Despite the fact that Madison left scant evidence in his voluminous writings about personal religious beliefs, he served as a powerful advocate for free exercise of religion.

Four specific events exemplify Madison’s work to ensure religious liberty.¹ As a young delegate to the Virginia Revolutionary Convention of 1776, Madison secured passage of a revision in Article Sixteen of the Virginia Declaration of Rights. Instead of accepting assurance of mere “toleration” for religious beliefs, Madison pressed for and obtained protection against governmental infringement upon “free exercise of religion.”

Less than ten years later, Madison opposed a “Bill Establishing a Provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion” proposed in the Virginia General Assembly. This bill prompted Madison to write “Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments,” which was a powerful statement for the superiority of an individual’s relationship with God over civil authority, as well as a discourse on the corrupting power of ecclesiastical establishments on both government and religion. Madison then helped secure the passage of

Jefferson's "Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom," which guaranteed a person's right to worship without governmental intervention.

Finally, Madison was involved in drafting the First Amendment clauses concerning religion. Madison helped formulate the final version of the First Amendment which reads in part: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." Madison thereby obtained protection against a national religion and obtained official recognition of the "unalienable" right to religious liberty.

Intellectual Influences

It is virtually impossible to determine exactly how Madison arrived at his views on religious liberty and ecclesiastical establishments because he never identified specific influences. Educated speculation, however, has led many scholars to point to the schooling he received from his first two tutors and his experience as an undergraduate at the College of New Jersey.²

At the age of eleven, Madison boarded at Donald Robertson's school. Robertson was a Scottish preacher who had been educated at Aberdeen and the University of Edinburgh. Madison studied English, Greek, and Roman classics, as well as arithmetic, algebra, geometry, and the "new science."³ More importantly, Madison probably read the work of such Enlightenment philosophers as Montaigne, Montesquieu, and Locke.

In 1767 Madison left Robertson's school to return home, where he resumed his studies under the Reverend Thomas Martin "who lived with the Madisons as a 'family-teacher'."⁴ Madison spent two years under Martin's tutelage and decided to attend Princeton University at the age of eighteen. Martin's enthusiasm for Princeton doubtless influenced Madison's choice. Many historians view this move as a momentous step in Madison's political development. William Lee Miller, for example, notes:

It does not, of course, always matter where one goes to college or whether one goes at all...but for Madison, by all reports and influences, it mattered a great deal that he went to the College of New Jersey and went there at the time he did.⁵

At the time of Madison's entrance to Princeton, it had become a stronghold of "New Light" Presbyterians, a "kind of West Point for dissenting Presbyterians" with a Whiggish political bent.⁶ Presbyterian Princeton also stood staunchly opposed to the establishment of religion (i.e., governmental support of a chosen religion by taxation regardless of a person's religious beliefs).⁷ When Madison attended the university, Princeton's stated goal was to "share in the instruction of the Youth...to cherish the spirit of liberty and free inquiry; and not only to permit, but even to encourage their right of private judgment."⁸ In Madison's day, Princeton was not only the "seedbed of sedition" Tory opponents claimed it to be but also an institution which taught "freedom and ordered government through the pursuit of virtue."⁹

The one person who most typified the Princetonian aims was its president, John Witherspoon. Witherspoon, who had been at the University of Edinburgh, was a Presbyterian minister grounded in the Scottish "Common Sense" philosophy which held that people have instinctive, "common sense" beliefs which can lead them to moral choices. Having battled the power of the synods of the Presbyterian Kirk over individual congregations in Scotland, he had an "instinctive suspicion of 'lordly domination and sacerdotal tyranny.'"¹⁰ Madison came into close contact with Witherspoon as a senior because the president presided over most of the senior classwork.

While at Princeton, Madison studied not only math, Latin, Greek, and natural philosophy but also the "Law of Nature and Nations." Madison gained greater familiarity with the Enlightenment philosophers Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu, and Harrington and their beliefs in the natural rights of man. In addition, he read such social critics as Addison, Swift, and Pope. The environ-

ment of Princeton itself encouraged and cherished liberty of thought and the studying of the proper relationship between “religion and ethics.”¹¹ Madison thus spent his formative intellectual years in the midst of Enlightenment thought and anti-establishment Protestantism. These two elements, along with eighteenth century rationalism, according to Ralph Ketcham, had the most significant impact on Madison’s later advocacy of religious liberty. Ketcham contends that Witherspoon’s “Common Sense” views and the rationalism of eighteenth century philosophy combined to help Madison formulate his belief about the importance of freedom of conscience.¹²

Early Views on Freedom of Religion

Madison returned home to Virginia in 1772, bringing back with him a “burning concern about the plight of dissenters and strong Whiggish view critical of British measures toward the colonies.”¹³ His ideas on ecclesiastical establishments and religious liberty were first enunciated in his letters to a classmate from Princeton, William Bradford of Pennsylvania. To understand the context of these letters, however, one must first have some knowledge of the Virginia religious landscape in the mid-eighteenth century.

The Anglican Church was the established religion in Virginia, as in England, while Madison was a young man. The Book of Common Prayer was the mandated liturgy of all churches and a variety of laws existed requiring Anglican observance. The commonwealth often enforced these laws to silence dissenting Protestants. From the Great Awakening to the 1740s, a number of different religious sects arose in Virginia, especially the “New Light” Presbyterians and the Baptists. These groups protested the governmental support for Anglicanism imposed by the province of Virginia. Baptists in particular insisted upon total religious freedom. By the 1760s, many Baptist clergymen were being arrested and jailed because they refused to obtain state licenses to preach (or

preached despite being denied such licenses) or because they refused to preach in authorized areas. These dissenting sects also were adamant in their desire for complete separation of Church and State, believing that God's supreme spiritual authority took precedence over man-made laws.

Madison visited a number of imprisoned Baptist preachers and was impressed with their spiritual fervor and enthusiasm. This feeling prompted Madison to write to Bradford that:

Poverty and Luxury prevail among all sorts [in Virginia]: Pride ignorance and Knavery among the Priesthood and Vice and Wickedness among the Laity. This is bad enough But It is not the worst I have to tell you. That diabolical Hell conceived principle of persecution rages among some and to their eternal Infamy the Clergy can furnish their quota of Imps for such business. This vexes me the most of any thing whatever. There are at this [time?] in the adjacent County not less than 5 or 6 well meaning men in close Goal for publishing their religious Sentiments which in the main are very orthodox.¹⁴

Longing to "breathe your free air [of Pennsylvania]," Madison concluded this letter of January 24, 1774 entreating Bradford "to pity me and pray for Liberty of Conscience to revive among us."¹⁵

Madison's experience with religious persecution conducted by the State did not leave him with a favorable impression of established churches. He had been thinking about the necessity for a state-supported religion when, in an earlier letter to Bradford, he asked: "Is an Ecclesiastical Establishment absolutely necessary to support civil society in a supream Government? and how far is it hurtful to a dependent State?"¹⁶ One month later, Madison moved beyond advocating toleration to supporting "Liberty of conscience."¹⁷ In addition, Madison had answered his own question about the desirability of ecclesiastical establishments, writing to Bradford that:

If the Church of England had been the established and general Religion in all the Northern Colonies as it has been among us here and uninterrupted tranquility had prevailed throughout the Continent, It is clear to me that slavery and Subjection might and would have been gradually insinuated among us. Union of Religious Sentiments begets a surprizing confidence and Ecclesiastical Establishments tend to great ignorance and Corruption all of which facilitate the Execution of mischievous Projects.¹⁸

Madison continued to embrace the concept of religious freedom, as illustrated by his April 1, 1774 letter to Bradford. Discussing the prosperity and good fortune of the colony of Pennsylvania, Madison declared that:

You are happy in dwelling in a Land where those inestimable privileges [of religious liberty] are fully enjoyed and public has long felt the good effects of their religious as well as Civil liberty...[while] Religious bondage shackles and debilitates the mind and unfits it for every noble enterprize every expanded prospect.¹⁹

Early on, Madison despaired of the stifling effects on the human mind of religious dogma supported by the government. Humans should be free to use their intellect as they saw fit, a proposition supported by Enlightenment thinkers.

As indicated by his writings, even before he was selected as a delegate to the Virginia Revolutionary Convention, Madison had formulated his views on state regulation of religious beliefs. Madison never said religion itself shackled the mind but rather it is state-imposed religious bondage which does so. He did maintain, however, that the very spiritual and intellectual essence of society is harmed by state intervention into religious matters.

Virginia Declaration of Rights

By 1776 the "Patriotic" movement was quickly gaining momentum throughout the colonies. Facing a tide of revolutionary sentiment, Lord Dunmore dissolved Virginia's assembly in May 1774.²⁰ In 1776 various Virginia statesmen decided to call a Revolutionary Assembly which instructed Virginia's delegates to the Continental Congress to introduce a resolution calling for independence from Great Britain. Madison, at twenty-five, was one of the youngest delegates to the Convention. Overshadowed by more established politicians, he played a relatively minor role in the Convention's proceedings save for one important exception.

After finishing its initial business, the Convention formed a committee to "draft a declaration of rights and a frame of government for Virginia."²¹

George Mason, a respected Virginian considered an authority on individual liberties, became the chief architect of Virginia's Declaration of Rights. When drafting the religion clauses of the Declaration, Mason initially proposed the protection that "all men should enjoy the fullest toleration in the exercise of religion, according to the dictates of conscience."²² As Miller points out:

To most of the delegates to the convention, [toleration] sounded, presumably, fine: Mason was using what had become the accepted, conventional word, following upon John Locke's Letter Concerning Toleration and the legislation built upon it in 1689 [Great Britain's Act of Toleration].²³

To Madison, however, the concept of toleration already seemed a flimsy guarantee of religious liberty. He could not let pass the concept of mere "toleration", implying some kind of gift given to the populace by a benevolent government (who, by implication, could also rescind that gift). Improving upon Locke's notion of toleration, "Madison was advancing a radical departure from tradition, anticipating the Jeffersonian notion of religious freedom as a 'natural right of mankind.'"²⁴

With his experience in the Whiggish atmosphere of Princeton and the plight of the persecuted Baptists fresh in his mind, Madison offered a reconstructed version of Mason's religion clauses. Madison's original amendment read, in part: "All men are equally entitled to full and free exercise of it [religion] according to the dictates of conscience."²⁵ Moving from a promise that government would only endure various religious beliefs out of the kindness of its heart, Madison recognized as an inherent right the freedom for all people to worship as they saw fit. Madison's original amended version also proposed that "no man or call of men ought, on account of religion to be invested with peculiar emoluments or privileges," essentially supporting the disestablishment of the Anglican Church.²⁶ At the time, however, this step was even too drastic for a revolutionary convention which elected instead to continue to uphold the establishment of the Church of England in Virginia.

The convention was ultimately persuaded, however, to substitute in its final version of the religion clause, Article Sixteen, the proposition that "all men are equally entitled to the free exercise of religion according to the dictates of conscience."²⁷ The convention effectively secured recognition of an inherent and broader right superior to that of toleration. Madison's critical change took Locke's argument for toleration (which excluded Roman Catholics and atheists) a step further. It upheld free religious exercise for all peoples, not just Protestants. One historian even goes as far to say that "everything that was to come in the American arrangement of these [Church/State] matters was already present in Williamsburg, Virginia in June of 1776 in the proposals of young James Madison."²⁸

The General Assessment Controversy

Madison's greatest triumph in the realm of religious liberty was yet to come, however. In 1779, while Thomas Jefferson was a member of the Virginia General Assembly, he had worked on a revision of the laws of Virginia, and had submitted a bill calling for complete religious freedom.²⁹ Known as the "Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom," Jefferson designed this bill to place religion in Virginia on an entirely voluntary basis. Conservatives defeated the bill in 1779 but the argument over governmental support of religion still persisted.

Between 1776 and 1786 the assembly grappled with the question of the means by which religion should be supported in Virginia: either by a "general assessment" levied on the population at large or by completely voluntary contributions. The free exercise of religion recognized in the Virginia Declaration of Rights argued against all taxes used to support religion. As a result, a number of religious groups attacked this inconsistency. In 1779 the assembly had abolished ministerial taxes for the Anglican Church altogether in response to the persistent outcry by dissenting sects but many proponents of religious assess-

ments still remained in the government.

In 1784 the issue came to the forefront of the state's consciousness when Patrick Henry introduced "A Bill Establishing a Provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion," which provided for the support of "teachers of the Christian religion" by a general property tax on the populace. Taxpayers could select the denomination to which they wanted their money to go. If they did not name a particular sect, the money was to be paid out to maintain a school in the county involved, provided that the use was for "pious" purposes.³⁰ The bill's supporters maintained that the disarray of the Anglican Church caused by the Revolutionary War had led to what they believed to be the subsequent decay of social virtue in Virginia. Anglican Church attendance in Virginia had been on the decline "as communicants found more reasons for attending Sunday horse races or cock fights than for being in the pews."³¹ With the endorsement of Henry, the bill's proponents deemed such legislation necessary "to correct the morals of men, restrain their vices, and preserve the peace of society."³²

From the start, Madison opposed this assessment, criticizing the contentions of those who said that moral decay resulted from the lack of state support of religion. (Madison believed, instead, that moral decay resulted from "war and bad laws."³³) Intent on stopping what he viewed as a potential "bad law" because he believed religion was "not within [the] purview of civil authority," Madison executed a series of astute political maneuvers to prevent passage of the bill.³⁴

First, Madison realized the weight carried by Henry's support; consequently, he supported Henry's election to the governorship of Virginia, effectively displacing the bill's most significant proponent. Madison then obtained a postponement of consideration of the bill until the next year, and voted for an amended version of a bill incorporating the Protestant Episcopal Church (an act which proved to be so unpopular it was repealed two years later).

Finally, Madison had the proposed bill submitted to the voters for further opinion on the matter.

Realizing that Madison was a tremendous advocate of religious liberty from his work with the Virginia Declaration of Rights, George Mason and George Nicholas asked Madison to arouse and focus opposition to the bill by outlining his objections to it. Although he refused to have his name printed anywhere on the final product, Madison produced what Ketcham has called "an argument in defense of freedom of the human mind worthy of Milton, Jefferson, or Mill."³⁵ "Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments" was a monument to liberty of conscience, religious freedom, and the advantageous effects of a disestablished church.

The Memorial argued forcefully against state intervention into religious affairs. Madison began his polemic by acknowledging that "the Religion then of every man must be left to the conviction and conscience of every man; and it is the right of every man to exercise it as they may dictate. This right is in its nature an unalienable right."³⁶ Madison went on to explain that religion, as a matter between individuals and a Supreme Being, is "Wholly exempt from the cognizance of Civil Society."³⁷ He maintained that the General Assessment bill fundamentally violated each man's natural right of conscience.

He expressed the belief that the bill was damaging to religion because ecclesiastical establishments historically had done little to sustain the "purity and efficacy of religion."³⁸ Instead he maintained that "it is known that this Religion...both existed and flourished, not only without the support of human laws, but in spite of every opposition from that."³⁹ Madison also debunked the argument that an established religion was necessary for a civil society, contending that "in some instances they [establishments] have been seen to erect a spiritual tyranny on the ruins of Civil Authority."⁴⁰

Not only did the bill deviate from America's policy as an asylum to

persecuted sects, he declared, but it would also cause great problems among competing religious groups vying for state money. Madison concluded his argument by citing the Virginia Declaration of Rights, maintaining that “the equal right of every citizen to the free exercise of his Religion according to the dictates of conscience’ is held by the same tenure with all our other rights.”⁴¹

Although Locke’s influence can be seen in Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance, Madison expanded upon Locke’s notion of toleration. Madison called for freedom of conscience for all believers (and non-believers), not just various Protestant sects. He presented the idea that the legislature has no authority over matters of spirituality, and built arguments for “a wall of separation between Church and State.” He also explained logically that the purity of Christianity becomes tainted when religion becomes entangled with the earthly matter of government. As one constitutional scholar asserts, “Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance reflected as much as shaped public opinion when he argued that religion must be left to private conscience and exempt from civil governance and would be damaged by the proposed establishment.”⁴²

Madison’s logical and well-reasoned attack helped coalesce the rising resistance to the bill. A tremendous number of opposing petitions flooded the Virginia assembly. The legislature received over 100 petitions about the assessment, 9 out of 10 which condemned the proposal.⁴³ The Presbyterians, some of whom had supported the bill, now petitioned for a law establishing religious freedom. Baptists kept up their adamant opposition to anything which resembled a religious establishment, especially a religious tax. (Methodists, Quakers, and Roman Catholics also expressed their dislike.) Most Anglicans still supported the measure but could do little to prevent the tidal wave of anti-assessment fervor. The bill was eventually pigeonholed in committee and died the death of many a controversial piece of legislation.

Having buried the General Assessment bill, Madison then secured

passage of Jefferson's "Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom." This bill had been languishing in legislative purgatory for six years. The state elections of 1785, however, produced a legislature overwhelmingly opposed to the establishment of religion. Seizing the moment, Madison called the bill to the floor of the assembly, which passed it in January 1786.

In describing the Virginia Statute for Establishing Religious Freedom, Madison said "this act is a true standard of Religious liberty: its principle the great barrier against usurpation of the rights of conscience."⁴⁴ The central provision of the act declared that:

No man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, restrained, molested, or burthened in his body or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer on account of his religious opinions or belief; but that all men shall be free to profess, and by argument to maintain, their opinion in matters of religion and that the same shall in no wise diminish, enlarge, or effect their civil capacities.⁴⁵

The statute justified a separated Church and State as a way to protect religious liberty.⁴⁶ With the passage of this act, Madison assured religious liberty for all Virginians, not just Christians (at least in theory).

"Congress Shall Make No Law..."

Madison's next major encounter with the question of Church/State relations came during the first Congress. After defending the Constitution in *The Federalist* and working to secure its ratification in Virginia, Madison was elected to the House of Representatives. One of his first acts in Congress was to introduce a bill of rights he had drafted.

Madison initially opposed the bill of rights, expressing to Jefferson his fear that "the rights of conscience, in particular, if submitted to public definition would be narrowed much more than they are likely ever to be by an assumed power."⁴⁷ Madison advocated a bill of rights, however, when he saw that without one, the Anti-Federalists would not support the Constitution. He was

also influenced by Jefferson's arguments for a bill of rights, and in the Virginia ratifying convention he promised to add a bill of rights after ratification.

On June 8, 1789, Madison presented for the approval of the House of Representatives a series of amendments to the Constitution. Religious freedom appeared as Madison's first concern in these amendments. The original religion clause he submitted was based on a similar clause in the Virginia state constitution. It stated that:

The civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in any manner, or on any pretext, abridged.⁴⁸

The Committee of the Whole, after a short debate on the subject, adopted the following version of the clauses written by Samuel Livermore of New Hampshire:

Congress shall make no laws touching religion; or infringing the rights of conscience.⁴⁹

This version was overly broad and was revised once again. A few days later the House adopted this substitute:

Congress shall make no law establishing religion, or to prevent the free exercise thereof, or to infringe the rights of conscience.⁵⁰

This version was then sent to the Senate for consideration.

When the religion clauses were subjected to the Senate's scrutiny, however, the amendment underwent drastic revision. The Senate version of the clause said Congress was to "make no law establishing articles of faith or a mode of worship or prohibiting the free exercise of religion."⁵¹ In effect, the Senate emasculated the House's version, offering only prohibition of an established creed and religious rituals. The Senate had left room for the government to provide federal aid to churches.

The amendment went to conference committee. No records remain as to the deliberations of this committee, but the final version which emerged from this committee is contained in our Bill of Rights and provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free

exercise thereof..."

The extent of Madison's role in drafting this amendment is a point of contention among historians. Irving Brant believes that the final version of the religion clause was a complete triumph for Madison. He contends that "the guaranty which became part of the Constitution could be ascribed to Madison on the basis of the legislative history, even if its wording did not clearly identify him as the author."⁵² Brant goes so far as to declare that "the history of the religious guarantee, as well as its wording mark Madison as its author."⁵³ Brant believes that Madison also obtained his ultimate goal with the final version of the religion clauses: complete separation of Church and State and total prohibition of government aid to religion.

Donald L. Drakeman, however, does not agree with Brant's sweeping assertion that Madison was basically the sole author of the religion clauses. If Madison had his way, Drakeman contends, he would have retained the assurance that equal rights of conscience would not be infringed by the states or the federal government. In addition, Drakeman points out that, as there are no records of exactly who drafted the religion amendments, it is presumptuous to assume they were all Madison's work.⁵⁴ (Drakeman, however, does not maintain that the final version was contrary to Madison's views on religious liberty.) Suffice it to say that the final draft of the religion clauses was a consensus opinion based on principles of religious freedom and good government, arrived at out of political necessity. Madison certainly had a role in the final draft, but First Amendment guarantees did not represent a triumph of one viewpoint over another or over an entrenched opposition, but rather a Congressional consensus.⁵⁵ As Richard Henry Lee of Virginia recognized, they were statements "for ages and nations yet unborn."⁵⁶

The House of Representatives and Beyond

As Madison's political career progressed, the issue of religious liberty was eclipsed by other concerns. In all of his political roles, however, Madison strove to uphold separation of Church and State and to keep civil authority out of the realm of religion (and vice versa). In 1790, while still in the House of Representatives, Madison became involved with a proposal for the first national census. Madison opposed asking about a man's profession in the census because it would require clergy to reveal their religious affiliations. Trying to prevent what he saw as infringement upon absolute privacy of religious opinion, Madison believed that the government ought not to determine "who are and who are not, ministers of the gospel."⁵⁷ Six months later, he voiced his desire to exempt conscientious objectors from militia service. Madison justified his stance by reasoning that it is the "pride of our present constitution that we respect the 'rights of conscience' in the exercise of 'religious sentiments.'"⁵⁸

As President, Madison vetoed two pieces of legislation he believed specifically violated the Establishment Clause. On February 21, 1811, he vetoed a bill calling for the incorporation of the Protestant Episcopal Church in Alexandria (then in the District of Columbia). In his veto message, Madison noted:

The bill exceeds the rightful authority to which governments are limited by the essential distinction between civil and religious functions, and violates in particular the article of the Constitution of the United States which declares that "Congress shall make no law respecting a religious establishment."⁵⁹

A week later Madison struck down a bill which would have set aside government-owned property in Mississippi for a Baptist church, and again said this action ran contrary to the Establishment Clause.

Only with his four proclamations setting aside days for public prayer and fasting did Madison deviate from his goal of keeping government out of religion. In these proclamations he called for holy and worshipful appeals for a divine blessing on the American effort during the War of 1812.⁶⁰ His motivation

for the proclamations may have been “to unite the divided country during the War of 1812 by focusing attention on the national covenant that superseded regional and political factionalism.”⁶¹ In a letter dated in 1822, Madison tried to excuse these apparent lapses from his normal practice. In a letter to Edward Livingston, Madison explained:

Whilst I was honored with the Executive Trust I found it necessary on more than one occasion to follow the example of predecessors. But I was always careful to make the Proclamations absolutely indiscriminate, and merely recommendatory; or rather mere designations of a day, on which all who thought proper might be united in consecrating it to religious purposes, according to their faith and forms.⁶²

Having issued these proclamations must have weighed heavily on Madison’s sensibilities because in one of his writings dated after 1819 he continued to address the practice of presidential proclamations. Listing a number of objections to executive religious proclamations “recommending thanksgiving and fasts,” Madison emphasized that: “Altho’ recommendations only, they imply a religious agency, making no part of the trust delegated to political rulers.”⁶³ He noted that “they seem to imply and certainly nourish the erroneous idea of a national religion” and had a tendency “to narrow the recommendation to the standard of the predominant sect.”⁶⁴ Whatever his earlier actions, Madison attempted to dissuade others from supporting executive proclamations.

After Madison retired to Montpelier in 1817, he managed his plantation, helped Jefferson operate the University of Virginia, and worked with the American Colonization Society. Madison maintained a lively correspondence with a variety of people, not only statesmen and personal friends but also clergymen of many different faiths. Through this correspondence, historians may glimpse more of Madison’s views on religious liberty. For instance, he continued to believe that separation of Church and State was beneficial to both parties, writing in 1819 that:

The Civil Government tho' bereft of everything like an associated hierarchy possess the requisite stability and performs its functions with complete success; Whilst the number, the industry, and the morality of the Priesthood, and the devotion of the people have been manifestly increased by the total separation of the Church from the State.⁶⁵

He expanded on this notion in a letter dated 1822:

In some parts of our Country, there remains in others a strong bias towards the old error, that without some sort of alliance or coalition between Government and Religion neither can be duly supported. Such indeed is the tendency to such a coalition, and such its corrupting influence on both the parties, that the danger cannot be too carefully guarded against. And in a government of opinion, like ours, the only effectual guard must be found in the soundness and stability of the general opinion on the subject. Every new and successful example therefore of a perfect separation between ecclesiastical and civil matters, is of importance. And I have no doubt that every new example, will succeed, as every past one has done, in shewing that religion and Government will both exist in greater purity, the less they are mixed together.⁶⁶

As an astute student of history, Madison knew that wherever "an exclusive and intolerant [religious] establishment" had been deemed essential (i.e. Great Britain, France, Spain) some form of persecution of dissidents had usually resulted.⁶⁷

In an earlier work, Madison had declared that: "Conscience is the most sacred of all property."⁶⁸ He strove to maintain a political system which upheld one's right to worship as one pleased. In all of his voluminous writings, however, Madison virtually never touches on the source of his ideas on religious liberty. His biographer Ralph Ketcham admits that "the source of Madison's ideas about religious liberty and the place of religion in society are not directly traceable."⁶⁹ Perhaps his lack of a systematic explanation of his position on religious liberty stemmed from the fact that Madison was not only a philosopher speculating on the nature of religious freedom but also a statesman trying to establish a new government. He subsequently had less time to devote to theoretical problems of religion when the practical problems of day-to-day government demanded his attention.

James Madison's Legacy

History has bound Madison inextricably to the First Amendment and its religion clauses. His Memorial and Remonstrance has been lauded by many people as one of the most influential statements on the justification for religious liberty and separation of Church and State ever written. Madison's views on religious freedom have taken on special significance in the twentieth century as the Supreme Court has become increasingly involved with interpretation of the Establishment and Free Exercise clauses.

Mid-century Supreme Court cases such as *Cantwell v. Connecticut*, *Everson v. the Board of Education*, and *McCullum v. the Board of Education* helped fuel the debate about the proper separation between government and religion. The extent to which government should be involved and influenced by religion and vice versa continues to create battles between historians, lawyers, political scientists, clergy, and laymen to the present day. *Lee v. Weisman*, a graduation prayer case decided upon by the Supreme Court in June of 1992, once again brought the discussion of governmental religious involvement to the forefront of the public's consciousness.

Much of this argument is based on interpretations of Madison's original intent when helping to draft the religion clause. Did he mean to prevent all government aid to religion? Was his Memorial and Remonstrance just a call "to revolution" and not a treatise supporting separation of Church and State?⁷⁰ What exactly did Madison denote by a "national religion" in his original draft of the religion clauses? One political scientist even suggests that Madison was actually hostile to religion and was trying to gag it by separating it from civil authority.⁷¹ Robert Alley makes a valid point when he observes that:

Americans today are in the midst of a shouting match about the Founders...All miss the point...The true history of the struggle for religious freedom is to be

found after the principle of the wall of separation had been formulated...It is an unending struggle...Each generation must fight the battles of freedom anew in terms of the problems and powers of its time.⁷²

Bickering about Madison's original intent will only get Americans so far, as Madison's original intent is, at this point, unknowable. Whatever his motivations, Madison undeniably called for liberty of conscience and the free exercise of religion, writing that the "Religion then of every man must be left to the conviction and conscience of every man' and it is the right of every man to exercise it as these may dictate."⁷³

Throughout his life, Madison worked to ensure more than toleration for a variety of religious sects and upheld the primacy of spiritual duty over civil authority in the process. Regardless of his original intent, Madison still serves as a potent advocate of religious liberty in his actions and writings. As Alley so aptly explains:

One does not need to evoke Madison or any person in order to justify an unswerving dedication to the principle of justice and liberty; but we will always require women and men to espouse those rights and freedoms if they are to be secured for posterity. To such persons, as to Madison, we owe a debt that can only be paid in the currency of continued vigilance regarding 'the first experiment of our liberties.'⁷⁴

In an age of increasing global intolerance, Madison's example provides powerful testimony to the desirability of religious liberty and its salutary effects on both Church and State.

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- (6) Miller, 88.
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***Das Kapital* and the Development of the Navajo Economy** Brad Foss

In Volume I of *Das Kapital*, Karl Marx explains that commodities are the fundamental unit for the process of exchange and from this develops a theory of the development of capitalism. In *Roots of Dependency*, Richard White writes about the development of the economy of the Navajo from the late nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century. In looking at the initial state of the Navajo economy, an economy based upon the family subsistence unit, and then examining what it became, there are many similarities between the development of the Navajo economy on the reservation and the model of the evolution of capitalism that Marx describes. I will briefly discuss Marx's description of the dawn of capitalism and the factors that led to its progression. Marx's theory emphasizes the process of exchange. Then, I will use the case of the Navajo to show how the development of capitalism occurred for them. The foci of my interpretation of the evolution of the Navajo subsistence unit into a quasi-capitalistic family, and how exchange changed form over the years, are the factors in the external world that made economic development happen, and the aspects of Navajo culture that facilitated the change.

Marx's account of the development of capitalism

Something becomes a commodity to be exchanged when an individual believes the item has a greater use-value than its owner or producer does. When two people come together, each with a commodity that the other desires, then the need for exchange exists. Exchange is a social process between two individuals with needs to be fulfilled. For each person in an exchange of commodities, the commodity that is given up has less use-value than the commodity received in exchange.

This process of exchange has relevance only to societies that allow private property. Private property is socially recognized and becomes a commodity through exchange. The equity in a simple exchange of commodities is agreed upon socially and labeled, in Marx's terms, the exchange-value. Exchange-value arises from the congealed human labor time that went into producing the commodity.

For Marx, exchange is "accidental" in its initial form in that two people who come into contact each desire a commodity that the other has. The commodities seem to be equal for exchange because each person sees use-value in the other person's commodity. However, use values of commodities are subjective and so use-values are incommensurate. What makes the exchange equitable is the equivalent amount of labor in producing the commodities.

Marx held that exchange does not only exist in this accidental form: 20 yards linen = 1 coat. He shows how exchange-value makes exchange possible between all commodities in the expanded form: 20 yds. linen = 1 coat = 10 lbs. tea = 20 lbs. coffee. The expanded form assumes there is a market for the exchange of all things that one person has little use for but for which someone else does. Commodities are exchanged in the market according to the congealed human labor time in them. The expanded form makes clear that equity in exchange is not accidental, but is the result of an equal amount of labor time embodied in each commodity. The exchange of one commodity for another commodity in which a social relation occurs between two individuals is described as C—C'.

However, individuals do not always come into contact with one another and directly exchange commodities. Gold became the universal equivalent form of congealed human labor time and served as a medium for the indirect exchange of commodities. "The first main function of gold is to supply commodities with the material for the expression of their values, or to represent their values as magnitudes of the same denomination, qualitatively equal and

quantitatively comparable" (Marx, 188). Money is the socially recognized measure of value equal to some amount of the world's supply of gold. Money is a commodity that measures value in labor time.

The advent of money, the universal equivalent, made it possible for people to sell a commodity for its value in money, $C—M$, and then with this money a person is able to buy the desired commodity, $M—C'$. This exchange is possible because of the exchange-value that is equally present in C , M , and C' .

When exchanges occur, $C—M—C'$, some commodities are used and drop out of the market. Money, however, stays in circulation and the pattern of exchange continues as $C—M—C'—M—C''—M—$ etc.. Marx calls this the circulation of commodities. Actually, the circulation of money carries commodities to buyers.

As the money economy developed, people began to produce commodities solely to exchange them for money so they could buy other commodities they desired. Or, people sold the surplus commodities they had for money to be exchanged for other commodities. The production and sale of commodities for money led to the separation of use-value from exchange-value, which Marx argues led to the division of labor. People now became buyers and sellers, exchanging commodities for money and vice versa.

With the establishment of the universal equivalent, the transformation of commodities into money and the re-conversion of money into commodities — selling in order to buy — became possible (Marx, 247). The inverse operation, buying in order to sell, also became possible. In the latter case, money's use-value is its exchange-value because the money is used to purchase commodities that will then be re-sold, yielding a profit. In this case, the formula is $M—C—M'$ (where M' equals M + additional value).

$M—C—M'$, the origin of capitalism, progressed when labor became a commodity people were willing to sell. Selling labor as a commodity might have

occurred because people sold all of their commodities or they did not have the means to produce any commodities. The exchange-value of labor as a commodity exists in the form of wages, which are based on the training of the individual and an estimate of the individual's financial needs. To make the system work, wages must be less than the value laborers produce. The difference between these two quantities is surplus value, which provides profits for the entrepreneur and signals the advent of capitalism as a mode of production and not merely a profit driven system of exchange.

The Development of the Navajo Economy

The evolution of the Navajo economy can be chronologically dated only to a certain degree. Economic changes were taking place rapidly because of changes on the reservation and political and economic developments in the rest of the United States, including the expanding markets of the east coast. The different time periods I outline overlap some, and are a bit amorphous.

In the late nineteenth century, the Navajo economy consisted of agriculture, sheep herding, and raiding. The Navajo also made blankets, rugs, and silver jewelry. These products were mainly for their own use, but minor trading occurred between Navajos and other peoples of the southwest. Economic activity was, and still is, largely communal, but individuals owned personal property. "All individuals might do as they wished with their sheep since no one would think of telling them what to do with their property" (White, 238). The Navajo held hard work and thrift to be good character qualities, and believed the best and most secure type of livelihood was one based on several sources of income.

The Navajo subsistence unit was not based upon capitalistic premises. However, there are elements in the typical Navajo subsistence unit that were necessary for the evolution of capitalism. Marx argued that private property

must be a socially established institution if the exchange of commodities is to take place. The types of exchange that occurred in the late 19th century were most similar to Marx's accidental form, $C-C'$.

During the early twentieth century a series of changes began to occur in Navajo lifestyle and economy, as well as in their land. The relationships between all of the changes are obscure; in some cases the relationships are causal, and in others apparently they are not. Raiding and warring ended during this period, and the Navajo became primarily recognized for their herds and crafts (White, 215). Almost simultaneously, land began to erode through gullying, the Navajo population increased, herds grew larger, and the commercial production of rugs began (White, 215).

The Navajo initially relied more heavily on agriculture than sheep for subsistence. But, gullying caused the water table to drop, which had the effect of injuring floodwater farming (White, 227). As a result, there was a reduction in production from farming, and I believe the Navajo responded with an increased emphasis on herding and then crafts.

Sheep herds have a cultural and economic importance for the Navajo. The Navajo had great concern for their herds, which were private property, because they feared poverty and wanted a balanced subsistence that gave them security and respect.

Prior to the existence of transcontinental railroads, trade in wool and hide products was minimal. With the introduction of the transcontinental railroads, the potential for trade with the east coast improved. "Trade and market dealings, however, were hardly natural and inevitable. The Navajos desired some European manufactures — especially metal goods and cotton cloth — but their demands were not insatiable" (White, 243). The implication is that producers and distributors of these manufactured goods were seeking new markets for their ever expanding capitalist system. This trade can be considered

the first step into the circulation of commodities, as Marx describes it, for the Navajo. Manufactured goods came from the east to trading posts on the reservation. The traders in charge of those trading posts paid cash for their goods. This exchange is $M—C$. Then the trader would exchange these items with the Navajo for wool or rugs. This exchange is $C—C'$. Then, the trader would take C' and sell it in eastern markets for a profit. This exchange is $C'—M'$.

There are two possible analyses of this early trade:

- 1) Neither the Navajo nor their eastern market counterparts figured exchange-value, because they were not in a socially direct interaction. As a result, traders priced items according to the laws of supply and demand. Because the Navajo desired the use-value of other commodities, and calculated less use-value in their own commodities, the Navajo engaged in trade. The traders set prices in order to satisfy both the Navajo and the markets in the east.
- 2) Because traders controlled access to the markets, they could arbitrarily set the rates of exchange without regard to exchange-value. Their profits depended on the power to set prices.

Although money is the universal equivalent for exchange, wool and rugs became the local equivalent for the Navajo. The Navajo used wool and rugs to purchase whatever they needed from the traders. Statistics from the 1930s show that the Navajo were trading mainly for foodstuffs — flour, sugar, coffee, and canned goods (White, 244). “The Navajos entered the market to obtain food and became partially dependent on commerce for their subsistence” (White, 244). I believe this is the point at which the Navajo began to produce rugs solely for exchange purposes, and not just as items that could be exchanged in the accidental form. The commercialization of rug production reinforced the cultural/economic importance that the herds had for the Navajo. Using wool to make commodities put a balance back in their economy that had been lost as farming became less productive. “Trade gave them a way of restoring some of

their lost security" (White, 246).

The increased demand for rugs in the east is one reason for the new role that trade had in the Navajo economy. Another was the extension of credit. A family subsistence unit could get all of the goods that it needed from a trader on credit. When it came time to shear the herds, the Navajo would pay the trader in wool. Thus, some understanding of exchange-value existed between the trader and the Navajo. In Marx's terms, the local universal equivalent, wool, was used as money. The exchange that the Navajo engaged in was $C-C'$, mediated by the money value of C and C' .

A new balanced economy of herding, trade, and crafts continued until the erosion of the land became more severe. The U.S. Government, fearing the loss of investment in the southwest's eroding land, decided it needed to solve the problem. Although the Navajo did not agree, the U.S. government ordered the reduction of herds as a solution to a problem the government reported was caused by over-grazing. During the mid-20th century, the production of herding took a direct blow as a result of the stock reduction, so that a new form of income became necessary. The Navajo could not survive by just selling their commodities. So, as Marx predicted, the next stage became the selling of labor as a commodity.

With fewer sheep to take care of, less hands were needed to work at home, and with the economy changing toward one based on money, people began working as wage laborers. To maintain a secure economy, the Navajo subsistence unit became more dependent on income from wage labor (e.g. mining, railroads). The reliance on a diversified income made capitalism culturally possible. Thus, labor became a commodity and the Navajo began to be incorporated in the larger capitalist economy.

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The balanced economy exists in all of the phases of the Navajo economy that I have examined. The original Navajo economy was one of agriculture and herding. When agriculture was no longer possible in some areas because of harsh land conditions, and when raiding ended, the Navajo became primarily herders and produced commodities for trade. Then, when the stock reduction occurred, production of commodities for use and exchange suffered. The result was a need to sell labor as a commodity, which made the Navajo a semi-capitalistic society. The Navajo are still not fully capitalistic because they do not rely solely upon labor as a commodity. Their wages are balanced with products such as rugs and jewelry that the subsistence unit produces at home. Because of this, the Navajo are not paid wages that are equal to the exchange-value of their labor.

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Monkey, Folk Novel of China. By Wu Ch'eng-en.
Translated by Arthur Waley, New York: Grove Press, 1958.

Monkey is a Chinese popular novel believed to be anonymously written by Wu Ch'eng-en in the sixteenth century. Told in the language of the peasants, *Monkey* is a departure from the style of the sixteenth century classical revivalists who urged a return to the poetry and prose of the great Chinese classical periods. *Monkey* vividly depicts the adventures of a wily monkey and his companions on their journey to India, the Western Paradise of the Buddha. The seemingly mismatched travelers face many obstacles in their quest to find and bring back the "Three Baskets," or the three main canonical divisions of the Buddha's teaching, to China. With each challenge they meet along the way, it becomes clear that these pilgrims are not only seeking the scriptures, but enlightenment and, ultimately, Buddhahood.

Monkey, at first glance, is an entertaining and humorous account of a clever and mischievous monkey and his adventures as student, king, and finally pilgrim. But beyond the appealing fairy-tale quality to *Monkey* is its deeper, religious meaning. The theme of the journey of the self, or the mind searching for enlightenment, permeates the book. Like the ox herder who disciplines the mind through the meditation of the ten ox-herding pictures, Monkey must not only take up the path, but learn to walk with purpose, direction, and restraint. It is this need for discipline that every "monkey mind" must learn.

Reading the book is an exercise in the restraint of the monkey mind. It is at times difficult not to get so caught up in the action of the various battles and adventures as to overlook the underlying religious themes. Yet *Monkey* has endured not simply as a skillfully crafted work of art, but as an interpretation of

the unity of Chinese religions. This paper will focus on *Monkey's* religious significance and, in particular, the theme of the journey's progression through discipline.

In its religious context, *Monkey* initially appears to simply be an allegory for Pure Land Buddhism, but such a categorization is far too narrow. The Pure Land tradition undoubtedly acts as a foundation for the novel, but the influences of both Taoism and Confucianism cannot be overlooked. In the opening chapters of the novel, Monkey's birth from the stone egg bears an uncanny resemblance to the Taoist creation myth (Plaks, 1987). "On this mountain is a magic rock, which gave birth to an egg. This egg changed into a stone monkey" (*Monkey*, p. 11). From the Tao came the one, the egg; from the egg came the two, the yin and the yang; from the two came the four, the four directions of the earth. In accordance with the scripture, Monkey's first act is "to make a bow towards each of the four quarters" in acknowledgement of the creation of earth (*Monkey*, p. 11). "Compounded of the essence of heaven and earth," Monkey begins on the path of the Tao (*Monkey*, p. 11).

Monkey soon rises from an ambitious and daring wanderer to be king of the monkeys. But his monkey nature demands that he always be moving, bounding, leaping to new heights, and Monkey becomes the pupil of a Taoist immortal. True to his monkey nature, Monkey immediately seeks to gain immortality. He does not realize, however, that immortality cannot be acquired simply through ritual tradition. Monkey must first become a disciple (a disciplined student) and achieve enlightenment before seeking immortality. Through the Patriarch's methods of the koan, "beating and shouting," and meditation, Monkey quickly develops supernatural powers and attains the immortality he so greatly desired. But, like the Buddhist, the true Taoist does not stop with the attainment of immortality.

Being an immortal with extraordinary powers cannot tame Monkey's

wild nature. His powers become a threat to himself and to those whom he clashes with. He becomes an unstoppable menace to the Jade Emperor in the Taoist heaven. Monkey gluttonously devours the peaches of immortality, crashes the emperor's banquet, and steals Lao-Tzu's elixir of immortality. Monkey is very powerful and he knows it! He refuses to remain a mere stable boy in heaven, and demands the title of "Great Sage Equal to Heaven." Monkey has fallen to the sin of pride. Only the power of the Mahayana Buddha can tame him. Only the mercy of the bodhisattva, Kuan-Yin, can save him. Monkey must learn the same compassion that the bodhisattva, Kuan-Yin, has shown him.

Here the Buddhist doctrine of compassion comes into play. The officials of the Taoist heaven would have Monkey executed, whereas the Buddha duly punishes Monkey but spares his life. Monkey's pride has swelled to such proportions that he believes himself to be more powerful than the Buddha. But the Buddha holds the universe in his hand (a feat incomprehensible to the clever little monkey) and punishes the unruly monkey by confining him to a mountain prison. Having mistakenly believed that his tricks could outwit the Buddha, Monkey again falls to the sin of pride. In order to truly attain the knowledge of the Buddha, Monkey must first suffer within the confines of the mountain and experience the Buddha's compassion. Only then can he become compassionate himself and claim to possess knowledge comparable to the Buddha's.

Throughout the journey sequence, the supposed author, Wu Ch'eng-En, illustrates the interactive nature of Chinese religions, but not without bias. Along the way Monkey encounters misguided and easily influenced Confucian kings and self-serving Taoist "immortals." Wu Ch'eng-En may have drawn this contrast between Buddhism and Confucian/Taoist traditions to emphasize the superiority of the Pure Land tradition as the only uncorrupt, pure tradition existing at that time. The Cart-Slow Kingdom, for example, depicts a kingdom in which the rather stupid king is influenced by false Taoist prophets. The Taoists

are self-serving enslavers of the Buddhists, and practice magic (the same kind of unchecked trickery that Monkey formerly fell slave to) rather than religion. Monkey, along with his Buddhist companions, Pigsy and Sandy, blatantly ridicules the Taoists when they impersonate the Taoist Trinity, steal the people's food offerings, and offer their urine as the elixir of heaven. Their stunt leads to a confrontation and an eventual contest.

This contest of supernatural powers seems to be used by the author to establish the superiority of Buddhism over Taoism in Chinese religious practice. Monkey easily defeats the Taoist priests and strips them of their proclaimed immortality. Furthermore, it is revealed that these Taoist "priests" were nothing more than animal impostors. Again the powers of Buddhism prevail. Yet the careful reader cannot overlook the fact that both Buddhists and Confucians, as well as Taoists, are ridiculed (Hsia, 1968). Tripitika is actually chastised by Monkey for being overly fearful for his own welfare. Likewise, the Confucian king of the Cart-Slow Kingdom is seen to be weak and easily manipulated.

The author's preference for Buddhist thought, however, does not completely discount the merits of Taoism or Confucianism. Overall, the author offers the "traditional gesture of showing equal reverence for the three teachings" (Hsia, 1968). From the start, Monkey's supernatural powers are attributed to his study with the Taoist immortal. In addition, *Monkey* incorporates the more general symbolism of the Chinese "naturalistic universe." Tripitika and Monkey can be seen as the embodiments of yin and yang, respectively. Tripitika possesses the highest skills of meditation; he is an adept practitioner of inactivity or "quiet sitting." He is the dark, weeping, feminine; he is yin. Monkey, on the other hand, is constantly in motion—leaping and bounding with strength and agility. He is the bright, laughing, masculine; he is yang (Plaks, 1987). Furthermore, the five pilgrims themselves can be seen as representatives of the five elements. Sandy comes out of the river of sand; he is earth. Monkey, the

immortal with the iron cudgel, is hard as steel; he is the element metal. The horse is a fallen water dragon; he is water. Pigsy is strong, stubborn, and unintelligent; he is wood. Finally, Tripitika embodies virtue and the spirit nature of meditation; he is the wind (Plaks, 1987).

Fitting with the author's theme, these five "elements" violently clash as the journey begins. The five elements, or pilgrims, can be both harmonized components and "forces of mutual destruction" (Plaks, 1987). All three fallen immortals, for example, attempt to devour Tripitika upon their first encounter. But, upon learning that Tripitika is the priest whom the Bodhisattva has sent, all three prostrate themselves before the meek Tripitika and become his servants. As their journey progresses, the pilgrims become increasingly devout Buddhists and, consequently, more in tune with each other (Plaks, 1987). Only Buddhism can harmonize the five elements and unify Chinese religions. Again, we see the taming quality of Buddhism.

Monkey, because of his great power and cleverness, needs more help in taming his Buddha nature than the other pilgrims. Like the ox herder¹ trying to catch the mind and tame it with meditation, Tripitika (with the aid of Kuan-Yin) must use restraints on Monkey in order to forcefully break his monkey mind and eventually free his Buddha nature. Like the ox, Monkey fears restraint and fights against it. He would surely have abandoned the journey if Tripitika had not enlisted the aid of Kuan-yin's golden fillet. The three other pilgrims, too, are like the ox. They carry Tripitika and his gear faithfully but not without occasional prodding. The ox and the ox-herder merge into one. Monkey's Buddha nature was happy to graze, wander, and occasionally fight, coming and going as he pleased until Buddhism's constraints tamed him. Yet, although Monkey is tamed, he is not weakened. With discipline, his powers become refined, precise and, ultimately, more powerful.

As the pilgrims approach their destination, Monkey is unwittingly

liberated from his fillet. At the bank of the river of the dead, Monkey experiences the true freedom that comes only through discipline. He is able to slide across the river and back without effort. He is in the eighth ox-herding picture; he has attained Buddhahood. Tripitika too becomes a Buddha. But he first must cross the river of dead souls and climb the Buddha's mountain. The journey, however, does not end here.

Having received not the "true" Buddhist scriptures (the blank scrolls of emptiness), but the scriptures accessible to the people of the East, the pilgrims must return to save all sentient beings. Their return to the kingdom of T'ang is the tenth ox-herding picture. The pilgrims (with two Buddhas among them) are abruptly dropped by the Western Buddha's helpers. They can no longer fly like immortals. They have returned to the mortal world where "mountains are mountains" and must conform to its conventions. The five harmonized, their act of compassion complete, they now belong to the kingdom of the Western Buddha, the paradise of the Pure Land.

Monkey emphasizes Pure Land and Ch'an Buddhism as a source of the discipline that brings healing and salvation. But the novel's message does not end or begin here. Wu Ch'eng-en does not overlook the importance of strong leadership (as seen in the Confucian tradition) or the validity of Taoist beliefs and practices. In the book, Monkey is brought to Buddhism through Taoism. The Buddha is called to the Taoist heaven to discipline Monkey when the powers he has acquired through Taoist study become too much for the overactive little monkey to handle. Through his journey of redemption, Monkey is renewed. Through Buddhism, he learns to control and refine the methods of Taoism. The three return to the one.

In its interactive approach to religions, *Monkey* is not simply a religious novel, but a folk religious novel. Monkey reminds us that there is more than one path to the truth. Our task is to find a path, follow it, and know when it is time

to find another. Monkey brings this message to the Taoist's court magicians who have lost sight of the folk tradition: "Never again follow false doctrines nor follow foolish courses, but know that the Three Religions are one. Reverence priests, reverence Taoists too, and cultivate the faculties of man" (*Monkey*, p. 248).

NOTE

(1) *The Ten Ox Herding Pictures* are used in Ch'an Buddhist meditation as an analogy for the process of Ch'an practice, or the journey of the "monkey mind." The pictures emphasize the necessity of discipline and compassion throughout the journey. For more information, see Master Sheng-yen's *Ox Herding at Morgan's Bay*, New York: Dharma Drum Publications, 1988.

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To What Extent Were the Surrealists Influenced by Freud? *Cynthia Anne Esteban*

The onset of the Surrealist movement was the year 1919, when Europe was picking up the pieces from the destruction caused by World War I. In an atmosphere of uncertainty created by a precarious peace agreement (i.e. the Versailles Treaty), the containment of German radical socialists, and the suppression of a spreading Soviet Revolution, two men from two countries using two different media questioned how traditional Western “rational” thought had led to such disorder and violence. The two — the French poet, Andre Breton, and the German painter Max Ernst — eventually rejected all that the war embodied (nationalism, militarism, patriotism, etc.). They proposed the creation of a new independent culture which would confront and break down traditional relationships between people, change the “We oppose They” attitude of the war, and release the suppressed human emotion which had led to the war. As a result, Surrealism was born.

The Surrealist movement embraced both literature and art. Many Surrealist poets collected art, while many Surrealist painters wrote poetry. These poets and painters officially began the movement by publishing the “First Surrealist Manifesto” in 1924, followed by the “Second Surrealist Manifesto” in 1929. Surrealism remained a dominant influence in Europe, however, only until 1935. With the outbreak of World War II, many Surrealist artists went into exile in America. There, Surrealism experienced its last autonomous phase before being absorbed into the mainstream of modern art. The end of Surrealism was signalled by the last Surrealist International Exhibition held in Europe in 1947.

Many artists and thinkers influenced surrealism. At various times, the names of artists such as Joan Miro, Giorgio di Chirico, Salvador Dali, Rene Magritte, Andre Masson, Georges Malkine, and Pablo Picasso, etc. can be linked

to the movement. Their participation often depended on whether they remained on good terms with its founder, Andre Breton. Likewise, many revolutionary thinkers influenced the shaping of Surrealism. World War I had brought to consciousness trends of thought which rebelled against tradition. For example, Freud's *Interpretation of Dreams* (1900) downplayed the individual's conscious intellect in order to reveal hidden chaotic desires that were often uncovered in dream interpretation. Einstein's General Theory of Relativity (1915) made people realize the need for a new set of laws to explain motion in gravitational fields. Darwin threatened the conception of human nature as created in the image of a rational god (1). These revolutionary ideas fuelled Surrealist thought. Of these influences, however, Sigmund Freud's insights into psychoanalysis formed the central pillar of Surrealist painting (2).

To what extent did Freud and, specifically, his theories of psychoanalysis influence Surrealist art? To answer this question, this essay defines Surrealism and discusses Freudian concepts. It also considers examples of Surrealist paintings to demonstrate how Surrealist artists used Freud's theories. With these examples, I show how art can be interpreted using psychoanalytical terms. Indeed, from the beginnings of civilization, art has sometimes been considered an "emotional outlet," but

...to have the temerity to try to bring together these two separate fields of human activity [psychoanalysis and art], with their vastly different terminologies and techniques, and with origins and goals so far apart, appears surely to be premature (3).

The Surrealist movement, however, accomplished just that.

What is Surrealism? According to the "First Surrealist Manifesto," Surrealism uses the free flow of association to express how the mind functions. Surrealist artists dictated their thoughts through various means without any attempt at moral or aesthetic control. Ultimately, Surrealism intended to replace

existing structures of psychic life to solve social problems (4). Andre Breton himself designates Surrealism as a "certain psychic automatism that corresponds rather closely to the state of dreaming, a state that is today extremely difficult to delimit" (5).

These definitions reveal that the Surrealists were inspired by Freud's theories of the workings of the unconscious mind. Although he was not the only revolutionary thinker to influence the Surrealists, several of Freud's ideas dominate their works. They used his ideas on the individual's primordial instinct (i.e. sexual desire) and society's suppression of this desire, which results in a conflict between the two. They also were influenced by his exploration of the individual's unconscious dream-world which exposes these repressed forces and unfulfilled wishes in an unconventional manner.

How did the Surrealists use Freud's ideas in their paintings? Freud's theories on man's unconscious, primordial instinct heavily influenced the Surrealists. He proposed that both the conscious and the unconscious are components of human personality but are often in conflict over what the individual desires — the former being rational and the latter irrational. The Surrealists' main aim then became to release the individual's unconscious sexual desires — providing them with a means of expression through art and literature. Freud claimed that the libido drive seeks sexual gratification, which is ultimately related to the preservation of the species, and that all manufactured objects are male or female sexual symbols. Thus, sexual symbols and an erotic atmosphere are found in many Surrealist paintings. For example, *Men Shall Know Nothing of This* by Max Ernst (1923) depicts a couple copulating in space over a planet (a female object) hidden by a dismembered hand. The two cones rising beside the planet, as well as the whistle dangling from the moon, are phallic (male objects). The hand, as well as the viscera strewn on the ground, signify death (6). Similarly, more sexual connotations can be seen in a painting by Man Ray entitled

Pisces (1938), in which

the woman is asleep and seems to be dreaming of the fish, a very obvious phallic symbol. The fish is shown swimming through a tunnel-like space and the woman would appear therefore to be dreaming of the phallus and also of being penetrated by it (7).

These two examples are not the only Surrealist paintings which depict sexual desire. Practically all Surrealist paintings can be analyzed in Freudian terms.

Freud, in his later theories of psychoanalysis, intertwined the main primordial sexual instinct (a procreative force) with its close correlate the aggressive instinct (a destructive force). Often, themes of sex and violence are coupled in such Surrealist paintings as Max Ernst's *The Robing of the Bride* (1939), which depicts a virgin about to be deflowered in an erotic, archaic king's court. A birdman-creature points his spear (a phallic symbol held near his groin area) at her sexual organ, which she protects with her hand. This aggressive action focuses the picture on her sexuality (8). Max Ernst's *The Elephant Celebes* (1921) also demonstrates this theme of sex coupled with violence. The picture is both macabre and erotic; a naked headless plaster-woman beckons to a powerful elephant-machine replete with phallic symbols (i.e. horns, spouts, and especially a trunk-like organ extending from its interior) suggesting an impending rape (9). In reference to the primordial instincts in both their sexual and aggressive forms, the Surrealists represent man as "a receptive, metamorphic being riddled with discordance and full of divergent, convulsive energies" (10), which may cause him to be confused.

This individual conflict exists within and is heightened by a confused and repressive social and familial structure that responds to man's sexual desires. According to Freud, suppression of the incest threat in families generates fantasies of parricide that is a component of the Oedipal complex. The Surrealists were influenced by Freud's theory of repression and how it causes destruction. In their paintings or writings, they illustrated and attacked society's

repression of the individual. Sometimes, the Surrealists used the figure of Eros to symbolize the stability and order that unifies civilization. But they depict her accompanied by her antithesis, Thanatos, who represents destruction.(11). These two drives, Eros (love) and Thanatos (death and destruction) are biological principles from which Freud derives his notion of the two types of instincts, libido and aggression. Paul Delvaux's *Venus Asleep* (1944) illustrates Death creeping up on Eros who is asleep. (12)

In addition to illustrating the conflict between apparent stability and impending destruction, the Surrealists also criticized, as Freud did, such traditional institutions as the family, state, and church, for repressing desire. Breton, in *Surrealism and Painting*, called for the lifting of social taboos, which Surrealists believed were based on the Western acceptance of a single universal standard of truth. Thus, Surrealist artists often looked to primitive and non-Western cultures (e.g. Oceanic, African cultures, etc.) for a fresh perspective. Freud himself stated that

If now we give up. . . [a] one-sided ethical valuation, we shall undoubtedly find a more correct formula between good and evil in human nature (13).

Both Freud and the Surrealists wanted to remove old foundations to rebuild new ones. They both sought to rebuild society on the assumption that the individual is irrational, as evidenced in his or her dreams, which are pregnant with symbolism. According to Freudian theory, dream wishes are informative.

They are derived from motives, and articulate them, but are not realistically constrained. So, arguably, they can show what the conditions of satisfaction of the motives underlying them would be, if these motives could operate without hindrance from reality and rationality (14).

Freud found that dreams could best be understood when linked with memories that emerged through free association.

The most relevant information emerged when his patients followed the

spontaneous flow of their thoughts and feelings. So he asked them to describe this as fully as possible, and without seeking to make their passing ideas sensible, or indeed to censor or control them in any way. (15)

Not only did Freud use free association with his patients; he began the same psychological study with himself.

Similarly, Andre Breton, after his tour of duty in a psychiatric center, where he was exposed to Freud's research on psychoanalysis, hastened to conduct some of his own experiments on hypnosis and free association on himself and his colleagues. Thus, Freud's research on the interpretation of dreams as wish-fulfillments influenced the Surrealists to explore the unknown depths of the mind in all its enigmas, irrationality, terror, and eroticism. Surrealists used the symbolism of dreams to work out the conflicts and maladies of life, especially the ravages of World War I. With hypnosis, a state akin to dreaming, they aimed to reconcile reality with dreams to create a super-reality. (16) This super-reality breaks rational conventions. After breaking conventions, Surrealist artists aimed to form new connections between the objects and events in their work.

Using super-reality in their paintings and poetry, Surrealists broke up the "dream" into its parts and juxtaposed its components in novel ways, as Freud had done when he interpreted dreams. John Armstrong's Dreaming Head (1938) depicts the dreaming head of a girl surrounded by rubble in a landscape of flowers. The strange combination of these apparently unconnected components helps to convey a disquieting atmosphere of space and rebirth. It does not "make sense" in the normal conventional manner, and hence is very dream-like and unusual. But because it is disquieting, it spurs the spectator to see the painting and ultimately life itself in a new light. Similarly, Salvador Dali's *Apparition of a Face and a Fruit Dish on a Beach* (1938) presents a double image as "rival realities." It is a representation of two very different objects simultaneously merging into one another—a face and a fruit dish set in a dream-like

landscape (17). To liberate the mind, Surrealists used dream settings where anything is possible. In this way, the Surrealists' dream paintings were dynamic, complex unions. They broke barriers, and they were always open to different interpretations.

I have assessed the extent of Freud's influence on Surrealism by pointing out that his psychoanalytic theories of human desire in both its sexual and aggressive instincts, repression, and the dream formed a basis for Surrealist thought. Ironically, Freud himself was not impressed by the Surrealists (except for Dali), and thought them to be fools. He considered their work incomplete, because they merely manifested the contents of dreams and the unconscious mind without interpreting their findings using clinical psychoanalytic methods (18).

Nevertheless, the Surrealists considered Freud to be extremely valuable. His theories provided them with a language to express their revolutionary ideas that were radically different from pre-World War I Western beliefs. Ultimately, the Surrealists sought to integrate all the different components of the individual, which had been shattered by the violence of World War I. By emphasizing the night side of being, the imagination, the instinct, desire, the dream, the irrational, Surrealism opened a field of total renewal to man (19). It was a powerful and controversial movement. Along with Freud, the Surrealists broke traditional borders "...aiming at nothing more intently than effacing the borderline between dream and reality, conscious and unconscious" (20). The Surrealists used these theories to understand the destruction and chaos of World War I.

Perhaps an analogy can be drawn between the Surrealist ideals and Joan Miro's painting *Dog Barking at the Moon* (1926), in which a ladder is propped against a wall and extends into the sky. The ladder may represent an adventure into the unknown — just as Surrealism was an adventure into the unknown. The

dog itself, barking at the moon, could represent the Surrealists and their human desire to represent novel and revolutionary concepts which stretched the human range of understanding.

NOTES

- (1) N. Sandrow, *Surrealism: Theater, Arts, Ideas* (Harper and Row), 1972, pp.10-14.
- (2) W. Rubin, *Dada and Surrealistic Art* (Thames and Hudson), 1978, p.10.
- (3) D. Schneider, *The Psychoanalyst and The Artist*, (New York), 1950, p.3.
- (4) W. Rubin, *Dada and Surrealistic Art* (Thames and Hudson), 1978, p.121.
- (5) *Ibid.*, p.121.
- (6) S. Wilson, *Surrealistic Painting* (Phaidon), 1975, p.10.
- (7) *Ibid.*, pp.9-10.
- (8) *Ibid.*, pp.7-8.
- (9) *Ibid.*, pp.6-7.
- (10) S. Stich, *Anxious Visions: Surrealistic Art*. (New York), 1990, p.12.
- (11) *Ibid.*, pp.144-145.
- (12) S. Wilson, *Surrealistic Painting* (Phaidon), 1975, p.10.
- (13) S. Freud, *The Complete Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis*. (London), 1971, pp.146-147.
- (14) J. Neu, *The Cambridge Companion to Freud*. (Cambridge), 1991, p.98.
- (15) *Ibid.*, p. 87.
- (16) S. Alexandrian, *Surrealistic Art*. (Thames and Hudson), 1985, p.48.
The word "Surrealism" is from the French word "Surréalisme" (from "sur" — over, beyond; and "réalisme" — realism). Thus, the literal meaning of the word (i.e. "beyond realism") corresponds very well with the notion of a "super-reality."
- (17) W. Gaunt, *The Surrealists*. (London), 1972, p.178.
- (18) R. Cardinal and R. Short, *Surrealism: Permanent Revolution*. (Studio Vista/Dutton Paperback), 1970, p.17.
- (19) M. Nadeau, *The History of Surrealism*. (London), 1964, p.227.
- (20) G. Picon, *Surrealism 1919-1939*. (Geneva), 1977, p.12.

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Truth or Media: Do Varieties of Coke and Pepsi Really Taste Different or are the Advertisers Just Fooling Us? *Lori S. Akawie*

Abstract

Eighteen Lehigh undergraduates participated in a taste test experiment, using a more systematic procedure than a similar study in Consumer Reports (August, 1991). Both studies had subjects judge preference and sweetness. However, the present experiment utilized a rating system and questionnaire to better quantify the judgments. The experiment tested diet and regular Coke and Pepsi with and without caffeine. Neither soda brand was rated significantly higher than the other, and caffeine had no effect on the preference or sweetness ratings. Finally, the diet sodas were significantly less preferred and were rated as less sweet than the regular sodas. Given these findings, it is suggested that health factors (caloric content and caffeine addiction), and appealing to consumers' emotions through advertising may affect consumer sales in the market place.

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When ordering a soda, the first question for many people is which brand, Coke or Pepsi? These two brands, which comprise 70% of today's soft drink market, were two of the first brands invented (Consumer Reports, 1991). In 1886, Coke was invented by accident, and in 1902 Pepsi emerged as a remedy for upset stomachs. These brands both originally served the dual functions of medicinal tonic and leisure refreshment. As we now know these sodas developed into the two soda market leaders that have competed with each other for almost a century.

Both Coke and Pepsi used to be 100% sweetened with sucrose (Consumer Reports, 1991). In 1980, Coke made an economical switch and began using 50% corn-syrup instead of the more expensive sucrose. In 1983 Pepsi

followed suit. Prior to this change, Diet Coke and Diet Pepsi had already emerged. In 1962, artificial sweeteners like aspartame (NutraSweet) were used instead of the natural sweeteners. Later, a further differentiation of caffeine and caffeine-free sodas emerged. The resulting three types of Coke and Pepsi, Regular, Diet and Caffeine-free, are rooted in the battle for supremacy and intense competition between the brands. This battle has resulted in extensive advertising campaigns which use catchy musical slogans, celebrities and taste test challenges to keep their products in the public eye and promote one or the other as the best brand of soda. The question arises whether or not the sodas really are different from each other, or if this billion dollar industry is superficially based and just has the public fooled. Bill Backer, the genius of Coke campaigns, admits, "The product of the Coca-Cola Company is not Coca-Cola. The product of the Coca-Cola Company is advertising" (Louis & Yazijian, 1980, p. 148).

The 1991 Consumer Reports studied Diet and Regular Coke and Pepsi with and without caffeine, as well as some other sodas. Consumer Reports (1991) found that diet sodas were less preferred and were rated as less sweet than the regular sodas because the artificial sweeteners lack the fullness of natural sugars. Furthermore, regular tasters were unable to identify a soda as Coke or Pepsi based on taste or sweetness. Expert tasters revealed that Coke has a vanilla flavor, whereas Pepsi has a citrusy, lime flavor. But, this did not enhance discrimination abilities in the average person. In addition, although Pepsi contains a little more sweetener than Coke, it does not taste sweeter. This is because the sour citrus flavor used in Pepsi offsets the sweetness (Consumer Reports, 1991). Finally, the absence or presence of caffeine had no effect on the preference and sweetness measures.

The present experiment expected to confirm the 1991 Consumer Reports data, but in doing so it used a more systematic procedure to better

quantify the results. In addition to the Consumer Reports (1991) blind taste test method, this experiment used a rating system that allowed the experimenters to evaluate and compare any of the sodas. A questionnaire was used as well to compare the subjects' opinions with their taste preference and sweetness ratings.

Overall, the patterns observed for the types of Coke should be the same as the patterns observed for the types of Pepsi. Neither brand should be rated better or more sweet than the other. Second, diet sodas, which are made with artificial sweeteners instead of sugar should have substantially lower taste preference and sweetness ratings. Finally, the taste preference and sweetness ratings should not be affected by the presence or absence of caffeine. Thus, the diet sodas with or without caffeine should be the least preferred and the least sweet. Conversely, the regular sodas with or without caffeine should be the most preferred and the most sweet.

The Experiment

Experiment and Subjects

This experiment was conducted as a group project in an experimental psychology class. Eighteen undergraduates (11 males, 7 females), who were enrolled in the introductory psychology class at Lehigh University participated in the study as subjects. They were randomly chosen and took part in order to satisfy a course requirement. Fourteen subjects reported that they drank at least three glasses of soda per week.

Procedure

Subjects sat opposite to two experimenters in an experimental chamber. One experimenter had the task of verbally instructing the subject while the other experimenter was responsible for preparing the sodas. We tested regular and diet Coke and Pepsi with and without caffeine. The sodas, which were stored at

room temperature, were hidden behind a barrier so the subjects could not see which sodas were being used. Keeping the sodas at room temperature allowed the sodas to maintain a consistent temperature through the experiment. We did this because we felt that human taste buds are more receptive to substances at room temperature than those substances that are colder; therefore, telling the sodas apart should have been somewhat easier.

The subject was then briefed on the experiment. It consisted of sipping soda from 20 different cups, two or four on each of six tests. Each 3 ounce cup was approximately one-third filled with soda, so they all appeared the same. Subjects were asked to eat an unsalted cracker between each of the six tests. Eating this cracker made sure that each subject had the same taste in his or her mouth before each test.

There were three taste preference tests and three sweetness tests. Trial 1 (taste preference) and Trial 2 (sweetness) involved tasting one brand of soda in its four variations. Trial 3 (taste preference) and Trial 4 (sweetness) involved tasting the other brand of soda in its four variations. Some subjects received the Coke brand for the first two trials and the Pepsi brand for the second two and the order was reversed for the other subjects. However, the subjects did not know that the Coke and Pepsi brands were not tested in the same trial.

After the first four trials, there was one more taste preference test (Trial 5) and one more sweetness test (Trial 6). These two trials were different because only one soda from each brand was tested against the other; thus, the subject was only presented with two cups. In Trial 5, the most preferred sodas from Trials 1 and 3 were compared. In Trial 6, the sweetest sodas from Trials 2 and 4 were compared. On Trials 5 and 6, there was no rating; the subject simply told the experimenter his/her most preferred and most sweet soda.

Now that the trial sequence has been explained, I will describe what the tests entailed. To save space, I will describe only the taste preference task, but

the basic procedure is the same for the sweetness task.

Preference Task

The subject was given a cracker and asked to turn around and eat it while the experimenter set up the cups. Once the experimenter filled and placed the cups in their proper order, the subject was asked to turn around. The subject was then asked to sip all four sodas in order from left to right and then to sip them again in order if necessary. The subject was asked to rank the sodas by placing the most preferred soda on the right. Next, the subject was asked to circle his/her rating of the sodas for taste preference. This was done on a data sheet that contained the numbers 1 through 20, which were horizontally spaced on a piece of paper. Twenty, which was on the left, was labeled the most preferred and 1, which was on the right, was labeled the least preferred. No two sodas on the data sheet were to be rated the same. The subject was given a separate data sheet for each brand. At this point, the subject was asked to take another cracker and turn around in the chair. While the subject was eating the cracker, the experimenter recorded the ratings on a separate data sheet. Then the experimenter set up the sodas for the sweetness task.

When the six trials were completed and the experimenter had recorded the data, the subject was asked to respond to a questionnaire.

Results

Analyzing the data statistically, we were able to make the following three comparisons: Coke vs. Pepsi, Regular vs. Diet, and Caffeine vs. Caffeine-free. Table 1 presents the mean ratings for taste preference and sweetness of each soda from the actual taste test, and Table 2 displays the subjects' answers to the questionnaire. We were able to compare what the subjects said they preferred from the questionnaire responses to what they actually preferred from

the taste test ratings. Out of the three comparisons, the diet vs. regular category was the only one significant in the questionnaire responses and the rating responses. The diet sodas were much less preferred and tasted much less sweet than the regular sodas. Even though the subjects did not have a preference for a sweet or non-sweet soda on the questionnaire, the diet sodas were rated significantly less sweet in relation to regular soda.

This preference for regular soda over diet soda in the taste preference and sweetness ratings was a consistent pattern for both Coke and Pepsi throughout the first four trials. Although a slim majority of the subjects said they could discriminate between Coke and Pepsi on the questionnaire, the ratings revealed that there was no clear ability to discriminate between them. Furthermore, the preference task between the most preferred Coke and the most preferred Pepsi (Trial 5) revealed that Pepsi was preferred over Coke, but not significantly. This indicates that some subjects who claimed to be able to pick out their more preferred brand, Coke, were not able to and chose Pepsi. As for Trial 6, the comparison between the most sweet Coke and most sweet Pepsi, neither brand was deemed more or less sweet than the other.

The pattern for Coke and Pepsi was also similar for the caffeine and caffeine-free sodas, which was the third comparison. Although subjects claimed in significant numbers to prefer soda with caffeine, less than half claimed they could discriminate between them. This difficulty of discrimination between caffeine and caffeine-free sodas was confirmed in the ratings. The absence or presence of caffeine had no effect on the taste preference or sweetness ratings of either brand.

Overall, the most sweet sodas did turn out to be the better tasting sodas, and the least sweet sodas were the least preferred sodas.

TABLE 1
Mean Taste Preference and Sweetness Ratings for Four
Types of Coke and Pepsi

	<u>Coke</u>		<u>Pepsi</u>	
	Regular Coke	Diet Coke	Regular Pepsi	Diet Pepsi
<u>Preference</u>				
Caffeine	12.4	8.2	13.0	7.7
Caffeine-free	13.2	8.7	12.3	9.2
<u>Sweetness</u>				
Caffeine	13.8	7.8	16.9	7.7
Caffeine-free	15.0	7.9	15.1	8.4

TABLE 2
Questionnaire Responses

<u>Question</u>	<u>Response</u>
• Prefer diet or regular Soda?	Diet-22%; Regular-78%
• Can you discriminate between them?	Yes-89%; No-11%
• Prefer caffeinated soda?	Caffeine-78%; No Caffeine-22%
• Can you discriminate between them?	Yes-44%; No-66%
• Prefer Coke or Pepsi?	Coke-50%; Pepsi-50%
• Can you discriminate between them?	Yes-61%; No-39%
• Prefer sweet or non-sweet soda?	Sweet-44%; Non-sweet-66%
• Is the most sweet soda the most preferred?	Yes-33%; No-67%
• Is the least sweet soda the least preferred?	Yes-61%; No-39%
• Does caffeine make soda sweeter?	Yes-44%; No-66%

Implications

Interpreting the results obtained from the systematic rating system and the questionnaire, it seems to me that the only real taste difference between sodas is whether it is diet or regular. Neither brand tasted better or sweeter than the other, and the tasters could not distinguish the presence or absence of caffeine. Therefore, I looked closer into the reasons why regular soda may taste better, but why the public still prefers to drink soda in its diet form. Furthermore, I suggest that advertising plays a tremendous role when someone is choosing between Coke or Pepsi and that there really is no significant difference between them. However, the media have been successful in fooling us.

Over the past seven years diet soda sales have increased. This increase may be a result of a calorie conscious society, not a better tasting soda. Consumer Reports (1991) found that people who drink both diet and regular soda actually prefer the taste of regular soda. Although diet soda is not the soda of choice for taste, it seems to satisfy consumers in another way. A trade-off is being made between a healthier one calorie soda that tastes good enough to drink and an unhealthier 160 calorie soda sweetened with 100% corn-syrup. The perception that artificial sweeteners, like aspartame, which are used in the diet sodas, lack the fullness of sugars may be true. However, this healthier less caloric diet soda satisfies consumers enough to be one reason for the 50% increase in diet soda sales over the past seven years (Consumer Reports, 1991).

Despite this increase in diet soda sales, future diet soda sales may be at risk. It has been suggested that the sales are dependent upon fresh taste and superior sweeteners (Keller, 1992). Keller (1992) claims that consumers have been slowly turning away from diet sodas because they tend to have a stale, piney taste if left on the shelf too long. Without a satisfying taste the draw to diet soda may lessen. Diet soda marketers should take measures to keep the artificial sweet taste as satisfying as possible. Otherwise, diet soda drinkers may not

choose regular high-calorie soda as an alternative, but perhaps seek another sweet, low-calorie competitor. This preference for a naturally sweet taste is supported in the present study as well as in Consumer Reports (1991).

As previously discussed, the ratings show this natural sweet taste can be pretty much equally found in both brands, Coke and Pepsi. It has been said that, "The colas are twins - they look the same, they taste the same and they bubble into foam the same" (Louis & Yazijian, 1980, p. 252). However, most people believe that while they may look and foam the same, they do not taste the same. The unsubstantiated common belief is that Pepsi tastes sweeter. Although Pepsi contains a little more sweetener than Coke, it does not taste sweeter because the sour citrus found in Pepsi offsets the sweetness (Consumer Reports, 1991). Perhaps the belief that Pepsi is sweeter than Coke stems from the never ending advertising campaign these companies promote. The musical slogans, celebrities, and taste-test challenges that are rampant throughout the malls seem to play on consumers' emotions. Moreover, this advertising fools consumers into believing that one brand tastes better or is more sweet than the other. Since there really is a minimal difference in quality between Coke and Pepsi, the brand image becomes a vital factor in soda sales and why both are spending billions of dollars on advertising. The strategy to sell soda seems to be based on advertising; taste has been lost as a true differentiator.

Further evidence for the similarity of sodas is found in Consumer Reports (1991). Other sodas, like RC Cola, taste just as good as Coke and Pepsi and sell for a lower price. This suggests that if consumers did not judge on the brand name itself, then soda satisfaction could be obtained for less money. Furthermore, very few people can actually pick out their favorite soda brand in a taste-test. In the Consumer Reports study, only 36% of regular soda drinkers and 26% of diet soda drinkers were able to pick out their favorite brand. The present experiment supports the difficulty inherent in picking out a preferred soda. Half

of the subjects claimed to prefer Coke and the other half Pepsi; yet more of them wound up choosing Pepsi in the actual taste test.

Nevertheless, maybe it is wrong to assume that soda sales are solely dependent on advertising (Harvey, 1992). Harvey (1992) claims that overall soda sales have fallen from 63% in 1984 to 60% in 1992. Furthermore, both Coke and Pepsi, which comprise 79% of the soda market, may have caused this loss by failing to build a brand image stressing brand value. While Coke and Pepsi marketers have been appealing to consumers' emotions, new beverages, like Perrier bottled water and wine coolers, have entered the competition. With less advertising, but with subtle appeal to consumers' values, these new beverages have been increasing in popularity since 1978.

Lacking caffeine, these newer beverages may still be a step behind the soda market. Even though caffeine does not affect the sodas' taste preference and sweetness ratings, subjects significantly claimed to have a preference for soda with caffeine. Perhaps this is based on society's desire to be a step ahead and have the extra jolt that caffeine, being a stimulant, seems to provide. The prolonged use of caffeine is addictive for many people. Caffeine addiction may be psychological, physiological, or both. A psychological addict may need caffeine to maintain feelings of well-being, and a physiological addict may need caffeine to avoid headaches and sleepiness. Ingesting around 200 milligrams of caffeine a day over an extended period of time can create this addiction. Since the subjects used in this experiment were Lehigh undergraduate students, I speculate that some perceive pressure to be a step ahead. Thus, caffeine, when it is viewed as an extra jolt may be one reason for our subjects' significant preference for it. Furthermore, I propose that if a wider population were tested, a significant preference for caffeinated soda would be found due to our fast paced society.

This experiment confirmed the Consumer Reports (1991) findings using

a more systematic method to measure taste preference and sweetness. The rating system and questionnaire allowed a more detailed evaluation of the tested sodas than the 1991 study conducted by Consumer Reports by quantifying the sodas in three ways (Coke vs. Pepsi, Diet vs. Regular, and Caffeine vs. Caffeine-free). In conclusion, I submit that Regular Coke and Regular Pepsi with or without caffeine are the most preferred for those who desire a naturally sweet taste. However, Diet Coke and Diet Pepsi with or without caffeine may be the most preferred for those who desire a healthier less caloric soda with somewhat of a sweet taste. Finally, for those consumers who are not caught up in drinking a soda just for its name, a less expensive soda may be equally satisfying. Consumer Reports (1991) suggests that some less expensive sodas taste just as good as the soda market leaders, Coke and Pepsi. Perhaps a future study can be conducted which includes Coke and Pepsi as well as less expensive sodas. If the Consumer Reports (1991) claim is supported then this is further evidence of the media sham the soda market has created.

Personally, I am a soda drinker and realize from the experiment that only a minimal difference between the brands Coke and Pepsi exists. By habit I still purchase one brand over the other if their costs are similar. However, since conducting this study I tend to buy which ever brand is cheaper of the two. So my message to you is, don't get caught up in the media. Coke isn't necessarily it and Pepsi may not be the right one either. The truth has prevailed over the media and for all intents and purposes there is no difference between the two soda leaders.

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Unhappily Ever After Joanne M. Nokland

Damsels are forever in distress and are always being rescued from their unfortunate lot in life by some prince charming with whom they ride off into the sunset and live happily ever after. These fairytale ideas we have all grown up with taught us ideals about love and marriage and about the expectations and limitations of our gender roles. In such a patriarchal society the male's role is to be independent, active, aggressive, and unemotional, while the female's role is to be dependent, passive, docile, and emotional. In *A Gentle Creature* by Fyodor Dostoevsky and *Lady Macbeth of Mtsensk* by Nikolai Leskov we see portraits of two women forced to behave according to the rigidly defined, traditional sex roles established by Russia's patriarchal society of the nineteenth century and the dilemma this role creates for them. Both women are rescued by male characters who later entrap them into a life of seclusion and obedience. The heroines use sexuality as an instrument of power over another individual that transforms them into tragic figures — figures whose only tragic flaw was belonging to the female race.

In *A Gentle Creature* and *Lady Macbeth of Mtsensk* both women are seemingly rescued from their impoverished lives by their older future husbands. Katerina Lvovna of *Lady Macbeth of Mtsensk* was "a girl from a poor family who could not afford to be choosy" (p. 111). She became the second wife to Zinovy Borisych Izmailov, a fifty-year-old merchant of Kursk, not out of love or attraction, but simply to better her impoverished situation. Zinovy Borisych was from a small and rather "well-to-do" family. The sixteen-year-old girl in *A Gentle Creature* also came from a very poor background and was desperate to escape her abominable living situation. After her parents died she was forced to "slave" for her aunts. This was her first entrapment. She had nowhere else to go.

She taught her aunt's children, made their underclothing for them, and in the end not only made their underclothing for them, but scrubbed the floors as well, and that with her weak chest, too... they even beat her, begrudged her every bite of bread she ate. And they ended up by intending to sell her. (p. 677)

Her aunts intended for her to marry a fat shopkeeper who owned two grocery stores. Yet, horrified by this proposition, the girl tried to take control of her own life by putting advertisements in *The Voice* hoping to get a nanny position. To pay for these advertisements she pawned items of little monetary value but of a seemingly priceless value to her. Although she couldn't escape her life by herself, the pawnbroker proposed to marry her but only as a favor to her, to save her from marrying the dreaded shopkeeper. He thought, "Oh, what filth I had dragged her out of then! She ought to have appreciated my action." Both these women pass from one entrapment to another: they are entrapped in a life of poverty and then entrapped in a power struggle with their husbands.

Both Dostoevsky and Leskov create a world where freedom, power, and control lie with the men in society, while the women are to be subservient, loyal, appreciative, and passive both in action and in speech. Men are the possessive bosses of the family and women are seen as their property. Men had rights, while women seemingly had none. In *Lady Macbeth of Mtseusk* Katerina Lvovna Izmailova stayed cooped up in the attic "like a canary in a cage" (p. 119) while her husband and father-in-law went to work. Katerina's cloistered life in the attic is analogous to the fairytale image of Rapunzel locked up in her tower. "The unrelieved monotony of life in the merchant's barred and bolted tower of a house, with its high staked fence and loose watchdogs, occasionally depressed the young woman to the point of stupefaction" (p. 113). It was a mundane life for Katerina, who spent much time alone being bored; "that peculiarly Russian boredom makes even the thought of hanging oneself seem a cheerful prospect" (p. 113). No one paid attention to her lonely situation, and her husband showed her hardly any affection. With the presence of her husband Katerina had no freedom; she was quiet and reserved in her speech and actions.

Leskov does not give Katerina a voice until her husband removes his domineering presence from the estate to attend to business away from home. With her husband's extended absence from her, Katerina changes and becomes aware of this newly discovered freedom. It is only then that we first hear Katerina's own voice through her own words: "What am I doing, sitting here yawning my head off like this?" (p. 114). Katerina's first conversations are brief and display her questioning nature. She is intrigued by the excitement of the gallery outside the granaries and is constantly asking questions. As the story progresses her voice becomes stronger in her life and in the text. Leskov emphasizes her increased freedom to speak and her increased say in her own life by employing a dialogue within his story accompanied by the third-person-objective narrator. With each chapter the amount of Katerina's dialogue increases along with the length of her sentences as does her boldness to express her opinions. In chapter four she tells her father-in-law, "Let Sergei out of there, father-in-law" (p. 122); in chapter seven she carries on a lengthy discussion with her newly-arrived husband in which she speaks her mind without restraint: "I've no reason to look to myself. As if it weren't enough to go wagging a lot of nonsense in your direction, I have to put up with all your innuendos as well. That's a fine state of things, isn't it?" (p. 137). Therefore, we now have Katerina's own perspective as well.

We realize this drastic change in Katerina from being silent to loquacious in her husband's reaction upon his return home: "Well, you'd better watch out, that's all I can say. You seem to have an awful lot to say for yourself" (p. 137). He tries to remind her that he, as her husband, holds all the control and power and that he has a right to beat her in punishment for her affair. Zinovy Borisych states, "No one is going to do so. . ." (p. 138). However, Katerina already has assumed her own power and identity allied with that of Sergei: "We'll do this my way, not yours. . ." (p. 140). Only by killing her father-in-law

and her husband can Katerina escape her entrapment of marriage, discover her freedom, and finally have a say in her own life.

In contrast, in *A Gentle Creature* by Dostoevsky, the woman does not have much of a say in her own life due to her status as a woman and as a poor member of society, nor is she given her own say in the text. The story is told from a husband's perspective after his wife's death as he reflects back upon their lives. He is the narrator and he controls what we hear the woman say. He also controls her and plays her according to his plan. He would accept items from her that other pawnbrokers wouldn't, such as a cigar holder and an icon. He wanted to assure himself that she would continue to return, and he wanted to make her dependent upon him. He would even put her in her place so as to raise his own self-estimation. He was blunt to the point of meanness about how her advertisements simply wouldn't receive any response. He was extremely possessive of her from the start: "Even at that time I already regarded her as mine, and not for one moment did I doubt my own power" (p. 696). The pawnbroker was even secretly finding out all about the woman through her maid, Lukerya. It was his plan to ensnare her: "Good and gentle creatures do not offer a very stiff resistance, not for long, anyway" (p. 673). When he found out about her life he thought, "I appeared as though from a higher world" (p. 677). After all he was a retired first lieutenant of a famous regiment and was a nobleman by birth.

Little by little he increased his power over her, culminating in his marriage proposal: "Oh, a man knows a dirty trick when he sees one!" (p. 679). He knew that "the fat shopkeeper at any rate was more hateful to her" than he was; he proposed the idea of marriage as a favor to her, as if he's saving her, like the prince who saved Cinderella. But what fascinated him was "that feeling of inequality." He purposefully tried to be stern, to exert his power over her, and to control her. Through this marriage the pawnbroker entrapped this "gentle

creature" and placed her in the submissive role of a woman. "Mind you, I know that a woman, and particularly a girl of sixteen, simply must submit to her husband. Women have no originality" (p. 685). According to the pawnbroker, women need to be controlled, and only men have rights: "Yes, I had a right to want to make myself secure at the time. I had a right to open the pawnshop... I had a right to look on life with my own eyes... and she had no right to walk out of the flat. She was to go nowhere without me" (p. 688). He was a god-like figure who played with the young girl's life; "I created a whole system." He had to always have the upper, controlling hand and his decisions did not have to be logical. Although he would strictly ration the amount of money he would give her each day for food, he would spend money for them to go to the theater once a month.

His plan was to control her completely, both in thought and in action. And when she would express her disapproval, she was punished. When the young woman refused to go to the theater anymore, he gave her the silent treatment. When she took a stance independent of her husband regarding the exchange of the captain's widow's bracelet worth eight roubles for a medallion worth thirty roubles, he humiliated her by saying that women have no rights. Furthermore, he never validated any of her feelings. He would always rebuff her attempts to embrace him. She seemed to live in a vacuum with everything but her knitting inaccessible to her. Not only was she isolated from the outside environment; the interior of the house was not at her disposal. The locked trunk inside the house, to which only the pawnbroker possessed the key, symbolized the young woman's imprisonment by her husband, both physically and emotionally, within her house.

In both *A Gentle Creature* and *Lady Macbeth of Mtsensk* the women are entrapped by their husbands into a submissive life isolated from affection and any interaction with society. Both women desire freedom from this

ensnarement; yet their only available escape from the morass in which they find themselves is through an extramarital affair. Both the women and the men in *A Gentle Creature* and *Lady Macbeth of Mtseusk* use their sexuality as an instrument of power over their partners, and it is this sexuality that brings about the tragic results in both short stories.

The woman in *A Gentle Creature* rebels against her husband's control and now leaves the house to meet with Yefimovich, an army officer and former colleague and adversary of the pawnbroker. It is through these encounters that this gentle creature attempts to attain her own freedom and power by humiliating the pawnbroker. The woman uses her sexuality to allure Yefimovich to her. However, while Yefimovich attempted to conquer her sexually, she "could not bear the horrible disgrace of it" (p. 691). She merely laughs at his professions of love and wittily responds to his grovelling. In this scene although the reader is unaware of the exact dialogue taking place, a strong change is felt in the young woman's character as we suddenly begin to feel her come alive and find her voice. Although we don't actually hear her speak because the story is told from the pawnbroker's perspective, Dostoevsky skillfully manages to impart this impression of her independence. This former gentle creature tries to assume a sense of power and identity for herself by seizing her husband's gun and contemplating his murder. However, she could not find the strength to kill him; therefore, her husband won the power struggle. The pawnbroker "had conquered and she was conquered forever" (p. 695). He dissolved the marriage with his purchase of a separate bed for her. Although at times he felt sorry for her and her humiliation, "what pleased me was the idea of our inequality" (p. 700). He even admits that the reason he married the woman was only to torment her (p. 707).

When the pawnbroker suddenly openly displays his affection for her and is willing to change his life for her, she admits that she was guilty but that

she would remain a true and faithful wife. However, being a very honest woman, she knew that she could not live up to this promise of hers and that she would completely lose her identity. So she took her life by throwing herself out the window. The irony of the power theme continues when the pawnbroker states to the judge, "What power do you possess to exact obedience from me? I shall live my own life" (p. 713). These are the same painstakingly silenced thoughts of the gentle creature who, only through taking her own life, could attain her freedom.

In *Lady Macbeth of Mtsensk* both Sergei and Katerina employ their sexuality in a struggle for power. It is Sergei who empowers Katerina to seek out her freedom; he ultimately leaves her with the choice of whether to have the affair or not, although he seduces her with both his flattery and his sexual appeal: "Your life's no happier than mine, only now. . . at this very moment it's all in your hands, it's all in your power" (p. 120). Katerina's first instinct parallels the tragedy of the woman in *A Gentle Creature*; she is full of terror and contemplates jumping out of the window. Sergei is a very sensual character who knows, through experience, how to use his sexuality to conquer a woman and exert his power over her; "I can find doors to you and from you wherever I look" (p. 120). Sergei seduces Katerina to prove his virility and worth as a male in society, attain more power, and trick and humiliate Katerina into giving her last stockings to Sonetka. Sergei uses his sexuality as a tool to manipulate all the women in *Lady Macbeth of Mtsensk*: Katerina, Fiona, and Sonetka.

Once empowered by Sergei to take some control in her extramarital affairs, Katerina's pent-up passion exploded and she "completely let herself go. She was no coward, and there was no knowing what might be on her mind; she strutted about giving orders to everyone in the house, and would not let Sergei out of her sight" (p. 123). Katerina begins to have a say in her own life but only by removing the social entrapment established by her husband; to achieve such

freedom from entrapments Katerina employs extremely drastic measures such as the murder of her father-in-law, her husband, and Fedya Lyamin (Boris' young nephew). Both Katerina and Sergei use their sexuality as an instrument of power. If Sergei would maintain his amorous relations with her, Katerina would make him a merchant so that they could live together in a proper fashion; she even has him addressed as Sergei Filipych now (p. 145). Her pregnancy initially provides her with the power to take over her murdered husband's entire business; for now there was finally an heir. Through his sexuality Sergei empowers Katerina in her quest for freedom from her secluded life in the attic and yet reduces her to a shell of a human being. Katerina loses her power to talk back and speak her mind. Sergei as a male possesses a strong power over Katerina; it is this power which brings about the tragic deaths of Katerina and Sonetka.

Once Sergei became totally unaffectionate towards her, Katerina became silent and refrained from speaking. "At times these replies would make Katerina Lvovna bite her lip until the blood came; at others, her normally dry eyes would well with tears of rage and resentment in the darkness of their nocturnal rendezvous, yet she endured it all, refrained from answering back, and tried to deceive herself" (p. 159). Now that Katerina has lost her social standing, been flogged, and been sent into exile, sentenced to a life of penal servitude, Sergei succeeds at putting her in her place: "You're not the wife of an important merchant anymore so. . . don't go giving yourself airs. Beggars can't be choosers" (p. 163). Katerina is put back in the woman's powerless role once again. She no longer has a say in her life nor in the text. When Sergei offends her she only has the energy to spit in his face before she collapses onto Fiona. Leskov no longer allows Katerina to speak; yet through her act of throwing herself and Sonetka over the side of the ferry, we hear the smothered cry of a woman destined to be mute in a world dominated by men.

In *A Gentle Creature* by Dostoevsky and *Lady Macbeth of Mtsensk* by Leskov there's no "happily ever after" for our heroines. Both women experience the limitations of their gender roles and remain entrapped by the males' domineering roles. Neither the gentle creature nor Katerina could survive in the patriarchal society in which they lived. Only through death can each young heroine seize control of her own life; only through their deaths can they escape the entrapment of males.

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Operation Restore Hope: Three Phases of Propaganda *Court Harson*

On Dec. 3, 1992, the U.S. government announced plans to send more than 28,000 troops to rescue the famine-stricken in Somalia. In the weeks before this announcement, United Nations workers tried to distribute food to needy Somalis, but their efforts were hindered by thievery and violence on the streets of Somalia's capital, Mogadishu. The looting intensified, and Mogadishu's port was closed after a U.N. ship was fired upon.

Operation Restore Hope aimed to protect U.N. aid givers from the looting and violence of armed Somali factions and to ensure that U.N. food deliveries would reach the starving Somalis. The mission was meant to be humanitarian, and it met with minimal dissent from the American public and mainstream media.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze Operation Restore Hope as an instance of U.S. media and government propaganda. This paper will argue that: 1) Media coverage of the Somalia famine and the chaotic government was limited in scope and used simplified imagery to create a dramatic crisis in which "gun-toting gangs" and "warlords" prevented food from reaching "helpless, starving children," thus generating support for an eventual American aid mission; 2) The official address by President George Bush announcing his plans for Operation Restore Hope used "stacked deck" techniques of propaganda by presenting limited and selected information; and 3) The operation, although nominally humanitarian, had strong political implications.

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In Spring, 1992, the American news media reported that famine and tribal infighting were ravaging the people of Somalia. Although few Americans knew where Somalia was, they were moved by pictures of starving children there. The press also reported that half a million Somalis could die by the end of the year, and that the warring factions severely crippled the distribution of food aid.

The situation in Somalia received hearty media attention after the U.S. presidential election campaign ended. Night after night, the media pumped the images of stick-thin children into American living rooms and provided daily death tolls. The United Nations was summoned to help the Somalis, but the armed gangs prevented the aid givers from completing their work.

The story in Somalia became one of helpless starving people and armed gangs that prevented food aid distribution. The media ignored the complicated history, class landscape and social issues of Somalia's civil war and simplified the ordeal into "a cartoon terrain of warlords, drug-intoxicated, gun-toting young hoodlums in shades and starving children ministered to by Western relief agencies" (Cockburn, 762). But by oversimplifying the story, the media led the public to believe that U.S. intervention was not only necessary, but that it would be easy.

The media presented only one chapter in the history of recent Somalia. How did the civil strife begin? What had been the United States' involvement in Somalia in the past? Why are the so-called "warlords" fighting? These questions were ignored by a media that was gung-ho on dramatizing and fragmenting the news. W. Lance Bennett criticizes the media for its limited scope in reporting international events: "The mass media almost always retreats from opportunities to explain the power structures and political processes that lie behind the issues that pop, mysteriously, onto the public agenda" (Bennett, 23).

Bennett discusses how media coverage of news is dramatized and fragmented. In the Somali famine story, pictures of starving children — a three-year-old who weighed 13 pounds (a television news program showed him on the scale) — are terribly dramatic and upsetting. Furthermore, the media insists on fragmenting the story from pertinent background information. "News stories would become undramatic and too complicated to grasp if their plots were strained to include multiple issues and explanations of larger institutional

processes" (Bennett, 24).

Moreover, the wide coverage of the Somalia famine is an example of the media's role as newsmaker. Television news is especially interested in choosing to cover stories with pictures, and the footage of emaciated Somalis is very visual. The news media's decision to cover one story but not another distorts the relative importance of world events. Sure, half a million Somalis may have died in the famine, but when U.S.-backed Indonesian troops massacred 200,000 innocents in East Timor, the media hardly noticed. Because of the choice of the media, the Somalia famine became a big story and the East Timor massacre was buried. Furthermore, although the Sudan suffers from severe famine, natural disasters, civil strife and mass migration, and although the Sudanese government has even begun ethnic cleansing against a minority, the Sudan receives little or no media coverage, and consequently no U.S. humanitarian intervention (Sciolino, 12-6-92, 1).

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After the media chose to make a huge story of the Somalia famine and the public clamored for Washington to do something, President Bush introduced Operation Restore Hope. Bush knew the plan would meet with little resistance because the media already had presented the oversimplified issue and generated support for humanitarian action in Somalia. Bush had no difficulty presenting a "stacked deck" speech in which he gave limited and selected information about his plan. We need to examine what he said and what he left out:

In the second sentence of his speech, Bush said that "every American has seen the shocking images from Somalia." He knew most Americans had seen these pictures because if they had not, he would not have been making this speech. In fact, it was the heavy media coverage of the Somalia famine and the public outcry that pushed Bush toward action.

Bush reported that over a quarter of a million people had died in the Somalia famine. But equally high numbers of innocents have died in civil and natural strife all across the globe during Bush's term as president. Why send troops to Somalia but not to East Timor, China, Bosnia, the Sudan, Liberia or Haiti?

Bush said that he consulted his advisors and decided that America would send troops to Somalia to create a secure environment so food could be delivered to the starving. But he did not say that on Dec. 1, the Central Intelligence Agency called the prospect for restoring order to the Somali government "bleak" (Sciolino, 12-2-92, A18).

Bush said the Somali people were desperate for help: "The people of Somalia, especially the children of Somalia, need our help. We're able to ease their suffering. We must help them live. We must give them hope. America must act." In other words, America needs to help the only way it can. Americans have been conditioned to believe that the only solutions to international problems involve the military. America is a waning superpower with military might; It can provide troops for a humanitarian cause. But Bush failed to mention that easing the suffering of Somalis is a new policy for the United States. Presidents Carter and Reagan both supported deposed Somali dictator Mohammed Siad Barre, who was responsible for the deaths of 150,000 Somalis. Bush also did not mention that if the Western world curtailed its diet of beef, the feed used to raise the cattle could be used to end world hunger. The famine and civil strife in Somalia were not as simple as Bush made it seem, nor was troop deployment the only solution. The president's comments were short-sighted and manipulative of his audience.

Bush said that the United States would not be working alone: "We and our coalition partners" would be the actors in the operation. But according to the Associated Press, U.S. soldiers represented 93 percent of the international force in

Somalia.

Bush then explained the two-part nature of the operation: "First, we will create a secure environment in the hardest-hit parts of Somalia so that food can move from ships overland to the people in the countryside now devastated by starvation. And second . . . we will withdraw our troops, handing the security mission back to a regular U.N. peacekeeping force This operation is not open-ended. We will not stay one day longer than is absolutely necessary." Bush later reassured his audience: "We have no intent to remain in Somalia with fighting forces, but we are determined to do it right, to secure an environment that will allow food to get to the starving people of Somalia." But, as *The Nation* notes, a military force of 28,000 troops with a virtually open-ended mission to create a secure environment in Somalia is a "significant political enterprise" (*Nation*, 760). Somalia, located on the Horn of Africa just across the Gulf of Aden from the Arabian Peninsula, is in a strategically sensitive area of the world. The Arab-Israeli conflict, oil and the huge arms arsenal of the Middle East could erupt into a conflict crucial to American interests. Any intervention in such a conflict "would likely project American power into the region into the next century" (*Nation*, 760).

Bush addressed the people of Somalia: "We do not plan to dictate political outcomes. We respect your sovereignty and independence." American intervention in Somalia can not be neutral. Any occupation intended to create a secure environment will eventually support one of the warring Somali factions. When U.S. troops leave Somalia, a chaotic power vacuum will most likely ensue. In order to prevent such a situation, the United States will have to back one of the warlords.

But any warlord the United States supports will not restore order or end the famine in Somalia. A warlord that the United State backs will only implement a pro-United States regime and "the stage will be set for the next act

of civil strife and famine" (*Nation*, 760).

Bush's announcement of Operation Restore Hope was widely supported by the American public and the mainstream media. The use of 28,000 American troops for a humanitarian cause was not questioned. That is because Bush, like the media in the months before this speech, used propaganda techniques to generate public support for the plan. Bush played on the emotions of the American public and oversimplified the events in Somalia. If an American sees children dying from starvation and knows thieves are stealing their food, he or she will not disagree with a plan to help them. But Bush failed to tell the entire story — he never gave the big picture — and therefore he successfully mobilized opinion in favor of his plan. For example, a *New York Times* editorial said "American troops are rightly being sent to Somalia to insure that food reaches millions of starving people" (*New York Times*, 12-4-92, A30). Bush was never challenged by the media; instead the media's unquestioned support enabled Bush to work his propaganda and gain widespread public support for his plan.

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Operation Restore Hope began on Dec. 9 when U.S. troops landed in Mogadishu. The event received tremendous media coverage: *The New York Times* gave 144 column inches to the landing in Somalia. In the next several days, the Somalia story remained on page one of newspapers and led evening news broadcasts. Although the coverage was extensive, the media consensus still supported Bush's plan and offered no dissenting opinions. Operation Restore Hope was called the "mission to aid the starving" (*New York Times*, 12-9-92, A1), a "mission of mercy" (*New York Times*, 12-13-92, 4:1) and "The U.S. to the Rescue" (*Time*, 12-14-92, cover). Editorials praised the effort and called for similar humanitarian operations in other countries like Bosnia.

The media relied heavily on sources within the U.S. government to

write their news stories. Somalis were seldom interviewed. Martin Lee and Norman Solomon say this reliance on government sources is typical of the U.S. press: "U.S. journalists commonly layer their stories with dubious statements from unnamed U.S. diplomats The end result is contradictory and misleading news coverage" (Lee and Solomon, 298).

But the news media rarely stepped back and questioned Bush's purpose. Although the motivation for Operation Restore Hope may have been largely humanitarian, Bush clearly had some political reasons for his actions in Somalia. A 17-column-inch story in *The New York Times* reported that anonymous senior Bush aides said that the U.S. role in Somalia gave Bush a way to leave the presidency in glory. Some said that Bush's desire to leave office on a high note affected his decision. One official said Bush wished to be seen ending his term as a decisive leader and not as a vanquished politician (Wines, A14). But this was a single report buried on page A14 and was the only indication in the *Times* that Bush intervened in Somalia for political reasons. The story was forgotten, and the humanitarian motivation continued to be stressed and praised.

Why didn't the press question Bush's political motives? Is leaving office on a high note any kind of reasons to commit 28,000 American lives to a foreign crisis? Had Bush won the Nov. 3 election, would he have sent troops to Somalia? Apparently, timing played a role in his decision: Bush wanted to go out in a blaze of glory, and the Somalia famine enabled him to do so.

Furthermore, Somalia's location probably affected Bush's decision to send troops. If Somalia were not near the Middle East, would the United States have sent troops? If Somalia did not have ocean access, would America have intervened? Probably not. We have already noted the similar strife in countries like Liberia, the Sudan and Bosnia that went relatively unnoticed. But Somalia was an easy place for the United States to intervene. In addition, Somalia provided an opportunity for America to flex its military muscle in the strategi-

cally important Middle East.

Another political motive behind Operation Restore Hope was the government's intention to frame the news media. Since the Vietnam War, the government has successfully muzzled the press during wartime so as not to rally the American public against Third World intervention. During the war in Vietnam, footage of dead U.S. soldiers turned the public against the war. In subsequent conflicts, including Grenada, Panama and the Gulf War, the press was censored so that no disturbing information reached the blissfully ignorant American public. In fact, the government successfully convinced the majority of Americans that censorship of the press during wartime is necessary: Polls conducted by the Freedom Forum suggest that most Americans agree with wartime censorship.

During Operation Restore Hope, the U.S. government told the press where on the Somali coast it would be landing. But when troops landed on a Mogadishu beach and were swarmed by television cameras, the Pentagon was upset because the media's lights and cameras endangered the lives of the troops. An Associated Press report said that a Marine major "virtually invited reporters onto the beach, saying they could freely cover the troops' arrival" (Burns, A1). The government clearly wanted press coverage of the landing. The images of troops landing on Somali shores would have stirred support for the operation, not unlike the way footage of bombing runs and Patriot missiles rallied the public during the Gulf War. But the government also wanted to make the press look bad. If the government could make the news media look careless or uninterested in the safety of the troops, it could continue to convince the public that the press must be censored during wars.

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Operation Restore Hope and the events in Somalia demonstrate how

the United States propaganda structure works. The media simplified and isolated a dramatic and visual story. The government introduced a plan by presenting limited and selected information. The media rarely challenged the government or its plan, and thus the plan met widespread support and only limited dissent.

In a free society, democracy works when issues are fully discussed and alternative solutions are presented. The role of the press in a democracy is to question authority in order to ensure that the public is not manipulated. The media did not question the military's actions in Somalia, and the government was allowed to distort the events of Operation Restore Hope. Democracy was never given a chance.

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Molloy: A Parody of the Jungian Mind

Gretchen Beidler

To remove this isolation and confusion of modern man, to make it possible for him to find his place in the great stream of life, to assist him to a wholeness that knowingly and deliberately binds his light, conscious side to the dark one of the unconscious—this is the meaning and aim of Jungian guidance.

(The Psychology of C. G. Jung, Jacobi, 48)

Gaber, he said, life is a thing of beauty, Gaber, and a joy for ever. . . . Do you think he meant human life? I listened. Perhaps he didn't mean human life, I said.

(Molloy, 164)

The first volume of Samuel Beckett's trilogy, *Molloy* (1955) consists of two reluctant autobiographies recorded by two listless narrators, which somehow fuse into a cohesive narrative of despair, hilarity, and seemingly impenetrable depth.¹ Religious and mythic echoes resound through the novel and have tantalized scholars for four decades, but *Molloy* resists definitive interpretation and there is still no critical consensus as to what, simply, the two-part structure of the novel "means." Nor, with luck, will there ever be. To explicate the significance of one facet of *Molloy* implies a benign falsification of the rest: *Molloy* is a veritable "chameleon" (30), and accommodates itself to a spectrum of valid critical views. This essay shall capture only one of its hues.

Beckett was familiar with the scholarship of Carl Gustav Jung, and an overview of Jung's basic psychological precepts provides fascinating insight into the barren plot and binary structure of *Molloy*.² The novel incorporates countless other philosophical, psychological, and mythological influences, of course, but Jung's theories in particular are "personified" by the two dishevelled protagonists in Beckett's text. Considered in this context, *Molloy* is clearly a parody of the Jungian psyche.

I shall first discuss Jung's definitions of the "conscious" and the

"unconscious," and how these terms are brought to life by Moran and Molloy. More specifically, I shall argue that Moran acts the part of a Jungian "persona," and that Molloy provides a remarkable verbalization of a Jungian "shadow's" intangible point of view. Ultimately, however, Beckett's fictionalization of the Jungian psyche shatters the very mould in which it was cast. Jung sought, through "individuation," to unify polarized factions in the human mind. Moran and Molloy have become "one," in a sense, at the end of the epic quests, but with un-Jungian, debilitating results. They become identical, anguishing cripples, writing convulsive lies, lying in bed. Contrary to Jung's ideal of a unified, rejuvenated human consciousness, Beckett seems to suggest mankind's ultimate place in this "great stream of life" is battered and whining, washed up on shore. To seek individuation in such a life through psychoanalysis is absurd, like "one dying of cancer obliged to consult his dentist." (30)

In his article "On the Nature of the Psyche," Jung argues that the human mind is segregated into two opposing, complementary spheres: the conscious and the unconscious. Separated from the conscious mind by a "flimsy threshold" (Jung 81), the unconscious "depicts an extremely fluid state of affairs" (Jung 95) where nonetheless "everything goes on functioning just as though it were conscious. There is perception, thinking, feeling, volition, and intention" (Jung 96). The first several lines of Molloy's bewildering second paragraph perfectly articulate this fluid stew of unconscious perception. Molloy describes a nebulous realm where:

All grows dim. . . . It's in the head. It doesn't work any more, it says, I don't work any more. You go dumb as well and sounds fade. The threshold scarcely crossed that's how it is. It's the head. . . . If you think of the forms and light of other days it is without regret. But you seldom think of them, with what would you think of them: I don't know. People pass too, hard to distinguish from yourself. That is discouraging. (8)

Jung further classifies people as either "extraverted" or "introverted" types, depending on their response to society and the outside world. Both these traits,

he claims, exist in every human mind "in compensatory relation to each other. If the consciousness is extraverted, the unconscious is introverted, and conversely" (Jacobi 23). Moran embodies the ultrarational repression of an extraverted consciousness, while the primitive gropings of an introverted unconsciousness are left for Molloy.

Molloy's Narrative

Let us first consider Molloy's narrative, "that long confused emotion that was my life" (25), as a soliloquy stemming from the depths of the unconsciousness. The human unconscious, Jung observes, consists of:

everything of which I know, but of which I am not at the moment thinking; everything of which I was once conscious but have now forgotten; everything perceived by my senses, but not noted by my conscious mind; everything which, involuntarily and without paying attention to it, I feel, think, remember, want and do. . . . These contents are all more or less capable, so to speak, of consciousness, or were once conscious and may become conscious again.

(Jung 5)

Molloy's narrative recreates this incomprehensible environment, in so far as it is possible to put unintelligible perceptions into words. "The less I think," he explains, "the more certain I am" (12), and "even my sense of identity was wrapped in a namelessness often hard to penetrate" (31). Molloy's region is a surreal landscape where "there could be no things but nameless things, no names but thingless names" (31). He confuses east with west, right with left, he inverts the poles and fumbles with tangible evidence of a bigger, external, world. "I misjudged the distance separating me from the other world, and often I stretched out my hand for what was far beyond my reach, and often I knocked against obstacles scarcely visible on the horizon" (50). Molloy cannot articulate his reasons for wanting to find his mother, but he insists that at one point "I knew them, I must have known them, I had only to find them again" (27). It is this murky arena Molloy describes as he dissolves in and out of his own

perception: "there were times when I forgot not only who I was, but that I was, forgot to be" (49). Molloy is consciously unconscious. Beset by the "dutiful confusions" (15) of his tiny, vast environment, he hints "I am perhaps confusing several different occasions, and different times, deep down, and deep down is my dwelling" (14). Even the "limpid language" (87) with which Molloy expresses himself is not to be trusted, he explains, for it is at best a crude approximation of what didn't go on:

And when I say I said, etc., all I mean is that I knew confusedly things were so, without knowing exactly what it was all about. And every time I say, I said this, or I said that, or speak of a voice saying far away inside me, Molloy, and then a fine phrase more or less clear and simple, or find myself compelled to attribute to others intelligible words, or hear my own voice uttering to others more or less articulate sounds, I am merely complying with the convention that demands you either lie or hold your peace. For what really happened was quite different. . . . I said nothing at all, but heard a murmur, something gone wrong with the silence. . . . And then sometimes there arose within me, confusedly, a kind of consciousness, which I express by saying I said, etc., . . . for it seemed to me nothing at all, and I had no impressions of any kind, but simply somewhere something had changed, so that I too had to change, or the world too had to change, in order for nothing to be changed (88).

It is this rambling, evasive non-voice, we must remember, which describes the non-happenings in Molloy's hazy, unconscious non-world.

The correspondence between Molloy's environment and Jung's theory of the human unconscious extends beyond the haphazard fluidity of each. Jung further describes the unconscious as a "mythological envelope" of sorts (Jung 97). While the same processes go on in the unconscious as in the conscious realm, in the unconscious they "sink back to a more primitive (archaic-mythological) level, to approximate . . . the underlying instinctual pattern, and to assume the qualities which are the hallmarks of instinct: automatism, nonsusceptibility to influence, all-or-none reaction, and so forth" (Jung 97). Many critics have responded to the mythic allusions sprinkled though both halves of Molloy. As Edith Kern observes, "it is only appropriate that Beckett

has cast the tale of this descent into the shape of ancient myths. For modern thinkers and writers, perhaps under the influence of Freud and Jung, have come to view the realm of myth as a reflection of the unconscious where is pooled the very essence of man" (Kern 40). Ruby Cohn delineates Molloy as a "figure of mythic size" (Cohn 83), and Rubin Rabinovitz has pointed out that Molloy "resembles a collage as well as a palimpsest" (Rabinovitz 31) of mythic figures and events. Indeed, Molloy narrates his story in the "mythological present" (26) and Beckett deliberately indicates he is a shuffling "conglomerate of all nature's kingdoms, as lonely and as bound" (Moran's words, 110). Furthermore, Molloy displays all the Jungian "hallmarks of instinct": "automatism" in his blind quest for his mother, "nonsusceptibility to influence" in his indifference to Mrs. Loy, and "all-or-none reaction" to the social worker's "tottering" (23) offer of tea. I do not mean to imply that Beckett sculpted his characters in verbatim compliance to Jungian terms. Rather, Beckett saturates Molloy with general symptoms of a Jungian unconscious in order, as we shall see, to challenge Jung's beatific vision of a united mind. Just as Molloy is a conglomerate "everyman" (111), his region is the unconscious portion of an everymind.

The mythic flavor of both halves of Molloy can be traced to the almost supernatural "archetypes" which Jung observed in every human mind. An archetype, according to Jung, is "pure, unvitiated nature . . . that causes man to utter words and perform actions whose meaning is unconscious to him, so unconscious that he no longer gives it a thought" (Jung 120). They are the images of our most primitive instincts, which lurk in the collective unconscious common to every human psyche and which "once they become conscious, naturally present themselves as ideas and images, like everything else that becomes a content of consciousness" (Jung 137). As such, the mysterious strangers Moran meets in Ballybaba clearly suggest archetypal significance. Archetypes have "a distinctly numinous character which can only be described

as 'spiritual,' if 'magical' is too strong a word" (Jung 115), and they frequently materialize in dreams or visions. There is a "mystical aura" (Jung 115) which surrounds them, and "there is probably no motif in any known mythology that does not at some time appear in these configurations" (Jung 113). The "pale and noble" (146) stranger with the club and the "extraordinary hat" (146) Moran meets clearly evokes such a mystique. "There was a coldness in his stare, and a thrust," Moran notes, and "he asked for bread and I offered him fish" (146) — clearly an allusion to the Biblical parable of loaves and fishes. Both Moran and Molloy meet with a silent shepherd tending his flock. Moran's experience is overtly religious. "The silence was absolute," he says, "the weather was divine" (158), and something in him yearns "to say, Take me with you, I will serve you faithfully, just for a place to lie and a little food" (159). Molloy also suggests biblical parallels (Abraham and Isaac) when he wakes under a shepherd's silent gaze. He wonders if the shepherd's dog took "me for a black sheep entangled in the brambles and was he waiting for an order from his master to drag me out?" (28). Molloy's description of the smoking boatman, with his "long white beard" (28) and his averted eyes, taking "a cargo of nails and timber . . . to some carpenter I suppose" (26), clearly implies the materials required to assemble the sacrificial cross. Without going into further detail, these archetypal allusions indicate clear links between Moran and Molloy, and the Jungian unconscious.

One final aspect of Jung's psychology that is echoed in Molloy is the "anima" and its influence over the unconscious mind. According to Jung, "an inherited collective image of woman exists in a man's unconscious with the help of which he can apprehend the nature of woman" (quoted by Fordham, 52). The image of this anima often stems from the man's mother, since his "first and most important experience of a woman" (Fordham 53) comes to him through her, and "later the image is projected on to the various women" (Fordham 53) with whom the man becomes involved. Molloy's quest for his mother reflects the influence

of such an anima. Molloy is "harrowed" (76) by his mother's image, and plagued by a "deep and doubtless unacknowledged need, the need to have a . . . mother, and proclaim it audibly" (17). Molloy describes the image that haunts him:

"What did I see of her? A head always, the hands sometimes, the arms rarely. A head always. Veiled with hair, wrinkles, filth, slobber. A head that darkened the air" (19). He then superimposes this image on to all the women he meets.

Accurately or not, he tells us, he is:

quite willing to go on thinking of [Lousse] as an old woman, widowed and withered, and of Ruth as another And there are days, like this evening, when my memory confuses them and I am tempted to think of them as one and the same old hag, flattened and crazed by life. And God forgive me, to tell you the horrible truth, my mother's image sometimes mingles with theirs (59).

We have examined how Molloy's narrative personifies Jung's theory of the unconscious with regard to Molloy's chaotic, fluid perceptions, the appearance of archetypes and mythic echoes, and his obsessive projection of a mother-figure, or anima. Now we shall consider Moran's role as a caricature of the rational, conscious half of one "unfathomable mind" (106).

Moran's Narrative

The perfect complement to Molloy's brooding introversion, Moran is a proclaimed extravert, an absurdly reasonable man. He practices a pragmatic, "meticulous piety" (95), and he is staunchly "turned towards the outer world as towards the lesser evil, [a] creature of his house, of his garden, of his few poor possessions . . . reining back his thoughts within the limits of the calculable" (114). Moran is a moody, unimaginative man who finds it "painful . . . not to understand" (102), and so adheres to the "falsetto of reason" (107) no matter what the cost. Moran is everything Molloy is not. Whereas Molloy is a slippery "form fading among fading forms" (10) Moran sees himself as "a solid in the midst of other solids." (108) Where Molloy's existence seems vague and timeless, Moran

"liked punctuality" (98), indeed it ranks second only to "decorum" (102) in his "methodical mind" (98). Molloy "didn't care much for good things to eat" (37), while Moran is a "heavy eater" (97), gluttonous at times. Moran disciplines his son "by giving him a good clout from time to time, together with my reasons for doing so" (95), and he prides himself on "being a sensible man, cold as crystal and as free from spurious depth" (113). Moran's life is an "inenarrable contraption" (114), which has "never had to deal much" (137) with members of the opposite sex (though he does have a son). There are of course obvious similarities between Molloy and Moran and their experiences, but their personalities initially are almost complete contrasts, just as the conscious and the unconscious contrast within a single human psyche.

There is a threshold of sorts separating the unconscious from the conscious, but Jung emphasizes that there are "no clear demarcations" (110) segregating the two, and that "the one [begins] where the other leaves off" (Jung 110). The "near-conscious" areas in between the conscious and the unconscious Jung labels a "no-man's land" (Jung 97), an uncertain border area where there exists a "consciousness in which the unconsciousness predominates, as well as a consciousness in which the self-consciousness predominates" (Jung 97). It is only here, in this "atmosphere, how shall I say, of finality without end" (111) that Moran can "consider" (111) his orders to track down Molloy. For it is only in this no-man's land "where Molloy could not be, nor Moran either for that matter", that "Moran could bend over Molloy" (111). Or so Moran hopes.

The Jungian Quest

I shall now consider Jung's theories in more detail. He divides the human psyche, as we have seen, into the conscious and unconscious realms, but within these two spheres several more specific distinctions are made. The "ego" is the center of the consciousness, but it covers behind a "socially accepted and

socially imposed mask" (Encyclopedia 295) called the "persona." In the unconscious, consequently, there exists a corresponding "shadow," or "counterpoint to this accepted and exposed part of the personality . . . the rejected and usually imprisoned set of desires, emotions, and attitudes" (Encyclopedia 295) that the persona masks. The object of Jungian guidance, then, is a process of individuation, or the reconciliation of these two facets of the mind, "which necessitates the forging of a link between the conscious and the unconscious aspects of the psyche" (Fordham 76) and results in a whole, healthy, unified self. But this "realization of the shadow," Jung emphasizes, this "growing awareness of the inferior part of the personality" (Jung 118) is not a purely intellectual process. Rather, it "has far more the meaning of a suffering and a passion that implicate the whole man" (Jung 118). It is this requisite "suffering" implied by individuation that the two narrators in *Molloy* so grimly portray. Moran, the persona, is sent to come to terms with himself through a reunion with his repressed shadow, Molloy. The result of that collision, as we shall see, is ambiguous, but there is certainly no evidence of a liberating rejuvenation of the two flagging narrators.

The shadow of a human psyche is "the inferior being in ourselves, the one who wants to do all the things we do not allow ourselves to do, who is everything we are not" (Fordham 49), and it encompasses "all those uncivilized desires and emotions that are incompatible with social standards and our ideal personality" (Fordham 50). We have already noted the contrast between Molloy and Moran, but there is further evidence in Molloy's relentless monologue that he represents, at least in part, the neglected shadow of hyper-civilized Moran. Molloy complains of a mist which "veils the world from me and veils me from myself" (29), and frequently speaks of himself "as I would have of another" (42). He hints that there is another, different half of his self which he is both estranged from and bound to by invisible ties. When he is arrested, for example, Molloy wonders: "was there one among them to put himself in my place, to feel how

removed I was then from him I seemed to be, and in that remove what strain, as of hawsers about to snap?" (21). Molloy is, in fact, awkward and retiring in society. He can only tolerate "being abroad, trapped, visible" (35) to the punishing public eye for limited periods of time.

The term "persona," on the other hand, is "the name given to the masks once worn by the actors of antiquity to signify the role they played" (Fordham 47). Moran derives grim satisfaction from "playing my parts through the bitter end" (122), and explains that "conspicuousness is the ABC of my profession" (124). The persona is the product of a "process of civilizing a human being" which necessarily "leads to a compromise between himself and society as to what he should appear to be, and to the formation of a mask behind which most people live" (Fordham 47). The persona's facade, however, is never complete. Repressed components of the shadow occasionally break through, and "therefore we are so often surprised by actions of a moody, savage, passionate kind proceeding from persons to whose nature as we know it they seem completely foreign" (Jacobi 16). When an unconscious introversion breaks through an extraverted consciousness, for instance:

the positively adjusted man who stands in harmony with all the world there upon becomes temporarily or permanently an egocentric, fault-finding, critical individual, who, full of mistrust, suspects the most personal motives every where. He feels himself misunderstood and isolated and sniffs hostility on all sides (Jacobi 23).

The "quest for wholeness," or individuation, is generally the aim of "middle-aged people, who have been successful in their chosen career, [who] suddenly wake to a feeling of emptiness and a lack of meaning in their lives" (Fordham 78). Moran is a "grown man thinking he is done with surprises" (112), who starts his narrative in "peace and happiness" (93). Soon, however, he complains of a "kind of nothingness in the midst of which I stumbled" (123), and observes that "such light-mindedness was not like me" (96). In seeking his self, Moran

realizes, he is "losing [his] head" (98). Moran has spasms of unprovoked paranoia, declaring himself "beset with enemies" (98), suspecting his son of perfidy and Father Ambrose of "having fobbed me off with unconsecrated bread" (102). Moran's erratic temper and fit of "hacking madly at an old chopping block" (127) are clearly symptoms of his stifled, dyspeptic unconscious (Molloy) percolating through.

The persona Moran is strangely familiar with Molloy, "without however knowing much about him" (113). He does admit that Molloy rises up in him "at long intervals. Then I was nothing but uproar, bulk, rage, suffocation, effort unceasing, frenzied and vain. Just the opposite of myself, in fact" (113). Moran even wonders at first if he had "invented [Molloy], I mean found him ready made in my head. There is no doubt one sometimes meets with strangers who are not entire strangers, through their having played a part in certain cerebral reels" (112). And yet, while Moran acknowledges Molloy's existence, he stresses he "would not have confided his existence to a living soul in all the world" (112). Moran's transformation is rapid. Ordinarily a rigidly structured individual who "never set out on a mission without prolonged reflection as to the best way of setting out" (98), by the time Moran leaves his precious estate "the unheard of sight was to be seen of Moran making ready to go without knowing where he was going" (124). By the end of his journey, of course, Moran had become just as decrepit, noncommittal and incontinent as Molloy is at the beginning of his. Both end up scribbling bitter invectives in bed.

Woven into Moran's monologue are unsettling tensions which foreshadow the dissolution of his grudging quest for Molloy. As he sets out, Moran has a

joyful vision of myself far from home, far from the familiar faces, far from all my street-anchors, sitting on a milestone in the dark, my legs crossed, one hand on my thigh, my elbow in that hand, my chin cupped in the other, my eyes fixed on

the earth as on a chessboard, coldly hatching my plans, for the next day, for the day after, creating time to come (125).

Moran expects to encounter Molloy and to be transformed at the end of his "psychological journey" (Fordham 74) into a "liberated, healed" (Fordham 83), dynamic personality capable of playing a decisive role in the world. But his quest is fraught with conceptual snares from the very start. Moran is convinced that the shadow inside him is called "Mollose" rather than "Molloy," but finally attributes the discrepancy to the faulty "acoustics" (112) of his soul:

Since Gaber had said Molloy, not once but several times . . . I was compelled to admit that I too should have said Molloy and that in saying Mollose I was at fault. And henceforth, unmindful of my preferences, I shall force myself to say Molloy, like Gaber (113).

Thus Moran sets out to come to terms with himself, on someone else's terms. Between the Molloy he senses within him "and the true Molloy, after whom I was so soon to be in full cry," Moran notes, "the resemblance cannot have been great" (115). Moran consciously attributes "without my knowing it, to my private Molloy, elements of the Molloy described by Gaber" (115), and sets out on a doomed pilgrimage for a misconceived self. The narrative is deliberately ambiguous as to the nature of Youdi, responsible for instigating Moran's tortuous search. "He changed his mind with great facility" (115), Moran observes, and at the end of the narrative Gaber describes him "rubbing his hands from morning to night . . . [and] chuckling to himself," (164) expounding on the joys and beauties of life. In this context, Youdi perhaps even represents Jung and his high hopes for the human mind. At any rate, no sooner has Moran set out on his quest than Gaber's instructions about what to do with Molloy once he finds him evaporate "clean out of my head" (137), and Moran is left stranded in Ballybaba aimlessly tracking a self he can't picture, for reasons he can't name.

Beyond Jung

We have noted the distinct parallels between Jung's theories of the conscious and the unconscious, of the persona and the shadow, with Moran and Molloy. It is at the conclusion of Moran's quest, however, when the hard-won "realization of the shadow" ought to occur, that Beckett abandons Jung's guidelines and the novel takes an abrupt satirical turn.

According to Jung, the closer one comes to a confrontation with one's shadow, "the more violent is the urge to shy away from it and to rescue the light of consciousness from the murks of the sultry abyss" (Jung 122). When the time comes Moran does not simply shy away, he scrambles backwards in frantic retreat.

A metamorphosis does take place, of course, which leaves Moran inalterably "so changed from what I was" (148). Moran "thought about myself, much" (158) on his journey, and even has a spasm of genuine self-contented bliss. Stranded in his shelter in Ballybaba, Moran exults:

I felt extraordinarily content, content with myself, almost elated, enchanted with my performance. And I said, I shall soon loose consciousness altogether, it is merely a question of time (163).

But the individuation process, or at least Jung's projected version of it, is never complete.

Earlier, Moran had been faced with an ominous:

crumbling, a frenzied collapsing of all that had always protected me from all I was always condemned to be. Or it was like a kind of clawing towards a light and countenance I could not name, that I had once known and long denied. But what words can describe this sensation at first all darkness and bulk, with a noise like the grinding of stones, then suddenly as soft as water flowing (148).

He glimpses an eerie image of an anonymous, lacerated human face, his own soul, perhaps, in a shimmering pool, and he turns away in mild contempt:

"doubtless I should have gone from discovery to discovery, concerning myself, if I had persisted. But at the first light I fled to other cares. And all had been for

nothing" (149). Moran's quest is a fiasco, by any standards. Ill-prepared to cope with individuation, he is horribly disfigured and spiritually deflated in the attempt.

And I who a fortnight before would joyfully have reckoned how long I could survive on the provisions that remained, probably with reference to the question of calories and vitamins, and established in my head a series of menus asymptotically approaching nutritional zero, was now content to note feebly that I should soon be dead of inanition, if I did not succeed in renewing my provisions (149).

The paltry joys and diversions with which Moran had ornamented his life have been stultified, but no new reason for living has taken their place. Moran is ordered to retreat from Molloy country, utterly transformed. Moran summarizes the outcome of his quest for wholeness:

I not only knew who I was, but I had a sharper and clearer sense of my identity than ever before, in spite of its deep lesions and the wounds with which it was covered. And from this point of view I was less fortunate than my other acquaintances (170).

As he obediently prepares to leave Ballybaba, Moran is crippled, racked by noxious "strange laughter" (162), in limbo, like a "turd waiting for the flush" (162).

Thus, at the end of *Molloy* we are left not with a serene, invigorated "whole" man, but rather as Michael Sheringham observes, two "fragments of one shattered identity" (Sheringham 73). Molloy and Moran are united, perhaps, but only in the sense that they are both listless paralytics recording the fiasco of their respective quests. *Molloy* illustrates, not the wholesome balance of a healthy mind, but "the almost unendurable burden of a consciousness absurdly divided against itself and condemned endlessly to seek meaning in a meaningless universe" (Webb 87). Molloy suggests that after all, "perhaps there is no whole, before you're dead" (27), and resigns himself to a numbing cycle of life which "continues, joltingly, of flight and bivouac, in an Egypt without bounds, without

infant, without mother" (66). He is left incapacitated in his dead mother's bed, both legs "stiff as a life sentence" (61), driven to record the events of his blighted life, and thus "drag them into the eudemonistic slop" (55) for the perusal of the world. Molloy suffers, in fact, more acutely than before. "From time to time," he warns us, "I shall recall my present existence compared to which this [narrative] is a nursery tale" (61). Moran, likewise, ends up a parody of Jung's enlightened consciousness which would finally come to appreciate "our intimate relationship with all life, not only human, but animal and plant" (Fordham 63). "There are men and there are things," Moran concludes, "to hell with animals. And with God" (165). Moran has been "banished from the absurd comforts of home" (132), but he knows "scarcely any better where I am going and what awaits" (133) than he did at the start of his misconceived quest. Moran is still, in fact, at the mercy of some "other," tyrannical will:

I am still obeying orders, if you like, but no longer out of fear. No, I am still afraid, but simply from the force of habit. And the voice I listen to needs no Gaber to make it heard. For it is within me and exhorts me to continue to the end the faithful servant I have always been, of a cause that is not mine . . . with hatred in my heart, and scorn, of my master and his designs (132).

Moran, the rational extravert, is bewildered. "Exiled in his manhood" (169) from other men, he wonders, vaguely, in his final syllables, "Does this mean I am freer now than I was?" (176).

The structure of *Molloy*, then, clearly parallels, and finally parodies, Jung's explanation of an individuated, unified human psyche. Individuation and enlightenment, according to Jung, are "experienced only by those who have gone through the wearisome but . . . indispensable business of coming to terms with the unconscious components of the personality" (Jung 133). A conscious persona, Moran seeks to come to terms with his unconscious shadow Molloy, with debilitating results. As Rubin Rabinovitz has noted, "for Beckett, there can be no way of justifying suffering" (41), and in *Molloy* the two pathetic protago-

nists discredit Jung's cautiously optimistic ideals. It is "man's capacity for consciousness alone," Jung declares, that "makes him man" (Jung 120). On this one point, Beckett seems to whole-heartedly agree. At the end of his "great inward metamorphoses" (163), Moran staggers, unkempt and in agony, to Gaber and pleads for information. Gaber's doleful response: "Ah, Moran, he said, what a man!" (163).

NOTES

(1) For those unfamiliar with Beckett's fiction, the trilogy I refer to is a series of novels called *Molloy*, *Malone Dies*, and *The Unnamable*. *Molloy* is divided into two first-person narratives: the first is a monologue by Molloy, the second is by a character called Moran. Molloy is vacuous and crippled and on a quest for his mother whom he has never forgiven for expelling him into this world. Moran is, initially, a hyper-rational sort of private investigator. His superior, Obidil, however, sends him on a quest for Molloy, and by the end of the novel Moran is transformed into a vacuous indigent very much like Molloy. There is no indication, however, that either quest is successful. The structure of the two narratives clearly toys with Jungian precepts. I argue that Beckett ultimately undermines Jung's recipe for an "individuated" humanity for two reasons. First, because the quests so pathetically fail; and second, because in the second two parts of the trilogy Beckett probes deeper into the paradoxes of the human psyche than Jungian paradigms allow. Beckett uses Jung as a springboard, he doesn't endorse Jung's philosophy.

(2) In his article *Jung and the Narratives of Molloy*, J.D. O'Hara investigates one approach to the Jung-Molloy connection at considerable depth. Unfortunately, I think he stretches the parallels too far. He interprets the Molloy/Moran narratives as "dream sequences," and analyzes them in Jungian terms. Moran's quest he considers "a somewhat successful and positive one," (45) while Molloy's is perhaps "an attack on the Jungian

ideal of an accommodation between the ego and... the anima." (46) While most of his arguments are valid, O'Hara seems to neglect the fact that *Molloy* is, first and foremost, Beckett's novel, not simply a facsimile of Jungian terms.

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China and the West: What Happened and Why

Cynthia Anne Esteban

Many disasters befell nineteenth-century China that would eventually lead to the 1911 revolution ending 2,000 years of imperial rule. With such an impressive and long-standing history of dynastic rule, how and why did China's old civilization collapse in search of a new and revitalized one? Some would argue that the West and its progressive technology based on modern science led China to other possibilities. Others may argue that China should have been left alone. Nevertheless, Western powers, empowered by the economic and military advancements launched by the Industrial Revolution in Europe, pried open China's doors. The Chinese government, preoccupied with internal rebellions, was vulnerable to these external pressures. As a consequence, it was forced to offer many commercial and evangelical opportunities to the West.

What happened to China? Why was China so vulnerable to Western expansion? Many scholars attribute Western economic and military advancements to the scientific revolution. (1) Their studies simplify matters by arguing that the emergence and non-emergence of the scientific revolution in the West and China were two sides of the same coin with a single cause. Because of the breadth of this paper, I may appear to be making the same generalizations, but that is not my intention. My argument begins with an account of nineteenth-century China—to depict how it was vulnerable externally and internally to Western expansion. I then attempt to explain why China was vulnerable to Western expansion by comparing some of the many factors in the evolution of the two civilizations.

The Vulnerability of the Nineteenth Century Chinese State

In the nineteenth century, primarily from the West, China faced external economic and military pressures. Internally, China also faced pressures because of its internal rebellions. These vulnerabilities forced movements within China for political and social change.

External Pressures: Economic and Military

Although it was considered dangerous to criticize the ruling Qing Dynasty, the nineteenth century dawned with many Chinese scholars seeking a change in the traditional Chinese economic and social structure. Chinese society was characterized by unequal distribution of wealth, rigid state examinations, and social oppression. The increase in opium addiction—an added factor—was brought about by an expanding foreign trade with Britain. Indeed, the spread of opium addiction was a complex and serious social problem causing concern among many Chinese officials. The problem worsened when the British East India Company ended its trade monopoly with Asia in 1834. (2) Many other foreigners then took advantage of China's open market, thus increasing external pressure on China. Historian Jacques Gernet divides this external pressure into two parts, conveniently delineated by the First and Second Opium Wars (1839-1842 and 1856-1860 respectively). He claims that:

The real threat that England posed for the China of the first half of the nineteenth century was not nearly so much a military one as an economic one: the imports of opium helped to undermine the economy of an empire whose finances and political system had continuously deteriorated since the end of the eighteenth century. And that is the essential point, for this internal decline ended in the terrible social explosions and in the insurrections of colonized peoples that were to shake the empire between 1850 and 1878. (3)

The Second Opium War, in contrast, posed a heightened military threat (due to the many new inventions of the Western Industrial Revolution) that forced China to accept the many unfair treaties imposed by the West.

The surge in trade with other Western nations after 1834 affected the fragile equilibrium of China's rural economy, setting the stage for the First Opium War. China had experienced an alarming shortage of silver, which flowed out in exchange for foreign imports such as opium. As a result, Qing officials decided to ban opium without considering the consequences of their actions. Opium was essential to British world trade and the British reacted to the end of opium trade and specifically Commissioner Lin Zexu's suppressive tactics with force. The First Opium War (1839-1842) resulted from the clash between a Sino-Centric world and a Western world interested in economic expansion through trade. The Qing were not quick enough in building boats to rival those of the West, and Nanjing was captured. As a consequence, the Treaty of Nanjing initiated the 1842-1860 "Unequal" Treaty System—a period characterized by increased freedom for foreigners in China. The 1843 British "most favored nation" clause prevented the Qing from forming alliances. Consequently, the Chinese stepped up anti-British activities. The *Arrow* incident, a confrontation between a smuggler's ship and the Chinese authorities, sparked the Second Opium War (1857-1860). After armed clashes with the British and French, the Qing Dynasty was forced to sign the Treaty of Tianjin in 1858. This treaty included a supplementary clause allowing the entrance of opium into China despite the Chinese penal code, which forbade the sale and consumption of opium. Interestingly enough, the first treaty—the Treaty of Nanjing—did not even mention the narcotic in any of its articles. In spite of the Treaty of Tianjin, the Chinese resisted foreign control and resumed armed conflict. They were quickly crushed, however, when a British and French expedition marched into Peking and burned down the Imperial Summer Palace, Yuan Ming Yuan, forcing the Chinese to sign the last of the unequal treaties—the Peking Convention in 1860.

The basic features of the Unequal Treaty System of 1842-1860 were as follows:

- the opening of specially designated ports
- the establishment of foreign-administered settlements at these ports
- extraterritoriality, or the legal jurisdiction of the treaty powers over their respective nationals in China
- foreign diplomatic representation at Peking
- freedom of movement for foreign ships in Chinese waters
- foreign regulation of Chinese customs tariffs
- the administration of foreign-trade customs by customhouses staffed by foreigners in Chinese employ
- missionary access to the Chinese interior. (4)

The evident expansion of Western territory in China was an outrage to Chinese tradition, but the Chinese were helpless in the face of Western military might.

In contrast to the First Opium War, which was principally a sailing ship merchant venture, the Second Opium War was characterized by improved technology. Western scientific and technological breakthroughs from the mid-19th century onwards strengthened Western military pressure on China. Among these improvements were the inventions of the screw propulsion for navy ships in 1880, Bessemer Converter in 1855, Martin furnace in 1864, Thomas Process in 1878, accompanied by the large scale expansion of railways in 1850. Financed by banking capital and industrial capital, these innovations contributed to an England that was much more advanced than the England of the First Opium War (5). This meant that at the end of the 19th century, "through the increasingly rapid progress of technology, the economic and military power of the industrialized nations of Europe and America, soon to be joined by Japan became really fearsome for China. This had not been the case fifty years earlier" (6).

The nineteenth century wars stressed the importance of military industrial might, which China did not possess. Yet foreign intrusions did not give China the chance to build up the infrastructure necessary to modernize the Chinese economy. Although there is evidence that China tried to match the

industry of its Western counterparts, China did not have *time* on its side. As a result, towards the end of the nineteenth century, China was forced to make many foreign concessions (e.g. Russia, France, and Japan annexed Chinese territories). With the failure of the Hundred Days of Reform, the period in 1898 when Emperor Guanxu proposed a coherent body of radical reform ideas, China was headed for revolution. The nineteenth century ended with the commencement of the world famous anti-foreign Boxer Rebellion.

Internal Pressures: Rebellion

In addition to and partially as a result of the external pressures, China also had to confront its internal crisis. China's domestic turbulence did not allow it the breathing space, time, means, or peace to gather strength and force to resist foreign encroachment. China before Western expansion was already very weak and characterized by

a growing population that put new pressures on the land, the outflow of silver, the difficulty the educated elite found in gaining official employment, the mounting incidence of opium addiction, the waning abilities of the regular banner armies, the demoralization in the bureaucracy caused by Heshen [corrupt advisor to emperor Quanlong] and his faction, the wide-scale suffering that accompanied the spread and eventual suppression of the White Lotus Rebellion [sporadic uprisings in north-central China in the late 18th century to early 19th century]. (7)

and a growth in local paramilitary units. Private interests were encroaching on government spheres, and the huge bureaucracy of the Confucian-based imperial system could not reassert its former powers. This led to four largely uncoordinated major rebellions in the 19th century, namely the Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864), the Nian Rebellion (1853-1860), and two Muslim Revolts—one in the southwest (1855-1873) and one in the northwest (1862-1878)—all of which failed to defeat imperial rule.

Of the four rebellions, the Taiping was the largest and most organized. Its Christian and egalitarian basis questioned traditional Confucian imperial

values with the aim to defeat the Manchus. Led by Hong Xiquan, a frustrated scholar who repeatedly failed the civil service exams, the Taiping Rebellion established its base in Nanjing in 1853. Its ideology espoused the equality of men and women under God, targeted the elimination of opium smoking, gambling, prostitution, and alcohol, and established a land law that would provide land for all and welfare for the deprived. The revolutionary program, however, was never put into practice. The Taiping Rebellion eventually failed because of a shortage of administrators divided by internal power struggles and a lack of cooperation among its leaders. Furthermore, it was suppressed by the Qing with the support of majority of the Confucian scholars and, ironically, the military and technology of the West.

The Nian Rebellion, unlike the Taiping, had no clear-cut goals, no clear religious affiliation, no political ideology, and no unified leadership. It found its base in the ex-peasants and the poor struggling to survive. The Nian rebellion used guerilla warfare, which undermined the prestige of the Chinese military. It was more a military than ideological threat to the ruling Qing. In comparison, the two Muslim Rebellions challenged the hold of the Qing over the non-Chinese and exposed not only the ethnic tensions between the Chinese and non-Chinese, but also the failure of the Muslims themselves to coordinate their rebellions.

These rebellions were eventually crushed, and the Qing was unified once again, but underlying discontent persisted. The internal fragmentation of China was a factor in its vulnerability to Western expansion in the 19th century, especially since the Qing relied on Western technology and advice to unify China.

The rebellions were not without their effects, however. The Qing did make attempts at modernization especially after the Taiping Rebellion, which provided inspiration for the post 1860 "Self Strengthening Movement" when China built arsenals, shipyards, telegraphs, etc. The reforms failed, however,

because the Qing had too much to do at once. From 1864 to 1894, it had to end its revolts *and* re-establish its central authority. Moreover, modernization was hampered by conservative opposition and an inefficient bureaucracy.

Although China was not so far behind the West at the beginning of the First Opium War, its failure to enter the industrial revolution at the right moment was due partly to historical circumstances—i.e its internal crisis from 1850 to 1875 and the economic and military external pressures exerted by foreign imperialists. Those circumstances describe how China was vulnerable in the 19th century.

Difference in the Evolutions of Chinese and Western Civilizations

Many factors explain why China was vulnerable to Western expansion in the 19th century. Here, I examine the most critical factor differentiating Western from Chinese civilization—the scientific revolution. First, I differentiate modern science from medieval proto-science. Then, I explain the factors favorable to the evolution of modern science in the West that lay behind European economic and military advancements into the 19th century. Although the West was more advanced in the 19th century, I argue that it is a misconception that China stagnated behind Europe:

We now know that the supposed stagnation of China and the rest of the Asia was illusory, their changes being slow only in relation to the accelerating development of Europe since the Renaissance. (8)

China merely followed a different route of development.

Modern Science versus Mediaeval Proto-Science

China, with its concept of Yin Yang and the Five Elements (Wood, Fire, Earth, Metal, and Water), developed medieval proto-science. It is ironic that for most of its early history, the West did not develop its own notion of science or

technology and merely imported the inventions of ancient China—gunpowder, printing, paper, the compass, mechanical clock, driving belt, crank, and efficient equine harness, the wheelbarrow, and segmented arch bridges. Indeed, the West pooled together its knowledge of ancient discoveries to develop the scientific method. Because of the scientific method's rational and empirical nature, characterized by a systematization of hypotheses about an external universe and tested by controlled experiments, its development is momentous. The method's empiricism stood in contrast to Chinese medieval hypotheses that were vague and incapable of proof or disproof, characterized by practical experiments but unrefined methods.

Perhaps there are also some differences between Chinese thinking and that required by the Scientific Revolution. Western scientific thought was more stringent, founded on demonstration. It used ancient Greek rationality as a basis for modern science. In contrast, Chinese argumentation supported its historical precedents and lacked vigorous demonstration and proof. Like the people of today who are not in the exact sciences, the ancient Chinese

exchanged arguments of varying and indefinite weight without seeing any point in putting premises and conclusions in the same form, filling in all steps however obvious, and pressing every line of thought to its logical end. (9)

Perhaps a good example can be found in the study of astronomy, which had reached a dead end in China, stopping at arithmetical systems of interrelated time cycles. The West, on the other hand, used geometry as a tool to carry astronomy beyond that point of development.

Factors Favorable to the Evolution of Modern Science in the West

Because of the unlimited, unrealized possible answers to the negative question of why the Scientific Revolution did not emerge in China, I examine the

favorable conditions that explain why modern science did emerge in the West and then compare those factors to ones experienced by China.

Joseph Needham in his book *The Grand Titration* identifies four factors that were unfavorable to the rise of modern science in China and favorable to its rise in the West: geographical, hydrological, social, and economic factors. I describe the first two, which had a profound effect on the social and economic development of both East and West.

Because of its large geographical land mass, China was more bound to agriculture than the West, which was more maritime and mercantile. Although the Chinese have always dabbled in trade (at least with its Southeast Asian neighbors), it needed a more dependable means of subsistence to feed its huge population; hence, China developed its agriculture. The Chinese peasant farmer required obedience and patience to wait for the crops to produce. His concept of "non-intervention" or action at a distance contrasted with the Occidental seafaring "interventionism." This European mercantile mentality formed the basis for Europe's economic trade expansion to China in the 19th century. In addition to the concept of intervention, feudalism in Europe and Asia developed along different lines. When compared to the West, China's economy was more important than its military. Chinese civilian officials who passed rigorous civil service exams (not found in the West) held the power of the written word and were more influential than military officials. Aristocratic Western feudalism, in contrast, was more military than bureaucratic.

The hydrological factor is very closely related to geography. Because of China's seasonal rainfall which changes yearly, the Chinese required efficient systems of irrigation, water conservation, river control, suitable drainage, and inland navigation for agricultural production and distribution. Instead of feudal lords and merchants, the imperial bureaucracy united and directed man-power to build these complex works. In contrast, the West, which was less massive

geographically, relied on city states instead of a vast imperial bureaucracy to coordinate its efforts.

These geographical and hydrological factors partially explain why China and the West were so different socially and economically. China's large bureaucracy, composed of the scholar gentry, prevented the merchants from rising to power and seizing the state. The scholars who were against the value systems of the wealthy merchants only allowed merchants to accumulate capital but not to manage industrial enterprises. With the decay of feudalism in the West, on the other hand, Europe became mercantile, industrial, and capitalist. Instead of the scholar class, the merchant class with its slogan of democracy rose to power.

Joseph Needham in *The Grand Titration* explains how the rise of democracy and capitalism correlate with the rise of modern science. The democratic principle that birth and descent are immaterial to science and learning bridges the gap between the scholar class and the artisan class. Western states in the 15th to the 18th century supported merchant venturers interested in the principles of quantitative economics, and the sons of the aristocracy were not afraid to become apprentices to industrial enterprises. Democracy, which regards an individual as a rational being with the right to express his or her own opinion, mirrors science, which is supported by an individual observer/experimenter, whose race, age, or class status in society is irrelevant as long as he or she is objective, competent, and empirical. With the rise of capitalism, merchants tried to investigate and explain everything. Capitalism also needed science to maintain and extend its high standards of living. Consequently, the democracy that permitted capitalism "might therefore almost in a sense be termed that practice of which science is the theory" (10)—the science which made possible Western military advancements on China in the 19th century.

At the risk of making sweeping generalizations about thousands of

years of development, I must point out that the Chinese civilization did not lack aspects of democracy when compared to Western civilization. On the contrary, in China it was possible for anyone to become a scholar regardless of origin because positions of leadership were not strictly hereditary. People could change position within the four classes of society: scholar, farmer, artisan, and merchant. For example, often a merchant's highest goal would be to have his son pass the civil exams and become a scholar. Comparing the evolution of civilizations is a complicated matter, and I have only examined some factors.

Although different, neither the Chinese nor Western civilization is superior. Historically, each developed according to different geographical, hydrological, social, and economic factors. Some of these factors were more favorable to the development of modern science in the West.

...

If I had only examined 19th-century Western economic and military expansion into China, it would be easy to generalize that Western civilization was superior to and more advanced than the Chinese civilization. The key word when comparing the development of these two civilizations, however, is *time*. China could have caught up with the West if it did not have to cope with its domestic turbulence, as well as with 19th century foreign expansion into China. In the end, foreigners, especially Western foreigners, used the advanced technology of modern science to thrust open the doors of an already vulnerable China.

Those who consider the West to be superior for developing modern science should bear in mind that modern science is rooted in the proto-science of ancient China, even though the West subjugated China in the 19th century.

I have not attempted to enumerate all the different factors that account for China's vulnerability in the 19th century when compared to Western developments. Instead, I explained some of the different routes each civilization

took. The West developed capitalism, democracy, and modern science, while China developed a vast bureaucracy. To declare Western ideals to be superior would be premature. After all,

Free enterprise and liberal democracy are the result of a process of development peculiar to the Western nations, to believe that all sectors must necessarily pass through the same stage of linear evolution, the model for which has been provided once for all by the West, is to fail to recognize the diversity of civilizations and their specific characters. (11)

NOTES

- (1) J. Spence, *The Search for Modern China*, (London: Hutchinson, 1990), p.146.
- (2) *Ibid.*, p.149.
- (3) J. Gernet, *A History of Chinese Civilization*, (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1987), p.542.
- (4) *Collier's Encyclopedia*, 1982 ed., vol. 6, s.v. "China," by O. Edmund Clubb, p.323.
- (5) J. Gernet, *A History of Chinese Civilization*, p. 541-543.
- (6) *Ibid.*, p.542.
- (7) J. Spence, *The Search for Modern China*, (London: Hutchinson, 1990), p.165.
- (8) A.C. Graham, *China, Europe, and the Origins of Modern Science*, from *Asia Major*, vol.16, p.178.
- (9) *Ibid.*, p.191.
- (10) J. Needham, *The Grand Titration*, (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1969), p.145.
- (11) J. Gernet, *A History of Chinese Civilization*, p.574.

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Ayurvedic Medicine *Ruchira Garg*

Modern medicine is a phenomenon many people take for granted. The technology and advances that have helped people to live longer, healthier lives have become integral parts of everyday life. However, there must have been a foundation that paved the way for our world medical system. One such system is the Ayurvedic system that has its roots in India from 2,000 B.C. and is still widely practiced today. This paper will attempt to convey the principles and practices of ancient Ayurvedic method and follow its progression to Ayurvedic medicine in present-day India. In addition, the organization of Maharishi Ayur-Veda will be analyzed to describe its attempt to integrate Indian Ayurvedic medicine into the western medical system.

The Classical Period (2000 B.C. - 700 C.E.)

India in 2,000 B.C. was a land of two distinct cultures; the Harappa and the Aryans. The indigenous Harappa population was a simple, agricultural community with a very primitive medical system based on the supernatural. Their strong religious beliefs hindered medical progress because diseases and cures were attributed to the work of gods and magic. However, the Aryan peoples who had recently invaded India and conquered the Harappa introduced a new medical system. Although it, too, was rooted in religion, it proved to be sufficiently independent to develop into the Ayurvedic medicine of present-day India.

Hinduism was the religion of the Aryans and the prime socializing force. Every aspect of life was based on the religious doctrines expounded by Brahmins and codified in sacred texts. Consequently, it was natural for medicine to develop in parallel with such religious beliefs. Religion encouraged the development of Ayurvedic medicine by providing a moral framework for its

growth but it did not try to direct its progress. The definition of Ayurveda itself reflects this unity of religion and medicine within one discipline. Ayurveda means life and encompasses not only the role of the doctor in curing disease, but also in promoting health and longevity. Veda means knowledge, or science, but is also used as a suffix for sacred Hindu texts, tying in the essential element of religion. Thus, Ayurveda becomes "the science of living to a ripe age" (Basham 1976: 20).

The principles of this medical system involved curative and preventative treatment as is embodied in the name. Physicians aided patients by providing advice on diet and on daily habits for health, as well as supplying aid to those who were ill. Although religious and medical practices were combined in Ayurvedic texts, in particular the Caraka, healing itself was fairly independent of religion. The approach elaborated on the humoral system, drug therapy and diet, and was certainly empirically based, even at such an early time.

Because the principles of Ayurveda are embodied in a union of religious and empirical doctrine, religion overlapped with medical theory. Health was believed to be found within a balance of three primary fluids or *dosas* (literally meaning defects) wind, gall and mucus, whose concordance dictated good health. It was believed that an imbalance of these *dosas* resulted in the manifestation of disease. At the same time, Ayurvedic physicians were beginning to realize a cause and effect relationship for disease. At an earlier time it was thought that demons and gods were the vehicles of disease, however this myth was abandoned when it was realized that man and nature alone caused disease (Basham 1976:20). It is interesting to note that many contemporaries of the Ayurvedic system such as the Greek system developed humoral systems as well. Even today, the medical beliefs of many cultures, including Malaysian, Arabic, Chinese and some European cultures emphasize a strong correlation between good health and balancing humors (Laderman 1983:35). Although there

is large variation between cultures, this similarity illustrates a universal tendency of medical practices.

Because of a strong taboo against handling and dissection of human cadavers until the early nineteenth century there was an extremely poor understanding of physiology and anatomy among Ayurvedic practitioners, bordering on complete ignorance. Internal surgery was severely limited while there was a remarkable understanding and practice of external surgery. The "surgical arm of (superficial) treatment in India reached the highest point of development attained in antiquity" (Garrison1929:72). Medical texts describe over 120 different surgical instruments which were wrapped in flannel and kept in a box for "sterile procedure." Fracture splinting, limb amputation, hemorrhage control, Caesarean section and tumor excision were all within the surgical realm of a physician. Although cadavers could not be used, apprentice physicians were trained by practicing upon plants, dead animals, etc. to familiarize students with the instruments and techniques. External surgery, Ayurvedic rhinoplasty, was far superior to that found anywhere in the world (Garrison 1929:72). It was, in fact, the basis of modern plastic surgery; when reconstruction surgery of disfigured faces was observed by European surgeons in the eighteenth century many techniques were adopted and brought back to Europe (Patterson1987:127).

Dietetic advice was another aspect of medical practice believed essential as an instrument of preserving health, and "prescriptions" of dietary intake varied with Indian climatic changes. One of the biggest strengths of this ancient medical system was its extensive command of pharmacopoeia. The abundance of flora coupled with an expanding medical system promoted the classification and adoption of many different plants and minerals that are, even now, recognized as empirically sound (Meulenbeld 1978).

The Practitioner

Initially an Ayurvedic physician was referred to as a *blisaj*, however, with some passing of time he became increasingly known to the public as a *vaidya*. This distinction reflects the religious environment of the physician, for the term *vaidya* has religious overtones people preferred.

A male born into any of the castes except the lowest slave caste could be a *vaidya*. The individual goals of all three classes from which a physician could emerge embody important roles of a physician: Brahmins (religious scholars) serve in their capacity to give satisfaction to all beings, *kshatriyas* (the ruling class) have a duty to protect their subjects, and *vaisyas* (the middle class) must simply earn an honest living. The rewards that were offered a physician were material and spiritual, and fitted within the ethical doctrines of the three arms of life: *dharma*, religious merit; *artha*, material gain; and *kama*, personal satisfaction. Consequently, the position afforded physicians at this time successfully integrated all aspects of Hindu religious life, yet remained a distinct entity (Basham 1976:23).

The medical training of a budding *vaidya* was threefold; instruction from a learned teacher, direct observation, and inference. Each of these components were essential to education throughout a *vaidya's* lifetime. Initial training was provided through textbooks and with the guidance of a teacher with whom the student resided as a junior member of the family. The training was analagous to that of a brahman religious student; the intimacy of the student-teacher relationship, the rituals associated with the teaching process, and the ethics that were passed from teacher to pupil were similar for both brahmins and *vaidyas*. Once the final ritual with the teacher was passed, a *vaidya* was ready to practice. However, learning continued through frequent medical colloquia that provided a forum for sharing new advances and exchanging

knowledge (Basham 1976:25-26). Although there were few publications, it was these gatherings that appeared to inform colleagues of the work of their peers.

The practice of a physician included house calls (or rounds) and also a private practice where one's personal pharmaceutical supply was more accessible. Over 700 medicinal herbs have been recorded from Ayurvedic literature and many of these drugs could be found in an individual physician's store. Animal products were also used frequently in drugs and on recommended diets for some patients, illustrating the freedom afforded physicians in spite religious taboos against meat consumption.

Adequate rewards were expected for the vaidya's time and any medicines he might have supplied. Since vaidyas were permitted to advertise, it became difficult for people to distinguish legitimate physicians from vagabonds and frauds who roamed the villages in search of employment. As time passed, licensing of physicians was also implemented by the governing administrative body as a public service to reduce quackery. Consequently, fines were imposed on those practitioners who provided incompetent treatment that resulted in patient death (Basham 1976: 33).

The Medieval Period (700 C.E. - 1700 C.E.)

The Ayurvedic system continued to evolve from the basic principles and characteristics described so far. There was some conflict with increasing orthodoxy in Hinduism coupled with a greater detachment of physicians from their religious foundations. Physicians were being regarded as materialistic and heterodox, experiencing pressure from mainly the brahman caste. Because physicians dealt with meat, blood, lower castes, and untouchables in their practices, they were often looked down upon by brahmans and were required to adopt a more religiously based practice. Unfortunately, this increase in orthodoxy resulted in the loss of many written works, as diverse points of view were

not preserved in India. Furthermore, this religiosity became an obstacle to the acceptance of innovation, so progress could only continue very slowly (Meulenbeld 1987:2-3).

In addition to the strong Hindu influence, the Islamic population that invaded India in 700CE left its imprint on Ayurvedic practice. This small population settled in India and introduced Yunani medicine. The most significant influence was in the area of sphygmology, or pulse lore. This technique was not present in any early Ayurvedic texts, yet by the sixteenth century, it became the hallmark of an Ayurvedic doctor. It originated as a skilled diagnostic technique, but by the nineteenth and twentieth centuries became more a technique of divination. Alchemy and additional pharmacopoeia were two more facets of Yunani medicine that were incorporated into Ayurvedic practices (Leslie 1976:356-357).

The European Period

The next drastic changes came in the sixteenth century with the Europeans who brought their own medical beliefs. The first contacts with Europeans in India were with the Portuguese, Dutch and English. All three groups were initially highly receptive to the Ayurvedic system they encountered. In addition to recording some of the pharmacopoeia for use back in Europe, they attempted to learn some medical techniques from the resident physicians and, while in India, relied heavily on Ayurvedic physicians for their own healthcare. The exchange of ideas between continents was initially positive and enriching to both societies, advancing medicine and knowledge for all.

Although all three European groups initially depended on Indian physicians, they soon forgot that their new knowledge was a direct result of this positive relationship. As time passed, the merit of Ayurvedic physicians became increasingly ignored and eventually they were restricted, first by the the

Portuguese in the sixteenth century, then by the English in the eighteenth century.

As the English settled India and grew in power, they opened European hospitals, employed Ayurvedic physicians as nurses and assistants, provided little pay, and greatly restricted the practice of vaidyas. A brief period of enlightenment occurred in the late eighteenth, early nineteenth century when the English were concerned with preserving the Indian heritage. The English administration proposed reintegrating the Ayurvedic system through translation of the texts, allowing access to all those interested in learning from the extensive materials. Local physicians were again consulted by European physicians about indigenous diseases and extensive records were made of the Ayurvedic herbs and drugs. However, this period was short-lived; in the early nineteenth century, a new period of aggressive Westernization again occurred, derogating Indian culture. All traditional Ayurvedic institutions were disbanded leaving European medicine as the only option for study. And those Indians who persisted, regardless of the difficulties, in desiring to learn medicine, were offered second-rate western facilities and could only practice in positions subordinate to European physicians. The only haven for the rapidly disappearing study of Ayurveda was its preservation in medical families and local practices without the benefit of governmental support. By the late nineteenth century, the British administration realized that their physicians could not possibly meet the demand of the huge Indian population. This provided an opening for privately practicing vaidyas who treated the Indian elite who desired traditional medicine either instead of, or in addition to, European medicine. Consequently, as the market opened up, Ayurvedic physicians were warmly welcomed by the Indian community (Patterson 1987:120-129).

One man in particular, Gangadhara Ray (1789-1885), was extremely concerned with the future of Ayurveda. While it was being suppressed, he

taught many students who excelled under his instruction. He was skilled in pulse-reading diagnosis and prognosis, the use of traditional drugs and herbs, astronomy and astrology and his Sanskrit publications included 34 commentaries and the composition of 41 books. Due to his influence, people realized that Ayurveda was still an essential part of Indian society. Gangadhara Ray and his many supporters and students opened schools and hospitals (Gupta 1976:370-371). Because of the earlier restrictions on practice, Ayurvedic medicine has remained subordinate to Western, allopathic medicine. The best students in India who were interested in medicine immediately flocked to the well-stocked, advanced allopathic colleges, which could also afford to grant scholarships. Only those students who were refused admission would resort to Ayurvedic teaching, leaving the calibre of such physicians at a distinctly lower level. This remains the situation in present-day India. Although one may find the president of India frequenting the practice of an Ayurvedic physician, such practitioners still have not attained the same prestige as western allopathic doctors (Patterson 1987:120-129).

The Present

In present day India, Ayurvedic medicine has become an interesting fusion of many factors. Ayurveda has evolved into a distinct medical system shaped by the teachings of classic texts, the influences of other medical systems, and contact with imperial regulation. A student interested in Ayurvedic medicine can receive a degree after 5 years at one of 108 Ayurvedic colleges in India (Sharma *et al.* 1991:2633).

The overall medical climate in India is now pluralistic. In the west, our system is best characterized as a single, scientific system lacking this pluralism. In India one finds western allopathy, Ayurvedic medicine, homeopathy, folk medicine, and residual traces of other, earlier medical systems.

Due to this pluralism, Ayurveda has continually evolved to fit into this medical universe. One of the greatest changes in the practice of Ayurvedic medicine was the adoption of many Yunani techniques. Contemporary Ayurvedic revivalists believe that Yunani was greatly responsible for the decline of Ayurvedic medicine as it was an aberration from early texts. However, the irony is that Yunani has been so strongly incorporated that now these techniques have become the basis of many Ayurvedic physicians' practices, including those of the concerned revivalists who criticize it (Leslie 1976:356-357). Another modernization of the system is the professionalism that has been implemented. This change has lent Ayurveda more support and credibility, helping to elevate it closer to the level of allopathic medicine. Ayurvedic physicians are now professionals who publish papers in well-respected journals, join professional associations, and prescribe commercially manufactured drugs (Leslie 1976:358). This aspect of modern Ayurveda greatly deviates from traditional practices, but is essential to the survival of the system today. By embracing the science, technology, and professionalism of the stronger allopathic system in India and combining it with the principles, religion, and tradition of classic texts, the Ayurvedic system is successfully integrated into the Indian medical system.

Possibilities in the West?

As effective as Ayurveda is in its indigenous role, there are concerns about its introduction to western society. There have been isolated incidents in the United States where Indian folk doctors using "traditional medicines" that had high metal levels have endangered patients, rather than healing them (McElvaine 1990:2213). In contrast, western scientists who have experimented with ancient herbs to determine their therapeutic effectiveness have discovered some beneficial drugs. This process led to the discovery of *Rauwolfia* alkaloids that were introduced to the west as tranquilizers in the mid-1950's (Clarke

1971:366-367). There is definite potential for this medical system, but clearly it also must be handled with care.

One current controversy involving Ayurvedic medicine and western society is the new movement, Maharishi Ayur-Veda. This group was founded by Maharishi Mahesh Yogi, the leader of the Transcendental Meditation movement, who is based both in India and North America. He recognized the potential for Ayurvedic medicine and, with many modifications to the present Indian system, introduced a "Westernized" version. (Sharma *et al.* 1991) to North America.

There are many problems with this system. There is no experimental support for their practices in the West, the treatment and services prescribed by this organization are grossly overpriced, and they have yet to be proven effective. The article summarizing this movement was published in the *Journal of the American Medical Association* (JAMA) (Sharma *et al.* 1991). However the article was brief, and according to Andrew Skolnick, the editor to JAMA, false in many of its claims. Skolnick wrote a response to this initial article refuting Maharishi Ayur-Veda's claims completely (Skolnick 1991). Maharishi Ayur-Veda proposes a modern revival of classical texts in conjunction with allopathic medicine; however, it has been so modified that it is distinct from mainstream Ayurvedic practice and is difficult to evaluate.

Even if this system were completely founded on empirical evidence and more legitimately presented, it would take years to integrate into the western system. The basis of Ayurvedic medicine is in a culture 4,000 years old and in a different hemisphere. The religion, beliefs, and practices of the people are entirely different than those of this continent. Our scientific system is not inclined to accept medical principles that are so fundamentally different from our own.

Medical pluralism once was a possibility in the West, but with the present foundation so clearly and rigidly established, it becomes almost impos-

sible to integrate new ideas that originated elsewhere. Though India adopted western ways, that was a product of duress, not choice.

Considering the growing dissatisfaction with our own medical system, it is time to analyze the medical systems of other ancient cultures. There are increasing complaints from Western patients that the practice of medicine is impersonal and attempts to only cure diseases after they strike rather than promote health and prevention. The Ayurvedic system had an ability to adapt continuously to outside influences, changes in social infrastructure, beliefs, and religion. I am not suggesting the immediate integration of systems such as Ayurveda into our own, for such a concept would be ludicrous. The success of one culture cannot necessarily be translated to another. The thousands of years of evolution of Ayurvedic medicine in India will not be implemented in a matter of years or even decades in North America. Nonetheless, we may have a lot to learn from the analysis of other systems.

Although it is difficult not to examine other cultures ethnocentrically, perhaps with an understanding of the history and nature of other medical systems we can visualize systems such as Ayurvedic medicine in their original context; only then can we appreciate their virtues and hope to incorporate some of them into our own system. Maybe by examining other cultures our faith in our own will simply be strengthened, but our openness to other systems could teach us to foster continued evolution and development through the future, much as the Ayurvedic system has evolved in its 4,000 years of existence.

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Second Sight *Jeremi Roth*

The first grasshopper gave a jump in the neck of the bottle and went out into the water. He was sucked under the whirl by Nick's right leg and came to the surface a little way down stream. He floated rapidly, kicking. In a quick circle, breaking the smooth surface of the water, he disappeared. A trout had taken him.

"Big Two-Hearted River," *The Complete Short Stories of Ernest Hemingway*, p.175

There was no choice at all. There was only the choice of streets to take you back fastest to where you worked.

A Moveable Feast, p.76

Since the 1920's, generation after generation has been simultaneously delighted and horrified by Ernest Hemingway's writing. While the directly sensory, unembroidered qualities of his storytelling create beautiful images, their clarity also illuminates grotesque ones. These two characteristics give his work an almost perverse quality. But there is more to Hemingway's stories than mere clarity of vision. Beyond and beneath the images and yarn-spinning skill, like the landscape suggested by the scattered brushstrokes of an impressionistic painter, lies an animating worldview. It is here, in the deep pools beneath the surface, that the ugliness and beauty of life are reconciled. This reconciliation is born not of hope but of necessity. Abundant filth and unmitigated despair remain forever, but there is life within the abyss: there is nothing to grab to break the fall, but there is a kind of existence on the way down. Hemingway's characters are caught in a world, closely analogous to our own, where all efforts to avoid or even ameliorate suffering prove futile. Everyone goes through the worst of times no matter what he does. But there are those who can give the suffering a meaningful shape, who can by force of will create a domain where they have real power. That domain is rigidly limited, but within it there is an

autonomy available to the powerful. This autonomy is an aesthetic one. Heroes don't fare any better in the end than others, and they can't save themselves or anyone else, but they can create their own rules and win on their own terms, develop incantations that exorcise feelings of helplessness, and create beauty from the chaos they live in.

But though this power is potent, Hemingway's more obvious mission is to articulate the much more potent outside forces that strip men of their usual powers. The sense of despair that his work tends to create results from his systematic assault on all that we normally hold sacred and turn to in times of need. If he creates a realm where man can have real power and make choices that matter, he first convinces us that any other power we thought we might have is a pleasant illusion. "Love," "God," "honour," "comradeship" and other catchwords denoting the absolute are emasculated, and we are powerless to maintain them.

This sense of powerlessness is perhaps the most evident theme in the short stories. The characters in, for example, *In Our Time*, are almost invariably found in situations where they are reduced to undignified, abject helplessness. We are told in the collection's interchapters of the stinking mess Sam Cardinella makes as he is publicly hanged (Ch. XV), of Nick Adams pleading, under fire in a trench in Italy, for salvation by the only power he thinks is left and unrepentantly forsaking it when safety returns (Ch. VII), of him waiting, shot through the spine, for stretcher bearers while the battle continues (Ch. VI), and of Greek peasants in a line with "no end and beginning," "herded" by the cavalry away from their homes (Ch. II). Within the stories themselves, we see Harold Krebs, unable to talk to a girl, afraid of "consequences" ("Soldier's Home"). We see Nick Adams' father and mother in their separate bedrooms, Mr. Adams helplessly pumping the shells from a shotgun after having his bluff called in front of his son by Dick Boulton ("The Doctor and the Doctor's Wife"), and we

are told of Nick as a young child watching the blood drip from the sliced neck of the desperate husband in "Indian Camp." People are portrayed in situations they could not possibly have avoided, where mistakes really cannot make things worse and no strength of character is sufficient to make things better. The forces they are up against are inevitable, unstoppable, and blindly malevolent. Orders come from higher up, letters ending relationships come from across the sea, and the horrors of the past come to mind unbidden.

Despair and helplessness are not unique to the short stories. *The Sun Also Rises* begins with the words of The Preacher of Ecclesiastes, crying that "One generation passeth away, and another generation cometh," the same prophet who proclaimed that all human accomplishments are vanity and vain striving. We see representatives of the "lost generation," Brett and Mike, and are made painfully aware of the vanity of their destructive nihilism, of the fear behind their endless drunks and short-lived romantic trysts. More powerfully, we see the failure and vanity of Jake Barnes' attempted sacraments. He seems to be better off than Brett and Mike in some ways, but beneath the surface he tends to grasp desperately at atonement for something. Baptism does not help him in San Sebastian. In a pointed passage immediately following the bleak parting of ways that occurred after the fiasco of San Fermin, he dives, away from a boy and girl obviously in love, into the clean dark water, swimming to the bottom of the bay, but the raft where they are chatting makes a "dark shadow" even there (235). The Lord's Supper does not help him in Madrid. No amount of bread and wine—three cocktails, five bottles of rioja alta, and a huge dinner with dessert—can atone for anything! "Oh Jake," Brett says, "we could have had such a damned good time together," but all Jake can say is "Yes . . . Isn't it pretty to think so" (243-247).

In *A Farewell to Arms*, a tentative solution to this powerlessness, romantic love, is explored but does not hold up. The time that the lovers, Patrick

Henry and Catherine Barkley, spend together seems to provide a refuge for them. They are able to be together in a hospital, a hotel, and a mountain retreat in a neutral country—all places where the fighting and death cannot seem to reach. The division between love on the one hand and war on the other is strengthened by heavily coded imagery. Carlos Baker has suggested the opposition of the two poles of “home” and “not-home” (Baker, 47) as a kind of Manichean good/evil dichotomy. This dialectical tension seems plausible: the mountains versus the plains, snow versus the rain, the sacred versus the profane, love versus war. More specific oppositions add to the plausibility. Gorizia, where the war is being fought, and where men are wounded and killed, is obviously the antithesis of the hospital in Milan; the retreat with soldiers and whores from the Isonzo seems deliberately juxtaposed to the lovers’ escape to Montreux. These carefully crafted poles seem to point to a comfort zone, a nest in the mountains above war and death. Baker maintains that this imagery forms the basis of a moral infrastructure for the novel (105). A careful reading, however, reveals that the home pole is little better than the not-home one and that the nastiness that Baker sees in the plains is everywhere. We realize that such purity does not exist for Hemingway when we read the passage in which Frederick Henry muses that “Abstract words such as glory, honor, courage or hallow were obscene beside the names of villages, the numbers of roads, the names of rivers, the numbers of regiments and the dates.” Nothing remains pure. The sacred, for instance, is sacred only in defeat. “How would Our Lord have been if Peter had rescued him in the Garden?” asks Henry (178). The price of Salvation is His passion and death. War rages through the mountain ranges between Italy and Austria, oblivious to Baker’s image distinctions. In a more obvious destruction of the home icon, Henry and his soldiers invade homes to steal food. One of the homes they encounter is described in just the way that Baker thinks is reserved for barracks and whorehouses:

Crossing the field, I did not know but that someone would fire on us from the trees near the farmhouse or from the farmhouse itself. I walked toward it, seeing very clearly. The balcony of the second floor merged into the barn and there was hay coming out between the columns. The courtyard was of stone blocks and all the trees were dripping with the rain. (215)

Rain, danger, and disorder surround the home. The war has invaded it. While Baker is right in insisting that the two poles have been deliberately developed, the home pole is not an unsullied sanctuary. Whatever it may have been, it too is deflowered by the war. Even romantic love wears out long before the stillbirth the novel ends with. At the races, before Henry is returned to active duty, while he claims to have been very much in love, he and Catherine wander away from their friends to be alone. But the older Frederick who is the narrator comments dryly on the characters: "After we had been alone awhile we were glad to see the others again" (132). Love, which many have mistakenly seen the book as deifying, frustrates him even in their mountain retreat, where, unwilling to go skiing with other men or do anything besides dote on the very pregnant Catherine, he grows a beard in a half-hearted attempt to maintain his masculinity (298). Without the accoutrements of manliness and virility—a gun and a uniform, both of which he loses on his return to Catherine—he must grasp at appearances. And rain comes even to the mountains, driving them to the valley and to the hospital where Catherine is to die.

This same darkness and despair appear in all Hemingway's works. In *To Have and Have Not*, Harry Morgan, despite his cojones and resourcefulness, loses first his livelihood and then his life to forces greater than he (The Great Depression, the Cuban revolution). In *For Whom the Bell Tolls*, El Sordo is killed not because he makes mistakes, not even because his enemy is more powerful than he is, but because he has the bad luck to make a raid just before it snows. In *Across the River and Into the Trees*, Colonel Cantwell doesn't die of stupidity or because he constantly picks fights, but of natural causes: he dies of a heart

attack. Life is like the swamp Nick Adams wants so much to avoid in "Big Two-Hearted River": bare banks, deep water, unseen currents and overhanging branches that get in the way when you cast. Fishing there is tragic and so is life.

But in "Big Two-Hearted River" (and in life) there is a place where men can make their own rules. No one is powerful enough to bend others to his will, and no one is untouched by the nameless, impersonal and indifferently destructive forces of nature. But some people can filter the information their sensory organs send them, and they can order the images their memory delivers, all by force of will. Nick Adams has a very specific set of rules by which he conducts his trip: he must make camp before he eats, he must eat before he fishes, and he must not touch the fish out of water. There is even a proper way to make the coffee. Only after having strictly adhered to this protocol could he happily think that "He was in his home where he had made it" (167). He cannot do anything about his troubled upbringing or his war wounds or about the way they keep bubbling to the surface when anything unexpected happens, but he can do what he does the 'right' way and for a while keep himself from cracking. It is in these small ways, in strictly adhering to unspoken rules of conduct, in being humane to others under inhumane conditions, that a man can act instead of react. Thus we see the old patron in "A Clean, Well-Lighted Place" portrayed sympathetically, not because he is a successful or happy man, but only because he maintains his dignity. He has nowhere to go and he always gets drunk, but he dresses neatly, always pays for his drinks—and tips—and he never spills them. Parts of the world are always salvageable to those who reach into this realm. The Harry of "The Snows of Kilimanjaro" maintains that "no thing could hurt him if he did not care" (53). We have to care about the right things and stoically accept the dirtiness and pain of the real world. Thus we see Jack Brennan, the boxer of "Fifty Grand," unable to make himself younger or even to get into shape, deliver a tough performance and grit his teeth long enough to return a low blow for a

low blow, go the distance, and win the money he could win only by staying on his feet until the fight is over. Instead of complaining about the crookedness of the sport, he ignored all else and made sure he satisfied himself. Similarly, we see Manuel Garcia of "The Undefeated" following the rules and style of the bullring long after the fight should be over, being horribly injured, and thus earning the right to keep his matador's ponytail. The way things are done is more important than the results they bring. An aesthetic right and wrong replace all previous idols.

The healing effects of this kind of power are more explicitly developed in *The Sun Also Rises*. Jake is a man of considerable physical appetite but of an even more enormous aesthetic appetite. He, like the other members of the inner circle of the novel, possesses a keen eye for beauty. Manifestations of this perceptiveness are everywhere. Early in the book, Count Mippipopoulos, a man Jake the narrator portrays sympathetically despite his involvement with Brett (contrast the treatment Mike and Robert receive), insists that the champagne he has bought must not be used for toasts: "This wine is too good for toast-drinking, my dear. You don't want to mix emotions up with a wine like that. You lose the taste" (59). This kind of reverence for beauty separates the "lost" from the "not-lost." On the trip from Bayonne to San Fermin, we see that this perceptiveness is one of the criteria for admission into the inner circle: Bill and Jake have it while Robert Cohn doesn't.

After a while we came out of the mountains, and there were trees along both sides of the road, and a stream and ripe fields of grain, and the road went on, very white and straight ahead, and then lifted to a little rise, and off on the left was a hill with an old castle, with buildings close around it and a field of grain going right up to the walls and shifting in the wind. I was up in front with the driver and I turned around. Robert Cohn was asleep, but Bill looked and nodded his head. (93)

It is only to those with this kind of perception that the term *aficionado* is given. Only an *aficionado* can truly appreciate the fresh beauty and bravery of Pedro

Romero, the bull-fighting "hero." The killing of the bull is only a necessary denouement to a rigidly defined and glorious performance. A good bull-fighter has a sense of how to do things well and neatly. And it is this attention to proficiency and skill, respect for beauty and grace—knowledge of the way things should be done—that forms order from chaos. As Jake taught Brett about the art of bullfighting, he commented that "it became more something that was going on with a definite end, and less of a spectacle with unexplained horrors" (167). As it is in the ring so it is with life itself. The proficiency of the picadors and the skill of the matadors combine to project beauty in a world where matadors are killed and horses gored. Thus Jake, the man mutilated by a war beyond his control, unable to consummate a romance, carefully wraps his comb in his towel and his fish in ferns, living a richer and more rewarding, if no less tragic, life than the physically unharmed wastrels with whom he consorts.

This attention to the right way to do things vitalizes the fatalism of *A Farewell to Arms*. The only right that remains is to get the job done properly, and the only wrong is to fail to. What people have to do is to do the right thing when they could have done otherwise. The inner circle of *The Sun Also Rises* is replaced here by a natural aristocracy of those who are good at what they do. Rinaldi, Jake's roommate, is certainly no better in his actions than Brett: he is usually drunk, always hopeless, and profane. But because he is an excellent doctor, he deserves a title while Lady Brett Ashley does not. More explicit portrayals of this natural aristocracy can be found. Referring to the doctor who wants to wait six months before he operates, Henry says, "If he was any good he would be made a major" (98). The doctor who eventually operates on him is good, and he is a major. The aging Count Greffi can still win at billiards. The barman at the hotel in Milan is laudable not so much because he helps Henry escape as because he is a good barman: he can find things out, he is courteous, and he provides good service (244-6). The waiter in the restaurant outside the hospital in Switzerland,

on the other hand, spills drinks (315) and refuses to serve what his patron wants (318).

Scattered throughout Hemingway's other works are countless other examples of this aesthetic code. The hunter's code of *Green Hills of Africa* insists not that the hunter be nice to his wife or sportsmanlike with his hunting partner, but only that he kill cleanly (148). To be able to do so, he must (obviously) be a good marksman. If he is, it doesn't matter whether or not he treats his helpers horribly. Harry Morgan is a very good fisherman, even if he isn't a very nice guy. Colonel Cantwell is a very good shot and he certainly didn't get to be a general by being a lousy soldier. He has an awful temper, however. All these characters are able to appropriate part of the world by creating rules in the void or by following implicit, unspoken ones. Their physical powerlessness is coupled with an aesthetic ability to seize the world they live in. This kind of gesture is aptly described in *A Moveable Feast*. Seeing a beautiful girl in a cafe, without touching her, talking to her, or even making eye contact with her, Hemingway can say: "I've seen you beauty, and you belong to me now, whoever you are waiting for and if I never see you again, I thought. You belong to me and all Paris belongs to me and I belong to this notebook and this pencil" (6). We can in this way enter a world where the fact that we may have to break mules' legs and shove them into shallow water to drown ("On the Quai at Smyrna") cannot touch us. The fact that the Republic had to begin with a drunken slaughter (*For Whom the Bell Tolls*, 103) and the fact that "poor boys who [do] not want to die, [will] share the contents of a match box full of gonorrheal pus to produce the infection that [will] keep them from the next murderous frontal attack" (*Across the River*, 59) remain, but their power is only physical. The second sight of the aficionado of beauty does not alleviate pain and suffering at all. His natural sight continues to deliver images of the messiness of the world. Rotten, filthy, and horrifying things will still happen because the world is a

rotten, filthy, and horrible place. Frederick Henry's words strike true when he says:

If people bring so much courage to this world, the world has to kill them to break them, so of course it kills them. The world breaks every one and afterward many are strong at the broken places. But those that will not break it kills. It kills the very good and the very gentle and the very brave impartially. If you are none of these you can be sure it will kill you too but there will be no special hurry (249).

Yet Robert Jordan's words also strike true: "But nobody owned his mind, nor his faculties for seeing and hearing, and if he were going to form judgments he would form them afterwards" (136). We can't protect those we love or even our own bodies, but we can keep our own counsel. We must with resolve and endurance move through the filth and muck, walking, as the patron of "A Clean, Well-Lighted Place" does, "unsteadily but with dignity" (290). If we do, we can create and defend, as living artists, a small realm where the ugliness that is allowed to enter is powerless against the beauty that lives there.

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